Workers of the World: International Journal on Strikes and Social Conflicts, Vol. 1 No. 9 by Strikes and Social Conflicts International Association
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Workers of the World - International Journal on 
Strikes and Social Conflict Partnerships 
5-2018 
Workers of the World: International Journal on Strikes and Social 
Conflicts, Vol. 1 No. 9 
Strikes and Social Conflicts International Association 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/wotw 
 Part of the Collective Bargaining Commons, International and Comparative Labor Relations Commons, 
and the Unions Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Partnerships at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Workers of the World - International Journal on Strikes and Social Conflict by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Workers of the World: International Journal on Strikes and Social Conflicts, Vol. 1 
No. 9 
Keywords 
Strikes and Social Conflicts International Association, strikes, workers rights, labor movement, unions 
Disciplines 
Collective Bargaining | International and Comparative Labor Relations | Unions 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Strikes and Social Conflicts International Association, Reprinted with special permission of the 
publisher. All rights reserved. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/wotw/9 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LETTER FROM THE EDITOR	  
INTRODUCTION: TRADE UNIONS IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATIONERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.	  
JOSÉ BABIANO AND JAVIER TÉBAR	  
INFORMAL ECONOMY, LABOUR AND TRADE UNION EXPERIENCES IN INDIA 
AND NIGERIA ............................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
UBALDO MARTINEZ VEIGA 
CHINA AND VIETNAM: THE TRANSITION FROM “OFFICIAL” TO “REAL” 
UNIONISM .................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.	  
ISIDOR BOIX AND FERNANDO ROCHA  
BRAZILIAN TRADE UNIONISM FACES NEOLIBERAL CAPITALISM – 
ALLIANCES AND DISPUTES BETWEEN CUT AND FORÇA SINDICAL (1990-
2015) ............................................................ ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.	  
PATRÍCIA VIEIRA TRÓPIA AND DAVISSON C. CANGUSSU DE SOUZA 
THE TRAJECTORY OF THE CHILEAN LABOUR MOVEMENT DURING THE 
GOVERNMENTS OF THE CONCERTACIÓN. FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON 
STRIKE SUBCONTRACTORS OF CODELCO, 1990-2010ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.	  
RODRIGO ARAYA GÓMEZ  
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE CRISIS IN FRENCH UNIONISM? A READING 
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MODELS OF PRODUCTIONERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.	  
JOSÉ-ANGEL CALDERÓN  
TRADE UNION RENEWAL AND RESPONSES TO NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE 
POLITICS OF AUSTERITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE CURIOUS 
INCUBATION OF THE POLITICAL IN LABOUR REALATIONSERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.	  
MIGUEL MARTÍNEZ LUCIO  
IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON ASSOCIATIVE RESOURCES OF TRADE 
UNIONISM. THE SPANISH CASE STUDY ...... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.	  
PERE J. BENEYTO  
 
*** 
 
MISCELANIA 
 
FROM PEAK TO TROUGH: SWEDISH STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN THE FIRST 
HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1983 ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.	  
JESPER HAMARK  
 
*** 
ABSTRACTS 
 
 
 Letter from the editor 
his issue of Workers of the World comes out after an interruption of one 
year, for which we want to apologize most of all the organizers of its dossier 
and the authors who have contributed with articles. We hope it won’t 
happen again, and the upcoming IV Conference of the International 
Association on Strikes and Social Conflicts to be held in São Paulo, Brazil, 
between 10 and 13 July 2018 will certainly make the necessary 
arrangements to guarantee its continuity. 
 
Issue no. 9 of Workers of the World had as guest editors José Babiano, from 
Fundación 1o de Mayo, Spain, and Javier Tébar, from Universitat Autònoma 
de Barcelona – Fundació Cipriano García, who organized a dossier on 
“trade unionism in the era of globalisation” – whose contents are thoroughly 
explained in the Introduction. In this issue we also include an article by 
Jesper Hamark, from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, which 
analyses the remarkable transition in the Swedish labour market in the first 
half of the last century: from wide-ranging militancy to quiescence. 
 
Our next issue will include a dossier, coordinated by Marcelo Badaró 
Mattos, from Universidade Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and 
Rana Behal, from the University of Delhi, India,  on “Capitalism, unfree 
labour and forms of resistance”. This dossier will accept contributions 
which analyse the various forms of labour exploitation marked by 
compulsion and/or “unfreedom”, from the sixteenth century to the present, 
as well as studies of corresponding modalities of resistance and revolt. 
 
Workers of the World is the journal of the International Association Strikes 
and Social Conflicts. 
Articles for Workers of the World should be sent to the executive editor at 
workersoftheworld2012@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
António Simões do Paço  
Executive Editor
T 
  
  
Introduction: Trade unions in the era of globalisation 
José Babiano
1
 and Javier Tébar
2
 
 
 
he crisis of Fordism, understood as a method of capitalist regulation, led 
to the emergence of a new paradigm in the late 1970s and early 1980s: 
globalised capitalism. It is not that globalisation is a new phenomenon in the 
history of capitalism, given that capitalist development tends to extend 
beyond the borders of the nation state. However, globalised capitalism 
occupies a specific period in historical terms. We shall observe some of its 
principal features.  
A central characteristic of globalisation is deregulation; deregulation of the 
movements of goods and capital as well as the deregulation of labour. 
Deregulation is not a natural phenomenon, as if a storm had struck or night 
had fallen suddenly; it is the result of a specific type of intervention by 
governments and international bodies, one that is often alien to democracy. 
It leaves states without the capacity to act in many aspects of economic life. 
In this way, deregulation appears as re-regulation.  
Moreover, globalised capitalism is characterised by the primacy of financial 
capital over manufacturing and services. This has generated a type of 
speculative capitalism, which is often described as “casino capitalism” and 
whose proliferation produced the international economic crisis of 2007. In 
addition to the hegemony of finance, North America and Europe underwent 
a process of deindustrialisation. Of course, this did not spell the end for 
                                                 
1
 Fundación 1º de Mayo. 
2
 Fundació Cipriano García. 
T 
Introduction: Trade unions in the era of globalisation 7 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 9, May 2018, p. 6-11 
 
manufacturing but created new industrial locations in peripheral and semi-
peripheral countries within the global capitalist system. 
 Overall, the story of globalised capitalism – this contemporary phase 
of capitalism – is also the story of privatisation. Initially, major state 
companies in strategic industries like gas, oil, iron and steel, metal or 
electricity were privatised. They were followed by services: health, 
education etc., which have been targeted by private business.  
 Less industry and an increasingly smaller public sector has 
inevitably affected the working class. First, in the field of employment, 
remembering that Fordist industry made great use of the workforce. The 
result is the end of full employment. Second, labour has been affected in 
terms of contracts and employment protection as both big industry and the 
public sector were strongly regulated in Fordist capitalism. Here, there has 
been a weakening of individual and collective employment rights. Thirdly, 
it has affected trade unions, given that the organisation of workers has been 
eroded as a result of these processes.  
The deregulation of labour was presented as something flexible. From the 
ideological standpoint, this description is an attempt to show deregulation as 
a modern, positive phenomenon in the face of supposedly obsolete and 
inefficient rigidity. However, the legal modifications introduced in the name 
of flexibility have, primarily, not only reduced workers’ employment rights 
but also restricted their bargaining power and eroded their social position.  
Thus, changes in legislation in the core countries of the capitalist system 
have led to the rise of atypical forms of recruitment, as in the case of 
temporary and part-time employment. This has gone hand in hand with the 
limitation of rights such as access to subsequent unemployment benefits and 
pensions. Similarly, states have promoted the individualisation of industrial 
relations, rather than the regulatory power of collective bargaining. They 
have also replaced the employment relationship for the commercial one, 
promoting the mode of freelance and self-employed work. It would seem 
that there is a trend towards convergence with the working conditions of the 
new industrial enclaves, where deregulation, very low wages and feeble 
self-organisation of labour in the workplace also prevail. 
Consequently, trade unions have been hit in Europe and North America by a 
loss of members, a decline in bargaining capacity and an erosion of social 
power. But beyond the effects of the changes in working processes and in 
the composition of the working class, trade unions have been affected by a 
direct assault from the neoliberal governments that have attempted to 
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minimise their activities through legislation and political campaigns. This 
has placed global trade unionism at a crossroads. 
Moreover, the deep-rootedness of globalised capitalism has represented a 
global political victory, which was capped by the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the end of the USSR. In political and cultural terms, this triumph of 
capitalism has been translated into the hegemony of neoliberalism. This 
cultural hegemony is so powerful that it has corroded the left itself, which 
has been in retreat, with the exception of Latin America up to now. 
It is from this scenario that we have undertaken an analysis of trade 
unionism after having received an invitation from the editorial team of 
Workers of the World to prepare a monographic dossier on trade unions. We 
are historians by trade, but we regard the study of trade unions in the present 
context of globalisation as being of the utmost urgency. Unions now 
represent the last line of defence for workers in the face of capitalism’s 
imperial victory. We acknowledge that this type of study is not easy in a 
context in which academic research has also been culturally contaminated 
by neoliberalism. The analysis of the world of work and workers’ 
organisations has become a very minor concern. Moreover, we have 
witnessed the introduction of approaches of a post-materialist type and these 
are often in line with neoliberal hegemony. 
We would like to thank Workers of the World for its invitation and extend 
our gratitude to the colleagues whose articles have made this issue of the 
journal possible. Of course, it can rightly be said that it is incomplete and 
even ethnocentric to the extent that it includes as many as three articles on 
EU countries. However, we feel satisfied that the final result – which is 
always within the framework of globalisation capitalism and the hegemony 
of neoliberalism – provides a variety of interesting cases. Moreover, the 
articles also respond to plural methodological approaches. Compare, for 
example, the narrative perspective employed by Trópia and Souza in their 
work on Brazil with the statistically-anchored argument on the Spanish case 
offered to us by Beneyto. Our desire for diversity is displayed by the fact 
that the dossier contains works on trade union experiences in Asia, Africa, 
Latin America and Europe. 
Consequently, we present work on countries that occupy different positions 
in the European Union, like the United Kingdom, France and Spain. We 
also include examples of emerging countries such as China, India and Brazil. 
There are two cases from Latin America: Chile and Brazil itself. Similarly, 
we have paid attention to “Communist” countries whose markets have been 
penetrated by their own state and party apparatus, like Vietnam and China 
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once again. Finally, the dossier includes two classic examples of the 
informal economy: Nigeria and, again, India. 
It is generally believed that trade unionism can only develop in the contexts 
of economic and social regulation. However, Martinez Veiga’s text 
proposes two case studies on union action in the scenario of the informal 
economy. Initially, he elucidates the concept of the informal economy itself 
from a theoretical point of view, explaining that this is not a marginal sector 
of the capitalist economy. He then goes on to study two trade union 
experiences from India and Nigeria respectively. The former concerns a 
trade union organised by women who make cigarettes, while the latter looks 
at the actions of a typical guild in decline, that of tailors. What is interesting 
about the cases is that both these female and male workers direct their action 
at the government, rather than at their employers. 
Meanwhile, Rocha and Boix analyse two singular cases in Vietnam and 
China. These are two countries inserted into the global market and 
globalisation but which have Communist regimes. Here, the state and the 
Communist Party have restored the market. In both countries, there are 
official trade unions, which are subordinate to the Party although it is true 
that in Vietnam the right to strike is recognised – despite its limitations – 
and there is a less repressive atmosphere there than in China. An industrial 
proletariat is growing in both countries as a result of the surge in 
manufacturing and stoppages and strikes have occurred at industrial plants. 
These phenomena place the official apparatus, especially in the case of the 
Chinese unions, in difficulties insofar as they cannot integrate them. A 
dilemma then appears. We do not know yet whether in the future the official 
unions – or significant tendencies within them – will be capable of escaping 
from the party’s tutelage and genuinely represent the interests of workers. 
The other possibility is that mobilisation and organisation into workshops 
will give rise to the emergence from the grass roots of new autonomous 
types of trade unions that, one way or another, could break with the 
apparatus of the regime.  
A very different case, that of a major emerging country, is Brazil. Analysed 
here by Souza and Tropia, who focus on the Brazilian trade union 
movement’s stance in the face of neoliberal policies in which neoliberalism 
is regarded as a stage of capitalism –which, in essence, we have termed 
globalised capitalism. Examining a period that opens with Collor de Mello’s 
government in 1990, the authors believe that petista governments have 
largely continued with neoliberal policies. Within this framework, they 
analyse the direction of the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT- 
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Unified Workers’ Central), which is closely linked to the PT (the Brazilian 
Worker’s Party) and Força Sindical (Trade Union Force), which is openly 
pro-capitalist. Until the arrival of Lula’s government, the CUT’s stance was 
always anti-governmental, as opposed to Força Sindical. With the PT in 
government, the CUT lent its support. However, when the government 
began to take unpopular measures, the CUT’s position was compromised 
and was decided through mobilisations. 
Rodrigo Araya provides an interpretation of the evolution of the Chilean 
trade union movement during the current democratic period, which 
commenced in 1990 as the country embarked on its particular political 
transition. With his analysis focusing especially on the action of the Central 
Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT- Unitary Workers’ Central), Araya 
examines the dynamics that were established between the adoption of a 
framework of social dialogue and the debate produced by labour reforms 
over this period. He argues that the CUT’s evolution went through an initial 
stage of collaboration with the government and then shifted with the 
adoption of a critical stance with regard to the neoliberal model. This path 
led to an internal crisis in the union as the problems of adaptation to the new 
context manifested themselves. However, in the 21st century, the trade 
union movement and other social actors were instrumental in the 
maintaining of protests with a view to making the democracy more inclusive. 
This helped the CUT to become a reference point in the opposition to 
neoliberalism, which in this case meant questioning the legacy of an 
incomplete transition. 
The crisis of contemporary trade unionism in France is addressed by José-
Angel Calderon. Membership rates of French unions are the lowest in the 
OECD, but it is also true that French trade unionism has never been 
characterised historically as a mass phenomenon and this has its own 
explanation. However, debate on this in France, both on the right and the 
left, has been reduced to “excessive” union institutionalisation and marked 
by the paradox in which the loss in numbers and low membership contrasts 
with a progressive implementation in companies and administrations. For 
this reason, Calderon raises the need to again take up the analysis of the 
institutionalisation of the wage relationship from the perspective of 
production models. This analysis leads him to argue that it is not so much 
the institutionalisation of French trade unionism that might explain its crisis 
as the deinstitutionalisation of the wage relationship in the context of the 
individualisation of industrial relations and the casualisation of the labour 
market.  
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Miguel Martínez Lucio looks at the British case. The country is undoubtedly 
the mould for the neoliberal policies introduced since the 1980s – and 
subsequently adopted by other states – whose consequences in a new state 
regulation of the individualisation of collective rights directly affected the 
heart of the British trade union movement. The author proposes a multilevel 
analysis of its causes and consequences. He also raises the need for new 
approaches to social protest, which take into account both the expression of 
new forms of conflict and the building of alliances by the trade unions. The 
difficult context of trade union policy in the UK is marked, in his view, by 
the problems of an unbalanced trade union “revitalisation” and a lack of 
social support. The analysis of these two aspects leads him to conclude that 
isolation is now the major challenge that British trade unionism has to 
overcome. 
We conclude the dossier with an article on Spain by Beneyto. The country’s 
trade union model is distinct from the British one within the EU as a whole. 
Furthermore, it is a southern country. This means that workers have endured 
a harsh austerity programme since 2010. This has produced an exponential 
growth in unemployment, cuts in essential public services like health and 
education, a lowering of wages and, last but not least, a harassment of the 
unions by the political, economic and media powers unprecedented since the 
post-Franco political transition. Beneyto’s study enables us through a series 
of indicators to observe how Spanish trade unions have responded to this set 
of difficulties. 
We believe, in the final analysis, that this dossier on trade unions in the era 
of globalisation offers a varied set of cases in different regions of the planet. 
It provides us with an approach to the direction that the union movement has 
taken during this most recent stage of capitalism. 
  
 
Informal economy, labour and trade union experiences in 
India and Nigeria 
Ubaldo Martinez Veiga 
 
 
he clear notion and the designation of the term “informal economy” first 
appeared in a 1973 article by the already famous Keith Hart.
1
 As a result, 
everyone thinks that Hart was the social scientist/anthropologist who 
discovered the phenomenon. He was referring to what was designated as the 
general and informal activities to obtain resources. The distinction between 
one type of work and the other is that “informal” is self-employment or 
freelance work while formal work is paid work. The fundamental variable 
that serves to distinguish between formal and informal work depends on the 
degree of work rationalization. If there is recruitment on a regular basis, and 
this is more or less permanent, with fixed remuneration, this would be a job 
that is located in the formal economic sector. The rest would be confined to 
the informal one, characterised by self-employment without permanence, 
either in the traditional urban sector or belonging to the reserve of the under-
employed or unemployed.  
Hart proposed a basic question: does the reserve army of the unemployed 
constitute a passive and exploited majority, or, on the contrary, are informal 
activities able to generate growth in the resources of the urban or rural poor. 
In the first place, one should stress that Hart was obliquely proposing the 
idea of the informal sector based on observations of Marx regarding the 
reserve army of workers, as set out with great clarity and depth, in the first 
                                                 
1
 HART, K. “Informal Income Employment Opportunities and Urban Employment in 
Ghana”. The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol.11, n.1, 1973, pp. 61-89. 
T 
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volume of Capital. Here it is important to underline what the Jamaican 
Nobel Prize winner Arthur Lewis said in 1954.
2
 He published a famous 
article, in which he observed that neoclassical economics was based on the 
premise of a fixed job offer. In contrast to this, and on the basis of 
observations about the so-called Third World, Lewis raised the question of 
the “infinite elasticity of work.” The source of this elasticity can easily be 
seen under the guise of unemployment among small farmers in a dozen 
overpopulated countries. Other elements would be on one hand, 
unemployment originating from the implementation of technology. 
According to Marx, this was enough to create an increasing work surplus 
and, on the other hand, underemployment in urban areas was what began to 
be called the informal sector. This term in general context must consider 
women leaving the household to join the labour market, and the population 
growth rate, which becomes a dominant factor. In this way, with a growth 
rate of 3% per annum, the labour supply becomes very elastic.  
Lewis proposed a model of economic growth based on two sectors: a so-
called traditional sector and a modern one. In Lewis’ terminology, that 
means a subsistence sector and a capitalist one. In the subsistence sector, a 
labour surplus is located with zero productivity or even a negative one, and 
is made up of agriculture as well as small trade, domestic work and the 
entire set of casual jobs, such as manufacturing furniture, bringing young 
people to throw themselves at people to carry their luggage or purchases, etc. 
In contrast to this sector, there was the modern capitalist one, where workers 
would be employed to the point at which their marginal product would be 
equal to their salary. As can be seen, the distinction between the formal and 
informal sectors of the economy was already present and explained by 
Lewis in 1954.
3
 
Without delving too much into terminological debates, we can say that the 
distinction between Hart’s formal and informal sector is based on the 
analysis of the type of work that occurs in each. On the other hand, the 
authors using the ILO approaches insist, at the beginning, on the 
characteristics of the companies. In this context, the viewpoints of 
                                                 
2
 LEWIS, A. “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour”, The 
Manchester School. Vol. 22, n.2, May 1954, pp. 139-191. 
3
 Ibid. 
Mazumdar were published,
4
 although they do not follow either of these 
tendencies. According to this author: 
the basic distinction between the two sectors is that in the formal sector, 
work is somehow protected, in such a way that the level of wages and 
working conditions are not open to job seekers unless they are able to cross 
a certain barrier to entry. This type of protection can stem from the actions 
of trade unions, governments or both acting together.
5
   
Mazumdar starts here from an idea which seemed more evident at the time 
than it is now. This was when entry into informal labour was thought to be 
practically free, whereas formal work presented some barriers that had to be 
overcome. Today it is thought that the free entrance to informal work is a 
chimera. However, it is important to note that formal employment is 
regulated and protected by the state, while informal work is not. Mazumdar 
said something about this here that in the 1990s would become the 
canonical notion of the informal sector. Feige says that the informal sector 
includes “all actions of economic agents that do not follow the established 
institutional laws whose protection is denied.”6 
In 1989, Castells and Portes had already offered a definition of the informal 
sector of the economy as “all the activities that generate resources and are 
not regulated by the state in social environments where similar activities are 
regulated.” 7  These two definitions say something quite similar to what 
Mazumdar raised well before, and, anyway, seem to be a good starting point 
for the study of the informal sector that will be proposed in this paper. 
However, my analysis will not stop solely at defining the object of study. In 
this way, other aspects of theoretical analysis that respond to current 
approaches will be analysed in order to question some of the ideas that have 
become a kind of dogma. 
                                                 
4
 MAZUMDAR, D. The Urban Informal Sector, World Bank Staff. Working Paper 211, 
Washington DC, 1975; MAZUMDAR, D. The Urban Labour Market and Income 
Distribution. A Study of Malaysia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981. 
5
 MAZUMDAR, D. The Urban Informal Sector. Op.Cit., p.1. 
6
 FEIGE, E.  “Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economics: The New 
Institutional Approach”. World Development. Vol.18, n.13, 1990, pp. 989-1002. 
7
 CASTELLS M. & PORTES, A. “World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics and Effects 
of the Informal Economy”. In: CASTELLS M.; PORTES, A & BENTON, L. (eds.) The 
Informal Economy. Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1989. 
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As is well known, the idea of the informal sector raised by Hart was based 
on the analysis of some African phenomena. All this had a rationale because, 
instead of diminishing or disappearing before the liberalization processes, in 
later years, informal economic activity had actually increased in the 
developing world, especially in Africa. In accordance with the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), Sub-Saharan Africa is the “most informalised 
region” of the world, with 75% of the non-agricultural workforce working 
in informal jobs. This informality rose to 90% in certain parts of West Africa, 
the area which Hart studied.
8
 
Neoliberal policies aimed to remove the incentives for the informal sector. 
In spite of this, informality has become an essential aspect of the life 
systems of the people, obtaining urban services and developing associative 
life through it. Analysis of what is happening in some parts of Africa is not 
an attempt to assert that informal economic activity does not take place in 
the countries of the so-called developed world. Both Lenin in Imperialism, 
The Highest Stage of Capitalism,
9
 and Rosa Luxemburg in The 
Accumulation of Capital
10
 showed that as the class struggle managed to 
increase wages, Europeans in the early twentieth century forced the 
capitalists and European workers to supply the raw materials obtained by a 
cheap, flexible and informal workforce of workers in the so-called Third 
World. They also obtained manufactured goods and services. The imperialist 
power structures ensured that informal workers accounted for the costs of 
the informal economy of manufacturing, production and reproduction of 
work, while not receiving the benefits of minimum wages, and working at 
home to eliminate wage increases. Informal work served capital, both in 
central and peripheral countries, to offer an alternative to halt the expansion 
of the formal working class that was much more expensive. 
In recent years, the problems created by the financial crisis and the 
disillusionment with the agenda of good governance, have brought with 
                                                 
8
 ILO. Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture. Geneva, 2002. 
9
 LENIN, V.I. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. In V.I. Lenin, Selected Works. 
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963, Vol. 1, pp. 667-766. 
10
 LUXEMBURG, R. The Accumulation of Capital. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1951. 
 
them a rethinking of the informal economy in development processes. There 
is a tendency to forget that the informal economy has to disappear and an 
attempt to raise the problem of the possible cooperative interaction between 
the formal and informal economy; instead of the problem of the elimination 
or absorption of the second by the first there appears to be a shift towards an 
interactive collaboration between the two: a hybrid governance, or 
informal/formal interaction. There is a trend among governments and 
development agencies to show the energy of the informal economy, its 
institutions and its system of service provision. 
Relations between formal and informal work  
The essential question posed by Hart is the possibility that the reserve army 
of the unemployed and those who work in the informal economy are no 
more than an amorphous mass that is passive and exploited, or if, on the 
contrary, these informal activities have the potential to generate resources 
and growth in the income of the poor or in the economy in general. Another 
related problem relates to whether informal activities offer independent 
potential for economic growth and development, independently of what 
happens to a certain extent in the formal sector.  
As you can see, there are three different problems. First, the question is 
whether informal workers are a passive or amorphous mass. That is to say, 
an entity without organization, the only chance left is to be exploited to the 
end or whether, on the contrary, it is a social class. The most basic character 
of social class is that it is an entity that is not quite chaotic and has an 
internal organization. The second issue concerns the relationship between 
formal and informal work or the formal and informal economy. You can ask 
if the only destination of the informal economy is to become part of or be 
replaced by the formal economy. Finally, the problem that arises is if one 
considers informal work to be somewhat dysfunctional or backward, or if, 
on the contrary, this is an organization that works and is in the direction of 
the evolution of societies, especially African ones. 
The first problem has an erroneous answer, insofar as one can say that it 
may be possible that informal workers are an amorphous mass. This is 
frequently affirmed without detailed analysis: when using the term 
disorganized work, or work in the informal, unorganized sector is 
contradictory. First, one cannot agree with this idea because all work, which 
is not pure and strictly individual, is organized, and, often, when speaking of 
disorganized work, this is because no analysis has been conducted.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, it was thought that given the magmatic 
character of work and the informal economy it was impossible to consider 
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that informal work was unionized. At present, however, there are an 
increasing number of cases of informal workers who belong to their own 
unions. In fact, this is present in both cases we studied. Perhaps one may say 
that the unions appeared due to the influx of informal workers from the 
formal sector. However, as seen by the characteristics of the informal 
workers’ unions, these differ from the formal ones and the former do not 
allow themselves to be subjugated by the latter, trying to defend their 
autonomy. 
Some authors nowadays refer to Africa in particular when they affirm that 
informal work is so extensive and the area of formal work is so small that it 
makes no sense to talk of the informal sector. This is the position of Kate 
Meagher who claims that the informal economy has become so extensive 
that it has produced the collapse of the “informality paradigm.”11 A similar 
affirmation is made by Keith Hart who claims that “when most of the 
economy is informal, the usefulness of the category becomes 
questionable.”12 Although the realm of formal work may be more reduced 
than the informal one, this does not mean that informal work is irrelevant. 
From this point of view, it is very interesting to emphasize that when 
discussing the informal work of women in India, (the second case), the 
workers insist that their activities are their job and really represent work. 
James Ferguson puts it gracefully stating that in South Africa “I will suggest 
that the picture that emerges from ethnographic research in Southern Africa 
suggests that the more fundamental characteristic of the ragtag livelihoods 
that support more and more of the region’s population is that they are almost 
unbelievably precarious and insecure and that those who navigate them 
manage to avoid the worst only through a continual process of flexible 
improvisation.”13 
A case analysis from India: Cigarette manufacturers at home and the 
union struggle 
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To understand the organization of informal labour, an example from India 
may be proposed. In this case, they are women workers who work in the 
informal sector of the economy. It is estimated that less than 8% of the total 
labour force in India belongs to the formal sector. Therefore, more than 92%, 
(350 million people of 400 million), work in the informal sector. This is due 
to the fact that labour legislation is not enforced, but also mainly because 
the laws are inappropriate.
14
  
One of the fundamental problems that makes it very difficult to organize 
women workers in the informal sector is that the law that prevents the 
dismissal of workers belonging to trade unions has no applicability to those 
who work in the informal sector. Another negative factor is the extreme 
discrimination against women and girls that, as is well known, begins before 
birth. The problems are even more complicated for homeworkers, mostly 
women. This status of workers was not even recognized, until very recently 
in Spain. Hensman carried out an analysis of the production of bidis, (a type 
of cigarette rolled in India which are cut and packaged in homes by 
women).
15
 The production of cigarettes was carried out in factories until 
1970. Then they were closed and began to be produced in homes. In 1967, a 
law was introduced that applied the employer-employee relationship to the 
producers of bidis. In Hyderabad, capital for a few years of the state of 
Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, a trade union of bidis producers composed 
exclusively of women was established. The first struggle was to be 
recognized as workers. When researchers began to analyse the situation of 
women workers in the city, it was discovered that government statistics 
recognized only a hundred women working. When the government was 
forced to release accurate statistics, it was discovered that the number of 
women workers was 10,000. The union was organized in 1987 and by 1994 
the number of women who belonged to the union was 5,000. 
It must be emphasized that the goal of recognition as workers was central. 
This may seem irrelevant, but in interviews with the women it appeared to 
be one of the most important goals to achieve: the recognition of the 
category as workers. This recognition was listed with the request to obtain a 
document, where it recognized that the women in question were endorsed as 
a category of worker. This was an important element in the establishment of 
the identity of the worker as an integral part of a social class. As stated very 
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well by Rina Agarwala: “This identity emphasizes that these workers in the 
informal sector see themselves as belonging to this class as an aid to 
legitimize themselves as valid citizens, not as an antithesis to capital.”16 It 
must be borne in mind that the requirement of providing a carnet (workers’ 
identity booklet) was proposed to the employers that, according to the law, 
they were obliged to provide. However, very few employers complied with 
this obligation.
17
 It is interesting to emphasize that women workers began a 
protracted struggle against the government to achieve this proof of 
employment. Before this request sustained by the fight, the government 
gave them, in the first place, a “carnet of social services,” (Welfare booklet), 
and subsequently an identity carnet as a worker. The carnet of social 
services gave them the right to maternity benefits and help with school for 
their children. There were also problems of a domestic nature. Many of the 
husbands beat the women, and at other times they had a lot of opposition 
from the family itself to be able to join the trade union. While sometimes 
women deviated from their union activities, other women often appeared 
who with the help of the same trade union lobbied the husbands to enable 
them to take an active part in the union. These data indicate that workers in 
the informal sector, far from being unorganized, a species of magma, were 
very well organized in trade unions or at other times in Non-Governmental 
Organizations. 
This was a working-class organization of an informal nature. This class 
organization implied recognition of the status of workers that was 
manifested in an identification card with the workers’ data. It is important to 
underline that this booklet was acquired by the workers, not with the help of 
the employers or as the result of a confrontation with them, but by means of 
a confrontation or petition to the state that in the end was the one that 
awarded it. In the final analysis, the carnet became very important in the 
creation of a class identity. This demonstrates something very important that 
has been underlined by many authors.
18
 In India, the formal workers 
considered employers responsible for the welfare of the workers and in this 
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case the labour rights flowed, as in all the other capitalist countries, from a 
requirement or confrontation between the employees and employers, which 
is what gave a class character to the formal workers. 
The problem is that the informal workers did not have a stable employer, 
and, often, the subcontracting processes were so complex that it was not 
known who the employer really was. In addition, the lack of a stable 
employer often meant that they were also not provided with safety in the 
workplace nor allowed the right to strike. For this reason, the informal 
workers tended to defend the responsibility for their well-being at the state 
level. Hence, the informal workers changed their demands or requirements 
from the rights of the workers like minimum wages, safety in the workplace 
and the disappearance of contract work. These demands or requirements that 
some authors designate with the term of “economicist” problems,19 are those 
which are generally carried out by formal workers. Although workers in the 
informal sector were also fighting for these rights, they often dispensed with 
them because of their particular situation. It seemed impossible to fight for 
the rights of workers in the workplace where this does not exist or for the 
disappearance of contract work when there is no other. This entailed that 
workers in the informal sector raised their fight against the state, (which is 
also a class struggle), to improve the household well-being. This 
improvement meant access to education, health, social security, aid for 
housing, etc. These claims or demands were carried out by the state 
authorities, leaving employers aside and in this way avoiding the influence 
of liberal, or rather, neo-liberal reforms.  
It is very important to understand the relevance of what occurred in this case. 
There were three very important changes in the configuration and 
performance of these informal workers as a class. First, they raised their 
demands at the state level rather than with their employers. Second, they 
changed the goals they were trying to achieve with the demands towards the 
objectives of welfare rather than strictly labour rights. The third has to do 
with the methods used to change their situation, namely traditional strikes or 
protests, but the use of their power as voters demanded responsibility and 
state obligations with respect to social consumption and reproduction not 
only of informal workers but ultimately of society as a whole. Informal 
workers defined their worker identity as a class, not as an antithesis to 
capital, but as a means of becoming a citizen with basic rights. Somehow, 
you could say that the struggles for basic human rights are also the rights of 
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workers. This goes against the viewpoint that informal work is a whole 
magmatic and confusing area, because workers in this sector were not 
politically organized and did not work in the capitalist economy. Yet 
informal workers’ organizations, (trade unions), gained an identity that 
constituted informal work as a distinct class. It is a class that does not 
possess the means of production. The workers acted at the margins of state 
jurisdiction and created an identity that connected them with the state 
through their needs of consumption or, in other words, through their 
expenses of reproduction. 
An African case analysis: the tailors’ trade unions of Nigeria 
From the African case to be analysed, I aim to shed light on the second 
question previously proposed: whether the relationship between formal and 
informal labour consists in that informal work is subsumed in the formal 
economy, or whether, on the contrary, it remains within a certain and 
relative union of the two sectors, being present as an autonomous, although 
obviously also relative, informal type of work. 
The example we are going to bring up refers to a fundamental activity in 
Nigeria. This is of tailoring which has great importance in quantitative and 
qualitative terms. Nigeria was formerly a significant exporter of cocoa, palm 
oil and other agricultural products. The massive production of oil has 
replaced agriculture. The centralization of the control of this product has 
generated a thriving middle class. Perhaps because of the influence of what 
is called the “resource curse” of oil, the manufacturing sector, which was 
large and important, collapsed. Between the various sectors, textiles were of 
very great importance. More than 60,000 unionized workers were employed 
in the mid-twentieth century with large factories in cities in the north and in 
the coastal town of Lagos. However, these numbers have now decreased by 
two-thirds. The collapse has been the result of the liberalization of the 
foreign market favoured by the World Bank and the IMF. This favoured the 
massive importation of textiles from China and India. However, spinning, 
weaving and stamping have given rise to major companies in Nigeria. 
Tailors are also very important because they provide the vast majority of all 
kinds of dresses that are sold in the country. 
They are not retailers, but the tailors who produced and sold dresses did so 
in such a way that almost the only competition they had was the sale of 
imported used clothing wholesale from Europe, where it is often obtained as 
if for charity when it is something to be sold. Tailors in Nigeria work as self-
employed producers who carry their products to final markets. They may 
have one or more apprentices and almost never have paid employees. They 
rarely operate as cooperatives. In Lagos and elsewhere in Nigeria, the tailors 
were organized into associations. This was taking place in markets where a 
system of guilds functioned, dating back to pre-colonial times. Tailors 
created their professional associations which were inserted into guilds, 
many of which are older ones. These associations are very important for 
maintaining their professional “standards” and of regulating the skills that 
the apprentices have to acquire. These guilds and associations became trade 
unions, without ceasing to be guilds and associations. It is a Union, the 
Union of Nigerian Tailors or NUT, to which another must be added, which 
appeared in 2010, the Federation of Informal Workers of Nigeria or FIWON. 
They are unions of informal workers. Another two unions must be added to 
these, which “in principle” are made up of formal workers: the Nigeria 
Labour Congress (NLC) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC). 
Taking this into account, it is possible to understand the week-long strike 
which involved a huge mobilization of workers in the informal economy in 
protest against the rise in oil prices. The tailors played a central role in the 
mobilizations. Although Nigeria is one of the largest oil producers in the 
world, there were no refineries in the country at that time. This brought oil 
imports to represent big business for a set of Nigerian companies.
20
 All this 
took place despite the fact that the price of oil was regulated in such a way 
that it was cheaper than in the world market. This difference in the price had 
been of great concern to some international agencies present in Nigeria, 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. They claimed 
that the local price of oil had to be adjusted to world market prices to avoid 
any type of distortion in the use of local resources. This was called the 
liberalization of the oil trade. 
In 2011, a rise in oil prices on the world market took place, bringing with it 
what groups within the country were calling for: the deletion of the 
“subsidy.” However, most of the people in Nigeria strongly defended the 
stipulated oil prices. Indeed, it was considered the only help from the federal 
government for the people. In addition, among other things, social services 
had deteriorated considerably after independence. On the other hand, the 
harmonization of oil prices with respect to the world market would bring the 
“huge benefit” of liberalization. In our case, the tailors were at odds because 
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harmonization was not really a creation of harmony but the vulgar and 
simple increase of the oil prices that would lead in turn to an increase of the 
production costs of the tailors’ work and an even greater increase in “energy 
poverty in the homes.” We cannot forget that small tailors’ workshops are 
sometimes their homes. The tailors who worked in the informal economy 
had a few clear reasons for the strike. It was an increase in the costs of 
transportation, the cost of survival due to the increase in the price of 
electricity, and the production costs in that sewing machines and electricity 
for the workshops would increase in price. 
The popular protest and the general strike that lasted for a week in January 
2010 represented an unprecedented mobilization of informal workers. This 
was enabled by the two unions of workers, NUT and FIWON, that had 
relationships with two of the major trade unions of formal workers, the NLC 
and TUC, who led the demonstrations. 
The participation of the tailors of Lagos together with their own trade 
unions and most of the general ones was a demonstration that the politics of 
limited and local performance had overcome and acquired a national 
dimension. The alliance between two trade unions of informal workpeople 
and the formal trade unions, was used by two formal trade unions at national 
level to try to formalize the relations with the organizations of the informal 
economy with the intention of formalizing informal work, and in this way, 
exercising its’ control. In fact, the two national trade unions imposed an end 
to the strike after one week. In spite of all this, the informal trade unions 
always maintained their independence; they never admitted to a situation of 
subordination. For this, they maintained a “friendly distance” with regard to 
the trade unions of formal workers. This way, they defended the autonomy 
with regard to these and cultivated intense relations with the state of the city 
of Lagos. Two trade unions of informal workpeople, but especially one of 
them, FIWON, the most recent, tried to continue with a different agenda 
from the one that the trade unions of formal workpeople maintained. The 
trade unions of informal workers did not direct its efforts to the creation and 
implementation of collective bargaining with the employers, but to obtain 
public assistance on the part of the state as well as other elements of social 
protection such as old age pensions, insurance, etc. It is possible to observe 
an enormous resemblance in the requirements of these trade unions of 
informal workpeople and those of the women in India described above. 
However, with this case description, the problems of the relationships 
between formal and informal work have not been analysed. Normally it is 
thought that informal economic systems are often backward and 
dysfunctional, and therefore, what we have to achieve is the formalization of 
the informal economy. Consideration of a more recent viewpoint is in 
accordance with our claims. Instead of formalizing the informal economy or 
making it disappear, further eliminating its’ incentives, as advocated by the 
neoliberal authors, there is a need to establish an approach according to 
which the interactive collaboration between the formal and informal 
economy is manifested in the idea of “Hybrid Governance”. That is, co-
production and the interrelationship between the formal and informal sectors 
must be advocated. The term used is to “normalize” not “formalize” – 
normalizing the informal sector, raises the question as to how this 
“normalization” of the informal economy affects the rights of citizenship. 
As has already been observed in the functioning of trade unions of informal 
workers, what these institutions demand are the basic human rights that are 
considered as workers’ rights and which are derived from the interaction and 
struggle with the state authorities. The pure inclusion of the informal 
economy into the formal one, or the formalization of this without taking into 
account the strengths and weaknesses of the informal economic institutions, 
is nonsense, as Andrae and Beckman emphasize very clearly in the case of 
the Nigerian tailors.
21
 The integration of informal unions into formal ones 
first gave them a national dimension that they had not had before. This 
allowed them to confront the state and demand social protection and other 
rights for workers in the informal economy. 
The result of the action of informal workers in the national protest in 2010, 
together with the trade unions of the formal workers, constituted a milestone 
in political and economic integration, which expanded their voice and 
horizons of action beyond considerations of a limited nature. 
However, it is necessary to raise a central problem that gives the case 
interest and originality. At the time that this integration between informal 
workers and formal ones was occurring, when integration and inclusion 
were being questioned, the informal unions tried to put forward conditions 
to defend their autonomy and relative independence. A very important 
phenomenon thus has to be considered. This is because the subordination 
and destruction of the particularities of the informal economy was thought 
to be something negative for the poorest and most vulnerable groups, 
(informal workers). In the context of African societies, studies frequently 
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refer to an “inclusive consideration” in the informal economy that can give 
the impression of a consensual process and without any controversy that 
obscures the role of struggles, whether pro or contra, the inclusion of, and 
the divisions and alliances that are created. 
Summed up briefly, it is a question of the maintenance of autonomy and the 
rejection of inclusion as an absolute good and of exclusion as evil. There are 
Africanists nowadays who have introduced a term of enormous analytical 
importance.
22
 It is a question of the idea of “adverse” or “harmful” 
incorporation. In the case which we are referring to, the problem needs to be 
raised in the following way. It is a question of knowing if the relations 
between formal and informal create genuine processes of inclusion or 
processes of an exploitative nature of “harmful incorporation”. Changing 
the informal/formal dichotomy to another one with which it is initially 
identified, poverty /not poverty, one must forget the narratives of pure 
exclusion and consider that poverty also persists because the people join 
economic and social life in a disadvantageous way. It is necessary to insist 
on the terms or conditions of inclusion more than the pure and simple 
inclusion that neoliberalism supports. To solve this serious problem, it is 
possible to give a condition that appeared in the relationship between the 
tailors who were employed in the informal economy and their informal 
organizations on the one hand, and the formal organizations with which they 
entered into relationship, on the other. It is a question of the preservation of 
the autonomy of the former before the latter which empowered the tailors of 
Nigeria to fight for their rights with the state. The problem raised here is 
therefore central.  
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China and Vietnam: the transition from “official” to “real” 
unionism 
Isidor Boix and Fernando Rocha 
 
 
nterest in the evolution of organized labour in China and Vietnam can be 
explained by the geographic, demographic, economic and political 
dimensions of one of them ─ China ─ and also by the peculiar history of 
both countries in their current evolution from a system of centrally planned 
economy towards their integration in a global market economy. This 
evolution, in which trade unions could play an important role, is 
contradictory, inter alia, because of the formal permanence at least of the 
political structures created from the revolutionary processes that developed 
their current states, which is causing increasing labour and social unrest in 
both countries.
1
 
China has been considered in the last decade as the “world factory”, but it 
also has become an important “world market”. For its part, Vietnam is 
playing an increasing role in the global industrial structure as a pole of 
attraction in Southeast Asia based on the still low labour costs in the country, 
although the country is currently facing accelerated production growth and 
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the increasing quality of production along with a remarkable political 
stability. 
A conceptual reference for the present paper is the notion of “real” unionism 
as the “social organization” to be given in every moment of the working 
class, thereby understanding organized labour as an “association of interests” 
of the employees. The particular relationship of workers with the means of 
production and their owners or managers generates common interests and 
the need for their joint defence, leading to define the union as “organization 
of solidarity” or “organized solidarity”. Against this background, this paper 
is aimed at critically addressing the process of transition currently faced by 
the labour movement in China and Vietnam. This is a process that is 
occurring in an increasingly connected world, and whose development 
seems to be irreversible. 
The analysis carried out relies on two main sources of information. First, the 
direct experience of one of the authors through his visits to different 
factories of the garment industry in China and Vietnam, proportioning a 
valuable empirical knowledge of the working conditions and the relation of 
the workers with their unionism, the “official” and the “real”.2 Second, the 
findings of a research project that addressed the the conditions of life and 
work and industrial relations in some of the more important industrial parks 
in Vietnam.
3
 This information is complemented with data and documents 
obtained from the official political and union sources, with news published 
in both countries, and also with some bibliographical references. 
The content of the article is structured as follows: first, the role of the “party” 
as a hegemonic political and social subject at the official level in both 
countries is addressed. Second, the paper analyses the role of trade union 
organizations in a context of increasing openness of the economy to global 
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investments and markets. Third, the legal regulation and development of 
collective bargaining is analysed. Fourth, we undertake an overview of the 
evolution of living conditions, followed in the next section with an analysis 
of strikes in both countries. The article concludes with some final thoughts 
for future debate. 
 
1. The Party as the only official political and social subject in societies 
with developing market economies 
The affirmation that China and Vietnam can be considered as “market” 
societies is highly controversial. The argument, however, that the “market” 
dimension is increasingly relevant may certainly be posed, at least on the 
economic level, in both countries.
4
 Nevertheless, in spite of the increasing 
insertion of both countries in the global market economy there is a particular 
condition of their national legal frameworks that affects market performance, 
and more specifically, relations between different social and political groups. 
For example, the existence and social function of the “single party” and also, 
in general terms, the “single-trade union”, are marked characteristics of 
these countries. 
In both countries, the Communist Party is, following the pure Stalinist 
tradition, the real unifying power of society in all areas of organization, both 
administrative and social, guaranteeing their cohesion (political, cultural, 
administrative...). It also affects social relations and generates nuances in the 
market economy itself, especially in its translation into social organization, 
in form and content as well as in the synthesis of existing social 
contradictions. Their constitutions and union laws establish the primacy of 
the Party over social organizations (in China even over the legal system 
itself). Particularly regarding trade unionism, the single union must also 
necessarily follow the guidelines of the Party. Moreover, union leaders are 
integrated today in the leading bodies of the Party yet are always less 
relevant in these organs than in the union structure itself, which means the 
theoretical subordination of the Union to the Party. 
Having said that, it is worth noting that this is a phenomenon with its own 
life, over which specific social and political realities no doubt have impact, 
as well as the changing world in an increasingly global economy. We have 
                                                 
4
 However, there are still some points of controversy. For example, there is an ongoing 
dispute about the recognition for China of “market economy status” under the World Trade 
Organisation. See PUCCIO, Laura. Granting Market Economy to China. An analysis of 
WTO law and of selected WTO members' policy. European Parliamentary Research Service. 
November 2015. 
China and Vietnam: the transition from “official” to “real” trade unionism 
 
29 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 9, May 2018, p. 26-43 
 
 
perceived symptoms in this regard throughout our own relationship with 
both countries, and particularly with their trade union environments.
5
 So, a 
necessary starting point of our analysis is a brief overview of the legal rules 
that highly affect the core of trade union activity in both countries, namely 
the freedom of union association and the right to strike. 
The Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China
6
 establishes in the 
General Provisions that the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (AFCTU) 
and all the trade union organizations represent the interests of the workers, 
and also that they “shall observe and safeguard the Constitution, take it as 
the fundamental criterion for their activities, take economic development as 
the central task, uphold the socialist road, the people’s democratic 
dictatorship, leadership by the Communist Party of China, and Marxist-
Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory” (article 4). 
The law also establishes that “the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
shall be established as the unified national organization” (article 10). And it 
establishes a clear hierarchy in the union structure and its limitations, noting 
that “the establishment of basic-level trade union organizations, local trade 
union federations, and national or local industrial trade union organizations 
shall be submitted to the trade union organization at the next higher level for 
approval” (article 13). 
It is worth highlighting that the right to strike is recognized neither by the 
Constitution nor by the Union law, after it was removed from the 
Constitution in 1982 under the argument that the Chinese political system 
had “eradicated problems between the proletariat and enterprise owners”. 
After the removal of the right to strike, article 27 of the Union Law 
establishes an alternative figure (quite shameful), the “work-stoppage”: “in 
case of work-stoppage or slow-down strike in an enterprise or institution, 
the trade union shall, on behalf of the workers and staff members, hold 
consultation with the enterprise or institution or the parties concerned, 
present the opinions and demands of the workers and staff members, and put 
forth proposals for solutions. With respect to the reasonable demands made 
by the workers and staff members, the enterprise or institution shall try to 
satisfy them”. 
                                                 
5
 See BOIX, op.cit. 
6
 This law was first adopted in 1950, then reworked in 1991 and later modified in 2001.  
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The Constitution Of the Socialist Republic Of Vietnam
7
 establishes that “the 
Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working 
class, simultaneously the vanguard of the toiling people and of the 
Vietnamese nation, the faithful representative of the interests of the working 
class, the toiling people, and the whole nation, acting upon the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh’s thought, is the leading force of the 
State and society” (article 4). 
Without opposing the primary position of the Party in society, the Labour 
Code of Vietnam
8
 establishes that workers shall have among others the right 
to strike (article 5.f). This law also includes a specific and complex 
regulation of strikes and strike resolution that, if followed, would seriously 
limit the application of this right. Thus, it establishes that the strike “shall 
only be carried out in regard to interest-based collective labour disputes” 
(article 209.2), but not because of a dispute on the interpretation of a 
compliment of the law.  
It also establishes a set of cases where strikes are illegal (article 215), for 
example, if: (1) the strike does not arise from an interest-based collective 
labour dispute; (2) the strike is organized for employees who are not 
working for the same employer; (3) the strike occurs whilst the collective 
labour dispute is being resolved or has not been resolved by the competent 
agencies, organizations or individuals in accordance with this Code; (4) the 
strike occurs in an enterprise in the list of enterprises provided by the 
Government in which strikes are prohibited; and (5) the strike occurs when 
the decision to postpone or cancel the strike has been issued.  
There are also some relevant provisions concerning the procedures for going 
on strike. For example, strikes must be organized and led by the Executive 
Committee of the grassroots level trade union, or by the upper-level trade 
union upon the request of the employees in undertakings where the 
grassroots level trade union has not been established (Article 210). Also, it 
stipulates that “employees who take part in the strike shall not be paid with 
wages or other benefits as stipulated by law, unless agreed otherwise by 
both parties” (Article 218.2). Finally, it can be noted that “strikes are 
prohibited in undertakings which are essential for the national economy and 
in which strikes may threaten national security, defence, public health and 
public order. The list of such undertakings shall be provided by the 
Government” (Article 220.1). 
                                                 
7
 Amended in 2013. 
8
 Amended in 2012. 
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Despite such limitations, it should however be stressed that the legal 
recognition of the right to strike in Vietnam and union intervention in its 
development, means that the union is considered as an expression of the 
interest of one side of the labour relations dispute, that of the workers. Yet 
these rules in Vietnam are applied in very few cases and the vast majority of 
strikes in the country, as happens in China with the “work stoppages” are 
“illegal” or, at best, “non-legal”. 
The formal conception of unions in both countries also contains ideas such 
as “it is a function of unions to educate workers”. And above all, the search 
for “harmonious solutions to conflicts” or “the common interests of the 
company and workers”, namely: it is not legally assumed that unions 
represent the interests of one of the sides in industrial relations, but they 
must play rather a role of “mediation”. In the interviews carried out in both 
countries with leaders of these unions, it also appeared that an essential 
function of the union ─ even the only one, according to some union officials 
─ is to ensure “labour law enforcement”9. This mismatch between the legal 
framework and real life requires addressing what is the reality of trade 
unionism in both countries from the perspective of working conditions and 
their evolution, the organization of workers and trade union action, strikes 
included, with or without the tutelage of other social, political or 
administrative authorities. 
Especially in China, regarding these kinds of considerations on the freedom 
of association and the right to strike, official opinion is that strike actions 
threaten to destroy the socialist regime. This official argument obviously 
contradicts international standards such as the 1998 ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
The situation in China and Vietnam may be compared historically with the 
statements made by Lenin in January 1921 in his controversy over the 
proposal of Trotsky, when the latter called for the militarization of trade 
unions. Lenin noted that the confrontation between workers with the Soviet 
government (the Party) was not only possible, but even necessary in some 
cases. The reason, according to Lenin, was that  
the trade unions no longer have to face the class economic struggle but the 
non-class “economic struggle”, which means combating bureaucratic 
distortions of the Soviet apparatus, safeguarding the working people’s 
material and spiritual interests in ways and means inaccessible to this 
                                                 
9
 These interviews were carried out by BOIX (see op.cit.).  
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apparatus, etc. This is a struggle they will unfortunately have to face for 
many more years to come.
10
 
 
2. Trade unionism, its organization and action in the official structures 
and in the workplaces
11
 
The trade union landscape in China, according to the official data for 2014, 
is as follows: an economically active population of around 797 million 
people; 772 million employed people; and 280 million members of the 
AFCTU.
12
 As for Vietnam, the official statistics give us the following 
figures also for 2014: an economically active population of 53.7 million 
people; 52.7 million employed people; and around 8 million members of the 
VGCL.
13
 
Now, if we move the focus from the macro to the micro level, it is worth 
noting that many workers interviewed in Chinese and Vietnamese factories 
with a high rate of union density stated that they were not affiliated to those 
unions. Or, even so, they were unaware of their activity at the workplace. It 
can be said that it is really not possible to compare the above figures for 
China with those of the International Trade Union Confederation, which 
states a membership of around 180 million people; or with the World 
Federation of Trade Unions, with 90 million people. 
This particular concept of “affiliation” is complemented by the system of 
union dues. It is formally a double fee: the one paid by each affiliate, and 
the one paid by companies directly to the union (2% of the wage bill, 
although with increasing difficulties in private companies). Around half of 
all paid dues are for the higher level structures and the rest for the “union” 
activity in the company, which are mainly for recreational activities and 
welfare programs. The affiliates are paid by payroll deductions in very few 
of the companies visited in both countries and were fixed at 1% of 
individual salary, but those observed were between 0.75 and 1.75 € per 
month in Vietnam and 0.3 € in China. 
                                                 
10
 LENIN, V.I. Collected Works, 1st English Edition. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1965, Volume 32, pp. 70-107. 
11
 The analysis of this section combines the information provided by the official statistics 
and the trade unions, with the empirical data collected in the visits of one of the authors as a 
member of an international trade union delegation to factories in China and Vietnam. 
12
 China Statistical Yearbook 2015. National Bureau of Statistics of China. And AFCTU for 
data on union membership. 
13
 Vietnam Statistical Yearbook 2014. General Office of Statistics of Vietnam. VGCL 
National Review Conference, 2015. 
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It is worth noting that in most of the factories visited, the formal workers’ 
representatives said they do not negotiate salaries. Nevertheless, in recent 
years they began to comment that they “sometimes speak of wages”, 
although it was related to the proper application of the labour law. 
Regarding this issue, it is possible to suggest that there is rising trade union 
awareness in Vietnam compared to the situation in China. 
Another key element is how the leading bodies of the trade unions are 
configured in the workplaces. In both countries, there are very detailed and 
complex rules, but they did not apply to any of the factories visited in China 
to Vietnam. There is a widespread practice of an alleged consensus that 
union functions in the workplace are performed almost always by technical 
or administrative workers, mostly managers or staff from the personnel 
department. Furthermore, in many cases the role of President of the Union is 
played by the chief of staff or the production manager. The members of 
such trade union bodies told us many times that for these functions middle 
management was usually chosen to lead. In a Chinese factory, where the 
union president was also the owner of the company, he told us that “he had 
been hired for both functions”. 
It is important to note, in any case, some differences of degree between both 
countries: in China, notions of common interests or the simultaneity of the 
roles among the leading bodies of employers and employees is more 
extensive. These differences can also been noted with regard to the 
evaluation of trade unions. In China, trade unions state that these situations 
happen mostly because workers desire it. Furthermore, the leading body of 
the ACFTU explained to us without blushing that a “pilot project” was 
launched in Guangdong province, consisting of the application of a “new 
rule” that forbids the owner or manager of a company, or their relatives, to 
be “union leaders”. 
These situations also can be registered in Vietnam, but there is an increasing 
awareness inside VGCL about the need for changing the representation 
procedures, and also regarding the improvement of skills training in order to 
engage in effective collective bargaining with foreign buyers and their 
suppliers.
14
 In this regard, it is worth noting a recent experience held in this 
country in 2015. Specifically, it consisted of a meeting of union members of 
                                                 
14
 Khanh, Do Ta. SWORR Fieldwork Research: Synthesis Report. Institute for European 
Studies, Hanoi, Vietnam. August, 2015; Ngọc Trần, A. “Vietnamese Textile and Garment 
Industry in the Global Supply Chain: State Strategies and Workers’ Responses”. 
Institutions and Economies. Vol. 4, n.3, October 2012, pp. 123-150. 
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textile companies from the north of Vietnam and suppliers for the Spanish 
company Inditex. The goal of this meeting, coordinated by the VCGL, 
IndustryALL, Global Union and the Vietnam Office of the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation, was to launch a national Trade Union network of the suppliers 
of Inditex, which is planned to be created in 2016. The Vietnamese Trade 
Union Confederation, committed to this project, has assumed the challenge 
and the risk of promoting an effective representation of delegates for the 
participation in the national Assembly.  
 
3. Collective bargaining
15
 
The labour law in both countries establishes a set of provisions about the 
concept and procedures of collective bargaining at company level and, only 
in Vietnam, also at the sectorial level. The Labour Law of the People's 
Republic Of China (1994, articles 33 to 35) regulates the procedures for the 
negotiation of company-level company agreements, on matters relating to 
labour remuneration, working hours, rest and vacations, occupational safety 
and health, insurance and welfare. The law also regulates the relation 
between these agreements and the labour contracts, establishing that “the 
standards of working conditions and labour remuneration agreed upon in 
labour contracts concluded between individual labourers and the enterprise 
shall not be lower than those stipulated in the collective contract” (article 
35). 
The regulation of this topic in the Labour Code of Vietnam (2012) is 
significantly wider, including a specific chapter on “Dialogue at workplace, 
collective bargaining, collective bargaining agreements” (chapter V). There 
is a more detailed set up of procedural provisions but the most interesting 
issue, as noted above, is the regulation of collective bargaining at the 
sectorial level. In this regard, the law establishes a hierarchy between both 
levels of bargaining, with a prevalence of the sectorial over the company-
level agreements.
16
 
Against this legal framework, collective bargaining according to 
international standards and ILO conventions is practically non-existent. 
                                                 
15
 See footnote 11. 
16
 For example, it was established that “where the contents of an enterprise-level collective 
bargaining agreement or other regulations of the employer on the lawful rights, 
responsibilities and interests of the enterprise’s employees are less favourable than those 
stipulated in the sectorial collective bargaining agreement, the enterprise-level collective 
bargaining agreement shall be revised accordingly within 03 months from the date on 
which the sectorial collective bargaining agreement comes into effect” (article 881.). 
China and Vietnam: the transition from “official” to “real” trade unionism 
 
35 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 9, May 2018, p. 26-43 
 
 
Collective bargaining is widely regarded as a formality rather than the 
outcome of real negotiations between workers and employers. For example, 
in Vietnam “according to the VGCL informant, most workers do not know 
the contents of the active collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) in their 
companies. Some cannot even tell the difference between the CBA and 
labour contracts”.17 
However, statistics provided by the trade unions highlight an important 
number of collective agreements. For example, in a meeting held in China 
in 2015 with the AFCTU, we were told that in 2013 2.4 million collective 
agreements covering 300 million workers were registered, with a target of 
coverage of 500 million workers by the end of 2015.  
The findings of the interviews carried out in China and Vietnam, and the 
analysis of the contents of some company-level company agreements, 
shows a similar pattern in both countries. Thus, what is called a “collective 
agreement” is that which has been formally signed by the union leadership 
and the directors of the company and its contents usually consist of a brief 
reference or transcription of the existing legislation on minimum wages, 
working hours, quoting social security laws or in some cases references to a 
supplemental question, such as to the price of the litter in China, or to the 
parking a bike in Vietnam. In some few cases, there were also provisions 
related to a bonus, but never to issues such as work organization, a bonus 
system or trade union rights. It is worth noting that these situations of little 
real collective bargaining can also be found in virtually all the countries 
with a presence of the production chains of the global garment brands. At 
the same time, it is fair to recognize the potential advantage of China and 
Vietnam regarding the number of such “collective agreements”, as they can 
be starting points for an effective collective bargaining. 
In Vietnam, there are sectorial collective agreements; the first was signed in 
2010. It has a limited coverage, affecting around 100 companies and around 
100 thousand workers in the garment industry. In spite of this low coverage 
and of the reduced scope of its contents, it is worth highlighting at least two 
points: on the one hand, because as noted above it is the first sectorial 
collective agreement at national level; on the other hand, because it links the 
regulation of strikes to collective bargaining, so it allows for the possibility 
of “national” strikes. The limitations of this agreement reflect those of the 
trade union itself, whose sectorial organization is still very weak compared 
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 Fair Wear Foundation. FWF Country Study Vietnam. 2015, p.25. 
36 Isidor Boix and Fernando Rocha 
 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 9, May 2018, p. 26-43 
 
to its territorial and local structure. These limitations are also evident in the 
ignorance of this agreement by the union leadership in Ho Chi Minh City, as 
well as by executives and unions of the companies we visited.  
The national textile federation and the Vietnamese Confederation affirmed 
their willingness to extend the effectiveness of the sectoral agreement while 
developing its contents, both in relation to salary and to issues related to 
working conditions, particularly working time. Also, they noted the 
importance of linking the sectorial collective agreement to the Code of 
Conduct and the company agreement of Inditex with IndustryALL.  
 
4. Evolution of working and life conditions
18
 
Over the last 10 years, living conditions in China and Vietnam have had a 
remarkably similar evolution, assuming in both countries major 
improvements, but with significant quantitative differences between them. 
Thus, in China the minimum wage – which differs regionally – rose from 
30-65 € per month in 2006 to 250-300 € in 2015. In Vietnam, they improved 
from 36 € in 2009 to a range between 90 and 130 € in 2015. However, these 
are minimum wages for the formal economy with a difficult implementation 
in the underground economy. 
The actual remuneration of an employee at the garment industry, as tested in 
production chains of the big brands of clothing, were between 100 and 140 
€ in 2006 in China, and came to be between 270 and 500 € in 2015. In 
Vietnam, actual remunerations evolved from 46 to 80 € in 2009 to 200 to 
300 € in 2015. All this for an extended regime of working hours, including 
additional hours, which has hardly evolved over the years and remains 
between 2,300 and 3,000 hours year. 
It was also noted that there was a certain evolution in living conditions in 
Chinese factories: in 2006, living quarters with bunk beds for workers in 
large factories away from urban areas could host from 8 to 10 people in 
spaces of 3.8 meters and 10 to 12 berths (the “surplus” served to deposit the 
goods of the working poor); in 2015 they were destined for 5 or 6 people. It 
was also possible to observe some increase in televisions in such spaces, as 
open windows to the world through the chains that censors allowed to 
“invade” the country. 
The audited figures on wages coincide with the official statistics of both 
countries regarding the evolution of living conditions and poverty. It should 
be added, however, that this progress has occurred in parallel with the huge 
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increase in inequalities, so that China is today one of the most unequal 
countries in Asia. This is expressed by an indicator such as the Gini index: 
thus, according to some sources this indicator has increased from a value 
around 0,35 in both countries at the end of the twentieth century, to a value 
of 0.38 in Vietnam and 0.46 in China in 2015.
19
 
In particular, international institutions have remarked that the current 
process of industrialization and the consolidation of a growing industrial 
labour force have favoured many people from rural areas who have escaped 
from a situation of monetary poverty. However, the results of empirical 
studies show that this process is not without contradictions due to high 
insecurity and harsh working conditions that characterize industrial jobs; in 
fact, in many cases there has been a return of workers, especially of women, 
to rural areas of origin.
20
 
It is possible to point out that the above noted evolution of living conditions 
in both countries has been influenced among other factors by the global 
struggle for “decent” work, the direct assumption of that objective by 
political and social organizations in each country, and the influence of the 
Codes of Conduct and Framework Agreements signed by the multinationals 
who buy in both countries. Nevertheless, some relevant differences can be 
found again between China and Vietnam, regarding the trade unions’ 
approaches on the concept of decent work. 
For example, in China the ACFTU has so far claimed to be outside of the 
Global Framework Agreements in the country
21
 and has established a Code 
of Self Conduct, almost copied from that first drafted in the BSCI
22
 textile 
sector (although we found that its existence is ignored by both entrepreneurs 
and ACFTU structures in the companies or territories). In Vietnam, by 
contrast, the VGCL has considered that the implementation of the Global 
Framework Agreement with Inditex can help improve working conditions in 
                                                 
19
 Statista (http://www.statista.com/) for China, and World Bank for Vietnam. 
20
 Cerimele, Michela. SWORR Project. Female Internal Migrant Workers at Thang Long 
Industrial Park. A Qualitative Case-Study. Author: Dr. Michela Cerimele, University of 
Naples L’Orientale. March 2015. 
21
 In the last two trips with official meetings, the ACFTU stated that the application of these 
agreements is “under consideration”. They have not yet accepted our suggestion to consider 
a protocol for implementing the Code of Conduct of Inditex, linked to the Global 
Framework Agreement with IndustriALL Global Union. 
22
 Business Social Compliance Initiative, commitment to corporate social responsibility 
promoted by major multinational European industry and distribution whose first approaches 
were criticized by European and international trade union movement for its lack of 
transparency. 
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the sector of clothing and footwear and has raised the question of the 
application of sectorial collective agreements mentioned above. Based on 
these approaches, we are working to advance unionization through its 
implementation and monitoring the Union Network Inditex suppliers in the 
country, which is a global pioneering experience in the trade union 
organization of subcontracting chains. 
 
5. The strike
23
 
The positive evolution of living conditions in both countries has 
undoubtedly been influenced by the policies of the respective governments, 
whose anti-crisis policies since 2008 have included among other measures 
increases in minimum wages, aimed to boost its domestic market by 
increasing purchasing power. In parallel, it is possible to ask about the 
influence of industrial action carried out by both the “official” and real 
unionism, and particularly of strikes. Once more, some differences can be 
found between the two countries.  
Thus, in China there is as noted above an “official voluntary ignorance” of 
the phenomenon of strikes. The very statistics of the Ministry of Public 
Security shows, however, an increasing social unrest in the country, from 
74,000 conflicts in 2004 to 200,000 in 2012.
24
 In Vietnam, official figures 
show an increase in the number of strikes in the past decade, from 147 in 
2005 to 293 in 2014. This rising trend is also corroborated by the findings of 
the academic research, which has highlighted that Vietnam has witnessed 
more strikes than any other Asian country in the last decade, in spite of its 
vibrant economy.
25
 
The strike movement in China was very active in 2010, especially in the 
automotive industry. Also, this year and the following were marked by 
strikes in the electronic, gas and electric sectors. The comments and 
evaluations taken in the field during our visits, particularly with the 
delegation of the ICEM
26
 in July 2010, suggested a conscious tolerance on 
the government side about these strikes. In April 2014, one of the most 
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 See footnote 11. 
24
 It is worth noting that different reports warn about the underestimation of the extent of 
social unrest in China in the official figures. See for example GÖBEL, Christian and ONG, 
Lynnete. Social unrest in China. Europe China Research and Advise Network. London, 
2012. 
25
 KAXTON, Siu; and CHAN, Anita. “Strike Wave in Vietnam, 2006–2011”. Journal of 
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26
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important strikes in the recent history of China occurred. In the town of 
Dongguan, Guangdong Province a strike of two weeks broke out with the 
participation of the vast majority of the 45,000 workers of the Yue Yuen 
Industrial Holdings factories. This is a Taiwanese company based in Hong 
Kong, considered the largest producer of sports footwear in the world that 
works for Nike, Adidas, Timberland, Puma, Crocs and others. The main 
reason for this conflict was that the company did not pay the social 
contributions according to the real wages (around 350 € per month), but 
according to the basic wages of the region (around 200 €). The company 
also did not pay the “funds for housing”, and there were also problems of 
schooling for many workers’ children as a consequence of the regulation of 
migration.  
The strike was developed with major demonstrations and an occupation of 
the workplace. In the little information we have on this conflict,
27
 there is a 
brief reference about an attempt to mediate by the official ACFTU union, 
which was rejected by the strikers. Some strike leaders were arrested on 
charges of “public disorder”, “obstruction of road traffic” and “spreading 
false news”, but they were quickly released. Finally, the government forced 
the company to pay the contributions, and it also accepted a wage increase 
of about 30 € per month. Some media compared the significance of this 
strike with that registered in the automotive sector in 2010. In June 2014, 
China Daily (the official English-language newspaper) reported that the 
Fujian arbitral tribunal had ruled in favour of workers after a strike of two 
weeks. The newspaper highlighted that “so far the courts and arbitral 
authorities did not support the positions of the workers if they defended 
their rights to strike”. 
As for the strikes developed in Vietnam, it is interesting to address one 
experience that took place in 2015, as we could test in our last trip to the 
country. In early April, a major strike broke out in a footwear company in 
the area of Ho Chi Minh City. It was the Pou Yuen company, Taiwanese-
owned, with 90,000 workers who produce shoes for Nike, Adidas and other 
brands. The reason was the draft amendment of the regulation in the country 
of retirement benefits for which hitherto existed a complex formula that 
allowed collectability, in a single or in instalment payments before 
retirement age (60 for men and 55 for women) if they had contributed a 
sufficient number of years (20 according to some documentation). The 
strike lasted a week and it included different actions such as the occupation 
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of the workplace and street demonstrations with no serious incidents. The 
workers returned to work when the government pledged to reconsider the 
issue. 
We could see the impact of this strike in the factories we visited by 
interviewing workers and trade unionists, and also employers. There was a 
first remarkable fact: talking of “strike” was no longer a taboo subject. Quite 
a few workers said they knew of the strike and its essential content 
(retirement benefits); also, they said they heard of the strike both on “radio 
and television” and in “meetings in the union”. In one of the companies 
visited, workers indicated that they had made a 2-day strike for the same 
reason, concurring with that of Pou Yuen. This was recognized by the 
governing body of the union. They explained how it happened: during lunch 
in the canteen someone said he had seen on the internet about how the strike 
was proceeding, and they decided to join immediately. Almost no one 
returned to their job. Union leaders of the company met with their managers 
and claimed that there should not be any sanction, letting the workers go 
home, and that they would report on the subject, so that the next day they 
could provide explanations. The next day the workers went to work, but did 
not start waiting for such information. A local union leader, along with 
those of the company, explained the reasons for the strike and the 
government's commitment to reconsider the issue. The workers decided to 
continue the strike the second day, and the company accepted the proposal 
of their return to their homes. The following day, employees resumed work, 
and the two days of strike were considered as holidays. 
In this company the union leaders indicated that there was also a strike in 
other places, but its development was more complicated by the absence of 
trade unions or trade union initiatives in them. During our stay, Vietnam 
News included several references to the meeting of the National Assembly 
that was taking place and on possible amendments to the law on Social 
Security 2014 Article 60, which had motivated the strike. This was the only 
recent conflict commented on our visit to the factories. In one, we were told 
that “until 2009” there had been some conflicts because “prices rose more 
than wages”. 
A few days after our last stay in Vietnam, the Vietnam press reported on a  
6-day strike carried out by 1,100 workers in a garment factory.  Based on 
information from the union of the town, the press noted that, as a result of 
the strike, the company accepted a wage increase, the construction of a 
parking lot for motorcycles and measures aimed to ensure safe water in the 
company. The newspaper added that workers also demanded rest on 
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Sundays and an end of the working day on Saturday at 4:30 p.m. The 
resolution of these demands was still pending. 
To conclude: it is possible to affirm that strikes are increasingly assumed as 
a normal fact related to the development of industrial relations in Vietnam. 
On the contrary, talking about this topic is still almost a taboo issue in China. 
 
6. Final remarks: reform or rupture 
The Chinese and Vietnamese labour movements are definitely in a transition 
phase, and even under strain in a context of the implementation in both 
countries of the market economy and its integration into the global world 
economy. There are now processes of union action that go beyond official 
political and union structures. Against this background, it would be very 
audacious to establish any certainty about the future developments of these 
phenomena. 
Clearly, a new unionism is emerging in both countries, but it is still risky to 
predict whether it will lead to the marginalization of the existing structures, 
or if the result will be an integration of the new union leaders arising from 
the current mobilizations and strikes into the union offices of the current 
ACFTU and VGCL. It remains to be seen what role unionists might play 
from such processes. The capacity of the Vietnamese official unions seems 
greater to integrate new union leaders arising from trade union action. 
It seems clear in any case that part of the current “union” structures will lead 
to management, outside of union action, to try to manage the great resources 
that have accumulated with the “union dues” paid for years by companies. 
Another element influencing the development of this transition will surely 
be the understanding that the role of trade unionism is necessarily different 
in a planned economy, based on the public ownership of the means of 
production, of one that it is taking hold through the already advanced 
privatization processes or new private equity investments, national or 
foreign, in a “market economy with its own traits”. This is a highly relevant 
issue in Vietnam given the current involvement of the country in negotiating 
free trade agreements, including the Agreement between the United States 
and Vietnam and the Trans-Pacific Agreement. Both agreements pose 
significant challenges, because if on the one hand they recognize the role of 
trade unions, on the other they strengthen the unilateral power of 
transnational corporations of foreign capital on the legal regulations related 
to living and working conditions in the country. 
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The labour movements of Chinese and Vietnamese, based to a greater or 
lesser extent in the current official union structures, will undoubtedly play 
an important role in the future unionism, responding to the current global 
labour crisis, and consciously taking its integration into the global working 
class. The incorporation of the working classes of both countries to the 
global trade union movement will be definitely a new opportunity to address 
the current crisis, broader than just an economic crisis, and that translates 
into a crisis response capacity of national and supranational institutions 
including trade unions This is leading to a global debate about the need to 
“rethink”, “reinvent” or “renew” the trade unions.28 
The necessary construction of a global trade unionism, integrating labour 
movements that organize the working class in all areas and at all levels, 
must also consciously assume the existence of interest not necessarily 
common in such areas and levels, and at the same time try find a synthesis 
in all of them. The immediate future of the labour movements in China and 
Vietnam can play an important role in this scenario with one condition: to 
organize and represent in a real way the working classes of their countries. 
Therefore, the relationship of global trade unionism with new labour 
movements under construction in China and Vietnam constitutes a matter of 
obvious interest. There is now, in the most diverse areas of world trade 
unionism, a debate on this issue that occasionally emerges with remarkable 
intensity. From these pages, we wish to emphasize its importance, 
contributing with our analysis to this process of the transition from official 
to real unionism, and our hope for its success. 
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ntroduction 
This article discusses the trajectory and actions of Força Sindical – FS 
(Trade Union Force) and the Central Única dos Trabalhadores – CUT 
(Unified Workers’ Central) during neoliberal governments in Brazil from 
1990 to 2015. CUT was founded in 1983 as a class-based and combative 
national trade union central. Throughout the 1990s, it was one of the main 
opponents to the neoliberal governments of Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco 
and Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Established in 1991, the FS assumed the 
role of CUT’s antagonist since it was responsible for agglutinating trade 
unions allied to the government around the conception of “trade unionism 
focused on results”, ending up as a supporting force for neoliberal 
governments. However, from 2003 onward, these union centrals became 
forces allied to the Lula government of the Workers’ Party (PT) (2003-
2010) and during a part of President Dilma Rouseff’s first term (2011-
2014). What kind of changes occurred during this period?  
The dynamics and the positioning of these two main trade union centrals 
must be understood according to the logic of capitalism in its present stage, 
which is marked by a double assault against work and workers. Our aim is 
to discuss the disputes and alliances between the two organizations in 
addition to their programmatic changes and dissidences that, according to 
                                                
1 Professor at Universidade Federal de Uberlândia UFU (Federal University of  
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our argument, were to a large extent motivated by their positions in the face 
of policies implemented by neoliberal governments.2 
 
Neoliberalism and the new stage of capitalism 
After a period of economic growth that lasted for three decades after the 
Second World War II, the bourgeoisie witnessed their profit rates decrease 
all around the world throughout the 1970s.3 Since then, the imperialist 
offensive on a global scale for the recovery of profit rates constructed a new 
stage of capitalism. 4  Productive restructuring, through new ways of 
management focused on the flexibilization of the labour relation and new 
technologies based on microelectronics that reduced the labour force, 
constituted the material base for this process. On the political-ideological 
plan, it was necessary to prepare the ground for the upcoming changes, 
since capitalism needed to overcome all the barriers to such a politics such 
as the strength of the welfare state, especially in the core capitalist countries. 
As a consequence, to achieve stability, capitalist states implemented a series 
of measures: the reduction of public spending, the dismantling of social 
policies, cuts to social security and labour rights, the deregulation of work to 
permit flexibilization, the opening up of new avenues of accumulation by 
privatizing strategic sectors and liberalizing trade and the financial system.  
Neoliberal policies sought to financialize the economy while subjugating 
countries to the requirements of financial capital. In this sense, the way out 
proposed by neoliberalism to confront the public debt and high inflation 
rates, was to basically transfer a part of government revenues to the banks 
and speculators. For its part, financial capital demanded fiscal adjustment 
(austerity) and a monetary policy that had been harming productive 
investment and public services for decades. The result was the precarisation 
of work, the rise of unemployment and the impoverishment and degradation 
of the working and living conditions of the working class.  
These policies went through many trials, but it was only at the end of the 
1970s that the financial part of the imperialist bourgeoisie conquered its 
hegemony on a global scale. Its consolidation occurred during a meeting 
among institutions headquartered in the U.S. capital, such as World Bank 
                                                
2 For this purpose, the congress resolutions for both union centrals were consulted over this 
period. 
3 ANDERSON, Perry. “Balanço do neoliberalismo". In: SADER, Emir e GENTILI, Pablo. 
(orgs.) Pós Neoliberalismo – as políticas sociais e o Estado democrático. Rio de Janeiro: 
Paz e Terra, 1995, pp.9-38. 
4 HARVEY, David. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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and IMF (International Monetary Fund) – known in the literature as the 
Washington “consensus”. The social relations of this new stage of 
capitalism were characterized by neoliberalism, which, in general, 
constituted an imperialist offensive on a global scale under the hegemony of 
financial capital.5  
This process did not occur in the same way among all countries. Taking this 
in to consideration, the restructuring of capitalist companies has occurred in 
those with high technological potential, especially those localized in the 
core capitalist countries. The suppliers and outsourced companies, in sectors 
of low technological potential and, especially, in the peripheral countries, 
operated through a cheap labour force which gave rise to a divergence 
between the technological potential available and the kind of investment 
companies were willing to make. Therefore, new technologies were not 
widely spread to the peripheral countries, but new methods were introduced 
to control workers, followed by the flexibilization of labour relations and 
the loss of labour rights. On the other hand, the advancement of neoliberal 
policies also arose from the particular configuration of international forces. 
In this respect, such policies were imposed on the periphery by the core 
countries and by financial institutions that acted internationally representing 
their affairs, most of the time without reducing their own 
protectionist policies. In this context, the role that the Brazilian social 
formation played during this new stage of capitalism made its peripheral 
condition even worse, insofar as it submitted the country not only to the 
industrial imperialist bourgeoisie, but most of all to foreign banks and 
speculators. 
In Brazil, neoliberal policies got a boost during Fernando Collor de Mello’s 
(1990-1992) government. They were continued by Itamar Franco’s (1992-
1994) government, reaching their peak during Cardoso’s two terms (1995-
1998; 1999-2002). They were maintained during the governments of Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2006; 2007-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-
2014; 2015-2016). When we characterize all these governments as 
neoliberal, it means that their actions had the clear purpose of prioritizing 
the objectives of the financial bourgeoisie above all others.6 However, 
neoliberalism in Brazil was not adopted without contradictions.  
                                                
5 DUMÉNIL, G.; LÉVY, D. “Superação da crise, ameaças de crises e novo capitalismo” 
(pp. 15-41). Em: CHESNAIS, F., DUMÉNIL, G., LÉVY, D., WALLERSTEIN, D. Uma 
nova fase do capitalismo? São Paulo: Xamã, 2003, pp. 15-41; BOITO JR., Armando. 
Política neoliberal e sindicalismo no Brasil. São Paulo: Xamã, 1999; ANDERSON, Op.Cit. 
6 BOITO Jr, A. “Governos Lula: a nova burguesia nacional no poder”. In: BOITO Jr, A., 
GALVÃO, A. Política e classes sociais no Brasil dos anos 2000. São Paulo: Alameda, 
2012; MARTUSCELLI, Danilo. Crises políticas e capitalismo neoliberal no Brasil. 
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Collor (1990-1992) was elected on an openly neoliberal platform. Among 
other measures, he promoted an indiscriminate trade liberalization of the 
Brazilian economy, reduced labour and social rights, made working 
conditions more flexible and downsized the public service. It was at the 
beginning of his first term in 1990 when he became the first president to 
introduce the Programa Nacional de Desestatização – PND (Brazilian 
Privatization Program). Under this program USIMINAS, one of the most 
important state-owned steel producers in the country, was privatized in 
1991.7  
Itamar Franco (1992-1994) continued these policies and during his 
government the list of privatizations grew even longer. Besides the steel 
companies Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional – CSN (National Steel 
Company), Açominas (a mining company known as Gerdau Açominas S.A) 
and the Companhia Siderúrgica Paulista – Cosipa (a steel company located 
in São Paulo), the Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica – Embraer (an 
aircraft company), one of the world’s major aircraft producers, were also 
privatized. 
In the following years, Cardoso (1995-2002) moved forward through the 
flexibilization mainly of labour rights 8  and privatizations. 9  In his 
governments, the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (a mining company known 
as Vale S.A) and Telebrás (Telephone Land Line Company) were 
privatized10 as well as some banks and state-owned electric companies. In 
addition, in 1999 he broke Petrobras’ state monopoly. As Finance Minister 
in the Itamar Franco government in 1994, Cardoso implemented a plan to 
control inflation using the Plano Real, a set of measures to stabilize the 
Brazilian economy. This measure was sustained by a recessionary policy, 
designed in the interests of international financial capitalism. In his second 
term as a president, this project was crowned through the economic policy 
                                                                                                                        
Curitiba: Editora CRV, 2015; SINGER, André. “Cutucando onças com vara curta: o ensaio 
desenvolvimentista no primeiro mandato do governo Dilma (2011-2014)”. Novos estudos 
Cebrap, n. 102, 2015.  
7 TRÓPIA, Patrícia Vieira. Força Sindical - Política e ideologia no sindicalismo brasileiro. 
São Paulo, Expressão Popular, 2009. 
8 GALVÃO, Andréia. Neoliberalismo e reforma trabalhista no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: 
Revan, 2007. 
9 BIONDI, Aluízio. O Brasil Privatizado – um balanço do desmonte do Estado. São Paulo: 
Perseu Abramo, 1999; BIONDI, Aluízio. O Brasil Privatizado II – o assalto das 
privatizações continua. São Paulo: Perseu Abramo, 2000; GRACIOLLI, Edilson José. 
Privatização da CSN – da luta de classes à parceria. São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2007. 
10 CAVALCANTE, Sávio. Sindicalismo e Privatização das Telecomunicações. São Paulo: 
Expressão Popular, 2009. 
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known as the “primary surplus formula, in which there are high interest 
rates and monetary overvaluation”. As a main consequence of this process, 
there was a rise in unemployment, a growth in informal labour and the loss 
of labour rights through reforms. 
The governments of Lula (2003-2010) and Dilma (2011-2016) sustained the 
last policy mentioned. Even though during the PT period there were no 
large-scale privatizations as in previous governments, their governments 
broadened the policy of concessions of the public sector and partnerships 
with private companies, above all in the transport sector. Moreover, there 
were also privatization policies that exempted private equity from taxation, 
notoriously the higher education industry. There were also smaller-scale 
privatizations of state-owned banks, hydro-electric power plants and the 
pre-salt oil exploitation fields, one of the major oil discoveries in the last 
decades.   
The Lula and Dilma governments maintained the hard core of neoliberal 
economic policy. Thus, if neoliberalism is the stage of capitalism under the 
hegemony of financial capital, these governments can be characterized as 
neoliberal, insofar as they adopted policies that benefitted a specific part of 
the bourgeoisie. In fact, what differentiates the PT governments from their 
antecessors is the re-accommodation of the other wing of the bourgeois 
class, mainly the large national bourgeoisie. 11  Another point of 
differentiation is that certain privileges were conceded to the working class. 
The point here is not to debate if this repackaged political economy would 
be enough to characterize the PT period as neo-developmentalist or as 
social-liberal etc. 12  Yet it is necessary to highlight the following: PT 
governments followed the economic policy rules that benefitted 
international financial capital, although it is necessary to take in to account 
that the remaining neoliberal policies suffered some setbacks under these 
governments.  
1) Trade liberalization was not as indiscriminate as it was in the 1990s. In 
fact it was quite the opposite, since the country had been achieving a surplus 
in the trade balance while it became a major commodities exporter. 
Furthermore, the focus on the national economy provided some recovery for 
some important sectors of national industry. 
                                                
11 BOITO, Jr. “Governos Lula: a nova burguesia nacional no poder”. Op. Cit. 
12 Boito Jr. Ibid., Martuscelli. Crises políticas e capitalismo neoliberal no Brasil. Op. Cit. 
and SINGER, André. “Cutucando onças com vara curta: o ensaio desenvolvimentista no 
primeiro mandato do governo Dilma (2011-2014)”. Op. Cit. present some disagreements 
related to terminology and the content of the analysis, but they agree that the PT 
governments adopted some neoliberal reforms and did not break ties with the hegemony of 
financial capital. 
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 2) Despite the advancement of privatization through concessions to and 
partnerships with the private sector, as well as some privatizations, no single 
large-sized companies were privatized.  
3) There was no great advance in the flexibilization of labour laws. 
However, it is possible to identify the loss of some labour and social rights, 
as shown in the Social Security Reform in 2003, which did away with some 
historical rights of public sector workers. The PT governments also 
implemented the First Employment Contract and the Legal Entity Contract 
that, respectively, reduced the employment stability of young workers and 
allowed the hiring of service workers as if they were private companies.13 
4) And last, but not least, it is crucial to draw attention to the fact that, in the 
first 12 years of the PT governments up to Dilma’s first term, there were 
considerable achievements for the working class. Formal job growth, the 
minimum wage and real wages rose, poverty declined through 
compensatory policies, the public service was enlarged and higher education 
vacancies expanded. This is diametrically opposed to what occurred in the 
previous 12 years when there were job losses, wage restraints and  reduction 
of the public sector.  
The next section will address how the Brazilian trade union movement 
reacted to these developments.  
 
CUT in face of neoliberalism 
Considering the period from 1990 to 2002, CUT opposed the neoliberal 
policies implemented by the Collor, Itamar Franco and Cardoso 
governments. This opposition can be explained by taking into account three 
factors. First, a programmatic matter: CUT had as a principle the 
conciliation of the working class’ historical and short-term objectives. In 
this regard, it defended a socialist perspective, but negotiated improvements 
in capitalism through a national-developmentalist agenda promoted by the 
state. This aspect differentiated it from neoliberalism. Second, a party-
political interest: the neoliberal project that won the 1989, 1994 and 1998 
presidential elections were against Lula of the Partido dos Trabalhadores – 
PT (Workers’ Party) one of the founders of CUT.14 Finally, it is important to 
                                                
13 GALVÃO, Andréia. “A reconfiguração do movimento sindical no Governo Lula”, 
Outubro, n.18 1o. semestre 2009, pp. 176-200. 
14 The PT was founded in 1980 and CUT in 1983 as part of the ascension of trade union and 
popular movements that occurred during the context of Brazil’s period of re-
democratization. Lula was the leader of historical metalworkers’ strikes at the end of 1970s 
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consider a pragmatic point: CUT’s basis was directly affected by neoliberal 
policies, composed not only by the public sector, but also by traditional 
sectors (banks, industry etc.) noted by their capital accumulation in the 
public and private spheres. Before the election of the PT in 2002, the 
national trade union central was totally against privatizations, trade 
liberalization, flexibilization of labour rights and cuts to social spending 
since these policies harmed workers through the precarisation of work and 
the increase in unemployment. It is important to note that CUT not only 
adopted positions against privatization, but also resisted through strike 
actions in the sectors which they had organized. One of the most important 
strikes in this period was by CUT-organized oil workers in 1995, which 
ended up with military intervention after more than 30 days of paralyzation. 
This event actually delayed Cardoso’s project to break Petrobras’ state 
monopoly that was only accomplished three years later. 
In short, it is possible to affirm that CUT resisted the hard core of 
neoliberalism. However, CUT’s opposition to neoliberal policies was 
marked by contradictions. Some of its metalworker union affiliates in the 
ABC region15, São Paulo’s industrial belt, used sectorial committees, among 
other means, to negotiate the flexibilization of labour rights using the 
maintenance of employment as an excuse. This kind of practice became 
recurrent in CUT unions and was the subject of intense debates, tensions 
and disputes. Besides that, it is worth remembering that the entity went 
through deep ideological shifts, changing it from a class-based and 
combative trade unionism to a much more conciliatory and propositive 
unionism, constructed through collusion with management and the 
promotion of social services for union members. This was dubbed by some 
CUT leaders as “citizen trade unionism”. Finally, even rhetorically 
criticizing unemployment, CUT bought into the argument that 
unemployment was the individual responsibility of the worker who did not 
have sufficient training. As such, CUT unions worked with the Fundo de 
Amparo ao Trabalhador – FAT, a federal support program financed from 
trade union coffers to promote training programs. In this context, in 1999 
CUT created its own training organs, the Central de Trabalho e Renda 
(Work and Income Agency Federation) and the Agência de 
                                                                                                                        
and the beginning of the 1980s when he also devoted himself to the foundation of the party 
and became its first president. 
15 The region in Greater São Paulo where CUT was originally born. It is the site of 
important metal industries such as the largest vehicle assembling companies in the country. 
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Desenvolvimento Solidário – ADS (Solidarity Development Agency). 16 
Summarizing, CUT was not immune to the impact of neoliberal ideology. 
In this sense, neoliberal policies and productive restructuring forced CUT 
trade unions to retreat and demonstrated that the level of resistance 
depended not only on the tools available in each moment, but also on the 
ideological beliefs that began to prevail in the union central.17 We can 
conclude that CUT fought against the hard core of neoliberal policies, but 
these policies put the union central on the defensive, reducing its margin of 
action, and in part, some of its trade unions adhered passively to neoliberal 
premises. 
With the beginning of the Lula governments in 2003, the political-trade 
unionist perspective suffered deep changes. For the first time in its history, 
CUT became aligned to the federal government. In this sense, it supported 
most of the measures and programs of the government, apart from the fact 
that many of its leaders participated directly in the government through 
nominations to ministries and secretaries. This support, however, did not 
prevent contradictions to arise when its interests were opposed or just not 
attended, even though these reactions were not as hard as when the PT was 
in opposition. In other words, although there were some disagreements 
related to certain measures, this opposition was rarely shown since CUT 
never stood up to the government. The dispute for hegemony defended by 
the union central became more internal, considering that the central itself 
was a key part of the government.  
In the first years of Lula’s government, there was dissatisfaction with the 
continuation of neoliberal economic policy and the delay in attending some 
historical demands from the “popular-democratic field”. This tension in 
CUT’s relation to the government was felt even in the first months of Lula’s 
first term when the government pushed through a Social Security Reform18, 
                                                
16 SOUZA, Davisson C. C. Sindicalismo e desempregados: um estudo comparativo das 
centrais sindicais do Brasil e da Argentina (1990-2002). Belo Horizonte: Fino Traço, 2013. 
17 We have already shown in a previous paper the relation between the evolution of strikes 
and political, economic and ideological factors that related to each other through a complex 
and contradictory articulation. See SOUZA, Davisson C. C., TRÓPIA, Patrícia Vieira. 
“Greves, conjuntura político-econômica e transformações ideológicas no sindicalismo 
brasileiro recente (1989-2013)”. Anais III Conferência Internacional Greves e Conflitos 
Sociais. Barcelona, junho de 2015. 
18 CUT presented a dual position in the face of the Reforma da Previdência (Social Security 
Reform).Its intervention in the discussion process was unbalanced and defensive, because 
since Lula assumed the presidency, the union central was a supporting force of the 
government. Luiz Marinho, the president at that time, was clearly a defender of the reforms 
even though he was aware of the pressure and resistance by public sector unions within the 
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which restricted rights and made public service pension rules more flexible. 
Public-sector unions constituted one of CUT’s key sectors. The tensions and 
disputes became more challenging in the following years, resulting in splits 
by socialist trade unionists from CUT who eventually formed two minor 
left-wing centrals: Conlutas - Central Sindical e Popular – Coordenação 
Nacional de Lutas (Popular National Trade Union Central), in 2004, and 
Intersindical – Central da Classe Trabalhadora (Intersindical – Working-
Class Central), in 2006. 
Legal reforms regulating trade union representation contributed to these 
divisions. Since the promulgation of Law 11.648/2008 in 2008, that 
officially recognized labour union federations as entities representing 
workers, the entities themselves, the ones with significant importance, 
began to collect resources from the trade union tax.19 It was in the heart of 
these changes that the Corrente Sindical Classista (Classist Trade Union 
Current) along with the Partido Comunista do Brasil – PCdoB (Communist 
Party of Brazil), which had historically offered support to the trade union 
structure, left CUT and founded in 2007, the Central dos Trabalhadores e 
Trabalhadoras do Brasil (CTB) – (Workers Central of Brazil). Taking into 
account that, in this period, the União Geral dos Trabalhadores – UGT 
(General Union of Workers Central) and the Nova Central Sindical de 
Trabalhadores – NCST (New Labour Union Central), emerged as 
representative entities, the conclusion is that, during Lula’s government, the 
trade union map was reconfigured and ended up much more fragmented.20 
Although CUT is still the largest Brazilian union central, it no longer 
competes only with the FS.  
Under Lula’s governments, the trade union map in Brazil thus underwent 
two major changes: on one hand, it became more fragmented with the 
creation of several union centrals; on the other, the hegemonic sectors – 
CUT and FS –, previous political opponents, joined together in support of 
                                                                                                                        
trade union centrals. According Freitas, CUT’s defensive intervention in the Social Security 
Reform happened also because the union central did not assume retirement as a possible 
way of reducing the weekly work week. FREITAS, Revalino de. “Sindicalismo, reforma da 
Previdência e Tempo de Trabalho: o caso da CUT. Trabalho apresentado no XII Congresso 
Brasileiro de Sociologia, realizado na UFMG, Belo Horizonte MG, de 31 de maio a 3 de 
junho de 2005. 
19 It is essential to remember that the Trade Union Reform maintained the pillars of the 
trade union structure: uniqueness, compulsory contributions and the role of the Labour 
Courts in decisions related to labour conflicts. The trade union tax comprised the main 
source of funding for trade unions in Brazil. It amounted to the collection of one full day of 
wages per year of every unionized worker. 
20 GALVÃO, Andréia; TRÓPIA, Patrícia Vieira; MARCELINO, Paula. As bases sociais 
das novas centrais sindicais brasileiras. Curitiba: Appris editora, 2015.  
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the federal government. However, we disagree with the thesis that struggles 
in Brazil underwent a process of pacification with the arrival of the PT in 
the presidency, or that CUT had been “co-opted” by the government. 
First, it is essential to mention that in the case of CUT trade unionism the 
term “co-optation” does not apply precisely. It is nonsense to say that an 
entity is co-opted by a government of which it is part, not only through 
composing its supporting base, but also for providing personnel in key 
positions. In addition, if we take as an indicator of trade union mobilization 
the most important instrument of struggle – strikes – it is clear that strike 
action did not begin to suffer during Lula’s governments. Moreover, from 
the middle of his second term, strikes increased with the peak occurring 
during Dilma Rousseff’s first government. During the Cardoso 
governments, the annual average number of strikes fell from 861 in the first 
term (1995-1998) to 436 in the second term (1999-2002). Considering 
Lula’s first term, it fell even more, reaching the minimum level of 315 
strikes a year in his first term (2003-2006) and increasing to 423 again in his 
second term (2007-2010). Yet strikes averaged 1,159 per year in the first 
three years of Dilma’s government. 21  In 2013, for instance, Dieese –
Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Socioeconômicos – 
(Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies) recorded 
2,050 strikes in Brazil, a number that surpassed the peak of 1,962 strikes in 
1989 and establishing a 30-year record in Brazil. How, then, did CUT 
behave during the governments of Lula and Dilma? 
The PT’s ascension to power was welcomed by CUT as an electoral victory 
over the neoliberal project. It would thus open up a new scenario while 
creating favorable conditions to overcome that model. However, while 
evaluating the first months of the first presidential term of Lula, CUT 
argued that the election victory was not enough and that overcoming 
neoliberalism would not be automatic, given the legacy of previous 
governments and the dispute that would happen with politicians aligned to 
neoliberalism, including those in alliance which formed the base of support 
in the Congress for the PT government.22  
However, even being aware of these limits overall, CUT’s expectation was 
that PT governments would make further progress. The union central called 
for measures that would reverse the privatization process of state-owned 
companies. Even though the PT never carried out the privatization of large 
                                                
21 The full details are mentioned in SOUZA and TRÓPia, “Greves, conjuntura político-
econômica e transformações ideológicas no sindicalismo brasileiro recente (1989-2013)”. 
Op. Cit. 
22 CUT. Resoluções 8o. CONCUT. São Paulo, junho de 2003.  
54	   Patrícia Vieira Trópia and Davisson C. Cangussu de Souza 	  
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 9, May 2018, p. 44-62 
 
state-owned companies, they did continue to privatize and never considered 
reverting the auctions of state-owned enterprises conducted in the 1990s. 
The union centre also advocated for a renegotiation and audit of the public 
debt. However, PT governments continued subordinating the public budget 
to financial capital23, including the issue of new debt and primary surplus 
targets that become increasingly stifling to the national economy. CUT also 
demanded the taxation of financial capital. Yet except for a short period 
during Dilma’s government, when interest rates fell, PT governments 
remunerated financial capital on a massive scale. 
During the discussion process of tax reform in the government’s first 
months, CUT made the following analysis: “It is necessary, however, to be 
bolder and more determined for the accomplishment of a true tax reform 
that aims at correcting the inherited distortions”.24 However, what we 
noticed in Lula’s government was an increase in tax exemptions for 
business through partnerships and public policy management. In addition, in 
relation to economic policy, CUT expected changes such as reduced interest 
rates, the end of primary surplus and of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (a law 
created to establish goals and limits in public spending). As we have shown, 
however, Lula and Dilma followed the neoliberal tenets established during 
Cardoso’s second term to the letter.  
Additionally, there was a great expectation for agrarian reform. Instead, the 
government favored the largest agribusinesses although it also promoted a 
microfinance policy for family farms. Yet there was quite limited progress 
in the expropriation of unused land to distribute to small-scale producers.In 
the labour rights area, there was also no progress related to CUT’s two other 
demands: the reduction of working hours and the “revocation of the 
provisional measures and laws for the flexibilization of labour rights 
adopted in Cardoso's government”.  
For what reason then would the union central keep its ties with PT 
governments? 
Using as a parameter the criteria used to evaluate the 1990s, we can assume 
that this support occurred for reasons of a programmatic, pragmatic and 
partisan order. CUT has never ceased to show its dissatisfaction with the 
continuation of neoliberal economic policies and the trifling improvement in 
many of its demands. But it still supported most of the government’s 
programs and measures such as the Bolsa Família program (Family Grant, a 
                                                
23 Even before being elected, in the Carta ao Povo Brasileiro (Letter to the Brazilian 
People) in 2002, Lula had announced to the banks and speculators that he would honor the 
previous governments’ financial commitments. 
24 CUT. Resoluções 8o. CONCUT. São Paulo, junho de 2003, p.35. 
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small but significant cash transfer from the federal government to the very 
poorest families), the popular credit incentive policy, especially around the 
housing program Minha Casa, Minha Vida (housing units for low-income 
families), the geopolitical realignment that valorized Mercosul and 
proximity to other Latin American left-wing governments. Among others, 
we can also mention the incentives for national businesses and the financing 
of productive activity through loans from the state development bank, 
BNDES, especially during the first edition of the Plano de Aceleração 
Econômica (PAC, Acceleration and Growth Plan) not to mention the growth 
in the trade unions representative roles such as the expansion of tripartite 
dialogues, the legal acceptance of union centrals after the trade union 
reforms, the minimum wage valuation policy, and so on.  
This support was also a result of a pragmatic question. The Brazilian 
working class as a whole – and CUT’s base in particular – enjoyed 
significant gains during PT governments with the increase in formal job 
creation, the expansion of public sector employment, real wage gains in 
negotiations, etc. Thus, the union central’s evaluation was that in the 
“wholesale” the gains were greater than the losses, including the relative 
stagnation in the labour rights area.  
Finally, we must consider the partisan issue. Even though its participation in 
the government was not unrestricted, the alliance between the CUT and PT 
was essential for this support, given the trade union leaders’ interest in 
participating directly in the government, holding positions and composing 
tripartite forums.  
It is crucial to remember that there were significant fluctuations in the PT 
governments. Therefore, we highlight as two key moments during this 
period, both of them during Dilma’s government, that were evaluated by the 
union central. In mid-2012, the reduction of interest rates25 was received 
with great enthusiasm by the union central: in fact, “The confrontation with 
and reduction of the power of financial capital was the great news coming 
from Dilma Rousseff’s government (...)”.26 During the president’s second 
term, the union central also played an important role in protests against the 
impeachment of Rouseff. Although it spoke out against some government 
measures aimed at fiscal adjustment, the union central admitted that: “CUT, 
since the beginning of Rousseff’s second term, has been advocating in favor 
                                                
25 This is a measure that is part of the so-called “developmentalist test” referred to by 
SINGER. “Cutucando onças com vara curta: o ensaio desenvolvimentista no primeiro 
mandato do governo Dilma (2011-2014)”. Op.Cit. 
26 CUT. Resoluções 11o. CONCUT. São Paulo, junho de 2012, p.15. 
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of Minister Levy’s economic policy changes, marked by a regressive and 
recessive character (CUT, 2015, idem, p. 48).  
  
Força Sindical in the face of neoliberalism 
In the 1990s, Força Sindical (FS) played a decisive role in disseminating the 
ideological aspects of neoliberalism to the Brazilian union movement.27 
Created in 1991 under the auspices of the Collor government, FS adhered to 
neoliberalism while defending programmatically privatization, deregulation 
of labour rights and the reduction of social spending, especially through its 
main union base formed by the Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de São Paulo – 
SMSP (São Paulo Metal Workers’ Union).  
During its founding Congress in 1991, in a clear contrast to CUT’s 
confrontational practice, FS proposed a unionism defined as “pro-
capitalist”, “modern”, results oriented and with a willingness to dialogue. 
The idea of partnership between capital and labour was one of the principles 
presented by the new national trade union centre. FS leaders criticized the 
“notarial” state and its excessive protectionism.28 In its campaign program, 
the union central was willing to fight for the idea that state-owned 
enterprises in strategic areas should not be privatized, preserving national 
sovereignty and patrimony. Nevertheless, it recognized the need to review 
the state’s role in sectors that “only entail losses to the people,” as well as 
“state-owned companies that serve only as administrative featherbedding”.29 
But, if in the origins of the FS we can talk about reconciliation, the union 
central’s firm adherence to neoliberalism occurred only during the first 
privatization process, more precisely that of Usiminas and Companhia 
Siderúrgica Nacional – CSN (Steel Producer Companies). 
In these events, the FS’ national leadership, especially Luiz Antonio de 
Medeiros, played a decisive role.  He was responsible for popularizing for 
the rank and file the discourse that state-owned companies were merely 
“administrative featherbedding” and propagated to workers of the 
companies that would be auctioned, the idea that, if they supported 
privatization, there would not be only a wage increases, but they would also 
become “partners with capital”.30 According to the union central, it would 
                                                
27  TRÓPIA, Patrícia Vieira. Força Sindical – Política e ideologia no sindicalismo 
brasileiro. Op.Cit.; GIANOTTI, Vito. Força Sindical a central neoliberal – de Medeiros a 
Paulinho. Rio de Janeiro: Mauad, 2002. 
28 FORÇA SINDICAL. "Congresso Nacional de Fundação". Ano I, no. 1, jun. de 1991.  
29 Ibid., p.47. 
30TRÓPIA, Patrícia Vieira. Força Sindical - Política e ideologia no sindicalismo brasileiro. 
Op.Cit. 
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be necessary to dismantle “privileges”, fight productive inefficiency through 
privatization, dissociation from the state and deregulation policies. In sum, 
the reduction of state intervention, an increase in private sector intervention 
and reconciliation between capital and labour would constitute the best 
recipe against the “broken” development model. 
During its first decade, FS served as a support base for the Collor and Itamar 
governments by disseminating to its rank and file free market vicissitudes, 
criticism of public services and by proposing and trying to implement the 
deregulation of labour laws as well as acting in the privatization process of 
Usiminas and CSN.31  
An intriguing question was presented: what interest then would the rank and 
file of this union central have in neoliberalism? FS spread a diffuse criticism 
of the public service, to the notarial state and the developmentalist model 
and, through this discourse, tried to attract its base – mainly composed by 
trade unions which belonged to the private urban industrial sector – 
favorably touting neoliberalism’s supposed benefits: efficiency, 
productivity, competition, consumer sovereignty and even job creation. 
The FS’s support for neoliberalism was not unconditional. Because of the 
perverse effects of neoliberal policies on their own base from 1995 onwards 
the union central began to criticize government economic policy and the 
trade liberalization that led to closing down industries and the explosion of 
unemployment. Because of this scenario, the union central actually 
participated in and supported in an unprecedented way some strike actions 
led by CUT such as the general strike of 1996. 
Nevertheless, FS never abandoned its neoliberal theses. For example, given 
its acceptance of the employer ideology, the union central dealt with 
unemployment through its management of the FAT’s resources to promote 
‘requalification’ courses until 1998, when the Centro de Solidariedade ao 
Trabalhador (Workers' Solidarity Centre) was created.32 According to the 
union central’s view, professional qualification would become the main 
weapon of trade unions (as training providers) leaving the workers 
themselves to cope with technological changes and new forms of 
employment and unemployment. 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 GALVÃO, Andréia. Neoliberalismo e reforma trabalhista no Brasil. Op.Cit; SOUZA, 
Davisson C. C. Sindicalismo e desempregados: um estudo comparativo das centrais 
sindicais do Brasil e da Argentina (1990-2002). Op.Cit.  
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What was the role of the FS during the PT governments? What was its role 
when it was confronted with a popular government, whose president had 
emerged from the ranks of its old antagonists, CUT and the PT? 
The two congresses held by FS in the 2000s, in our opinion, demonstrate a 
slight change in their ideological and political programs. During its 5th 
Congress, held in August 2005, the central directed its critique to the 
macroeconomic policy of the Lula government, saying it was in many ways 
a continuation of the FHC government. At its 6th Congress, held in July 
2009, the union central not only assumed its support for Lula’s government, 
but participated in it and, surprisingly, adopted a critical position of 
neoliberal policies. Was this just an ideological shift or just mere occasional 
support for the government of the day? 
During Lula’s first term (2003-2006), it is possible to observe the 
permanence of an austere macroeconomic policy, but in the second term 
(2007-2010), this policy combined a set of developmental policies with 
economic protectionist measures. These measures were evidently, especially 
in the face of the 2008-9 financial crisis, a favorable scenario for the unions 
affiliated to FS, which was composed primarily by workers in the private 
sector. 
After that, there were changes in labour legislation, which resulted in the 
Law 11.648/2008, which officially recognized labour union federations as 
entities representing workers. In this scenario, FS and CUT worked together 
and, more than that, become allies. Because of the Fórum Nacional do 
Trabalho – FNT (National Labour Forum), these national trade union 
centrals decided to defend common causes and, from 2007 onward, the very 
FS integrated the PT government.33 
This alliance caused reactions and divisions in the labour movement in 
general, and, in particular, within the FS. One result was the creation of the 
UGT, composed by former participants of Central Geral dos Trabalhadores 
– CGT (National Trade Union Central), the Social Democracia Sindical - 
SDS (Brazilian Social Democratic Party) and dissident sectors of the FS – 
such as the Sindicato dos Empregados no Comércio de São Paulo (Union of 
Commercial Workers in São Paulo). The dissidence of the last mentioned 
entity happened, to a large extent, due to its connection to CUT and the 
controversy surrounding compulsory contributions under the FNT. Besides 
the defense of common causes, CUT and FS held joint actions such as acts 
                                                
33 In 2007, Luiz Antonio de Medeiros was nominated as the Secretary of Labour Relations 
in the Ministry of Labour. 
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and unified campaigns for better wages and reduction of working hours to 
40 hours per week. 
However, economically, it is possible to identify part of FS’ opposition to 
the Lula government. Macroeconomic policy would be the subject of 
criticism and reactions that culminated in actions, campaigns and the 
proposition of legislation. But, the criticism of the FS of Lula’s 
macroeconomic policies had no class content and did not identify the 
dominance of finance capital and agribusiness allied with the industrial 
bourgeoisie although numerous criticisms were made of financial and tax 
policies which harmed domestic industry, increased unemployment rise and 
cut workers’ income. 
As seen earlier, CUT also directed similar criticism to the economic policies 
of the PT governments. However, we found some differences in the 
positioning of the two centrals in relation to the Lula governments. During 
the period in which CUT had an ambiguous position on the Social Security 
Reform, it was effectively backing the FS’s historical claims, which, since 
its inception has identified the public service as a source of privileges and 
“administrative featherbedding”.34 The union central’s position on social 
security was exposed and presented to the government at the beginning of 
February 2003. In order to justify its proposal, FS would repeat the widely 
disseminated discourses about the privileges and “injustices” related to two 
issues: the existence of a dual retirement system (public and private) and the 
high expenses to businesses. In this regard, among other changes, the FS 
proposed the creation of a single retirement system – which, in fact, would 
entail the end of retirement in the public sector.35 
Another point related to economic policy and criticized by FS, but absent in 
CUT criticism, was the economic opening to China. Besides FIESP 
(Federation of Industries in the State of São Paulo), FS expressed its 
dissatisfaction with Lula’s government, which, for recognizing China as a 
market economy, encouraged massive importation of Chinese products into 
the country. In addition, in association with FIESP and other employers, FS 
conducted a campaign for the reduction of the tax burden which, according 
to the union central, would encourage job creation in the country. 
However, according to our hypothesis, it is at the political-ideological level 
that significant changes can be seen in the FS. More precisely, the union 
                                                
34  TRÓPIA, Patrícia Vieira. Força Sindical – Política e ideologia no sindicalismo 
brasileiro. Op.Cit. 
35 It is important to mention that FS is the largest union federation in the private sector 
while CUT has the large insertion in the public sphere. 
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central went through an ideological shift in its 6th Congress, in 2009, when 
it abandoned some ideas and neoliberal principles that guided its foundation 
and its practice in the 1990s. The 6th Congress occurred in the context of 
the effects of the international financial crisis, which started in 2008, which 
induced the union centre to demand protectionist policies and direct severe 
criticism at the Lula government’s economic model and neoliberalism. For 
FS, the crisis resulted due to the predominance of speculative capital over 
the productive one, resulting in unrestricted freedom for the movement of 
capital and a deregulated financial system.36  
The 5th Congress also revealed a change in the FS profile. Although it 
continued as a general representative union central in the private and urban 
sector, the service sector trade unions and representative institutions for 
pensioners henceforth became the majority in the central. It is clear that the 
changes that occurred in the social base of the FS, verified since the 5th 
Congress, were reflected in its proposals and in its main action plan. On the 
one hand, issues related to pensioners, such as the campaign against the 
Social Security reforms and the minimum wage increase, showed the 
importance of this sector in the composition of the union centrals. On the 
other, we can say that the employment increase, salary gains and the 
minimum wage valuation policy, which was also positive to pensioners, 
benefited the FS rank and file. 
However, why was FS allied with the Workers’ Party governments? It was 
for the same reason that the union central, in the past, was allied with Collor 
and the PSDB governments. FS was a union central that allied itself to the 
government to secure privileges, but it did not intend to create a party, and 
despite not being nonpartisan, it did not have politicians with a national 
reference.37  
Only with the emergence of the political party Solidariedade – SD 
(Solidarity Party) in 2013, the FS and SD president, Paulinho da Força, 
became a major political reference and led the union central in opposition to 
Dilma Rousseff’s government. However, while the SD built a coalition to 
support Aécio Neves (PSDB) in his candidacy for the presidency in the 
2014 elections, FS did not have a clear opinion about which candidate it 
would support. While Paulinho da Força, FS President, supported Aécio, 
part of the leadership and the union central’s rank and file would support 
Dilma. The same division appeared recently in which Paulinho da Força and 
                                                
36 FORÇA SINDICAL. “Resoluções do 6º Congresso Nacional da Força Sindical”, Praia 
Grande, 29, 30 e 31 de julho de 2009. 
37 In the union central, we find leaders affiliated to various parties such as the PT, PSDB 
and PDT.  
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SD supported the demonstrations for the president’s impeachment, while the 
union central as a whole, which formed part of pro-government trade 
unions, supported the maintenance of Dilma as president. 
 
Final considerations 
How did the main forces in Brazilian trade unionism behave in the face of 
the neoliberalism? First, we can affirm that neoliberal policies were the 
vector for the disputes and alliances between the two main Brazilian 
national trade union centrals in the last 25 years - CUT and FS. The dispute 
between these union centrals was not constantly polarized: there were 
moments of convergence, such as that which occurred in 1996 and during 
the long period of alliances during the Lula governments and the first term 
of Dilma (more specifically, for the Fórum Nacional do Trabalho – FNT 
(National Labour Forum) until the creation of the SD when the FS itself was 
divided. 
The support/opposition given by CUT and FS to neoliberalism was not 
unanimous, continuous and without contradictions. Tensions and disputes 
between the union centrals and within them has even led to a sharp process 
of dissidence. The entity’s position in face of neoliberalism cannot be 
explained by purely programmatic reasons although the FS’s ideological 
transformation can best explain its closeness to CUT during the PT 
governments.  
The criticism/support of neoliberalism also depends on the interests of 
workers, who are represented by the base unions of the two union centrals. 
This explains the reason why CUT, which has many trade unions in the 
public sector, has never accepted the deterioration that occurred to services 
and to state employees. It also clarifies why the FS, the biggest union central 
in the private sphere, has revised some of its positions when the effects of 
neoliberal policies were felt more acutely by its rank and file.  
Finally, it depends on the alliances between the trade union lobby, political 
parties and governments. CUT is historically linked to PT becoming the 
Lula/Dilma governments’ main basis of support. FS is not partisan, but it 
has acted primarily as a union central that allies itself to the government in 
power. This explains, in part, their adherence to neoliberalism during the 
Collor and Cardoso governments, but also its programmatic shift in the 
2000s when it began to support and participate in PT governments.  
In short, both CUT and FS acted as an important basis of support for Lula 
and benefited from nominations to government posts (mainly by CUT, but 
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also in the FS), and participation in tripartite forums as well as being legally 
recognized as union centrals, which gave them permission to access the 
resources of the trade union tax. In this context, FS revised its positions and 
began to criticize aspects of the neoliberal project. Moreover, it is worth 
mentioning that the members of both union centrals benefited from the 
increase in formal jobs and salary gains during the Lula governments.  
The affiliation/critique made by the two main union centrals to 
neoliberalism contains limits and contradictions. CUT, an anti-neoliberal 
union central in the 1990s and in open opposition to the federal government 
partially criticized the continuity of neoliberalism in the PT governments, 
but never ceased to be one of its main allies. FS, an earlier defender of the 
neoliberal platform and allied to the governments that implemented it in the 
1990s, revised their theses and got closer to the PT governments during the 
2000s. In 2016-2017, CUT integrated the Frente Brasil Popular (Brazil 
Popular Front) with the slogan “no to the coup” defending the legitimacy of 
the elected government of Dilma even though it adopted measures contrary 
to workers’ interests by implementing austerity measures close to the 
neoliberal orthodoxy. 
  
 
The trajectory of the Chilean labour movement during the 
governments of the Concertación. Frame work agreement on 
strike subcontractors of CODELCO, 1990-2010 
Rodrigo Araya Gómez
1
  
 
his article aims to analyse the trajectory of the Chilean labour movement 
during the governments of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (In 
Spanish: Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia – CPPD). The 
actions of the Unified Workers’ Central of Chile (In Spanish: Central 
Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile – CUT) to constitute a trade unionism 
with greater representation at a national level will be the focus of this 
analysis. 
We argue that during the governments of the CPPD, the union movement 
faced a series of problems, expressed in the loss of relevance of CUT as a 
political and social actor nationwide. Thus, the conflicts experienced by the 
unions would be a reflection of the contradictions of the process of 
democratic consolidation due to the different expectations of change by 
workers and the objective of preserving social order by the governments of 
the CPPD as a fundamental requirement to ensure the success of the young 
Chilean democracy.
2
 That is, the lack of realization of the political and 
social democratization process influenced the history of the labour 
movement, which struggled to influence public policies and be also 
recognized as a valid social actor against other actors such as the business 
sector.
3
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Thus, the problems of the consolidation of Chilean unionism are linked to 
the demobilization of civil society, considered as an effect of the application 
of the neoliberal model as the policy of de-politicization of the Chilean 
society carried out by the military dictatorship, which sought to destroy 
traditional links between political parties and social movements. The 
dissociation between the political and the social was also stimulated by 
political dynamics developed by the governments of the CPPD, whose 
member parties, such as the Socialist Party (SP) or the Christian Democratic 
Party (CDP), ignored work within social organizations, favouring a type of 
political practice of an elitist character, which meant they lose their 
influence within social movements.
4
 
Studies on the trade union movement during the governments of the CPPD 
have been scarce because the academic production on trade unionism 
focused at first on the effects of the Labour Plan in the union action.
5
 Once 
democracy was restored, researchers linked to the sector of labour, such as 
Guillermo Campero
6
 and Patricio Frias
7
, studied the the orientations of the 
unions, included discussions on labour reforms and integration of trade 
unionism in the new democratic regime. The scarce progress made by the 
unions in the recovery of their rights led to the development of a critical 
literature, which highlighted the contributions of foreign authors like Joel 
Stillerman
8
 and Volker Frank.
9
 In recent years, there have been a number of 
studies that have analysed the problems of the labour movement due to the 
continuity of the inherited labour model from the dictatorship, highlighting 
the contributions of Sebastian Osorio, who approached from a Gramscian 
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perspective the trajectory of CUT during postdictatorial Chile
10
 and Antonio 
Aravena, Daniel Núñez and Sandra Leiva
11
, among others, who have 
studied the movements of subcontracted workers in an interpretive 
framework that refers to the concept of a new social question, to understand 
the effects of the neoliberal model in the working world. 
Bearing in mind the above contributions, this work will focus on the history 
of the union movement, represented by the CUT, as a political-social actor 
in a dynamic relationship with the governments of the CPPD. 
 
Unionism in transitional times. Between social dialogue and debate on 
labour reforms. 
At the beginning of the new democratic period, most of the CUT leaders 
belonged to the CPPD. The Central sought to adapt to the new political 
context initiating a dialogue with business organizations to agree on reforms 
to the Labour Code inherited from the dictatorship, parallel to the policy of 
the Aylwin of holding a social dialogue that would help consolidate the new 
democratic regime. Thus, there was a moderation in union actions reflected 
in the abandonment of a class-based discourse and demands solely related to 
improving the living conditions of workers. This was a policy assumed by 
the unions linked to Christian democracy and the renewed socialism of the 
SP. However, this position was not unanimous within the CUT because the 
sectors linked to the Communist Party (CP) were opposed to the 
abandonment of the policy of social mobilization, especially taking into 
account the programmatic definitions of the party, focused on working in 
social organizations as a way to cope with their position of political 
marginality and remain relevant at a time when its historical reference, the 
USSR, was in terminal phase.
12
 
These changes in trade union orientations were reflected in the position 
taken by most leaders of CUT who supported the policy of sustained social 
dialogue by the Aylwin government, whose first achievement was the 
signing of the Framework Agreement of April 1990, highlighted by several 
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authors as a key milestone in the consolidation of the Labour Plan. Initially, 
most of the leaders of CUT and sectors of the leftist CPPD would have 
supported the restoration of the old labour standards since it meant 
recovering the rights lost by the enactment of the Labour Plan.
13
 This was 
clear in the final declaration of the Constituent Congress of the CUT that 
demanded “that the Labour Code be repealed, imposed by the dictatorship 
and legislation passed with active participation of the CUT inspired by the 
principles of worker protection and freedom of association and collective 
bargaining”.14 
However, an intermediate position was imposed, pointing to a partial reform 
of the Labour Code inherited from the dictatorship. Thus, the coalitionist 
leaders of CUT supported the signing of the Framework Agreement of April 
1990 in view of reaching a social pact with the government and the business 
community. Although the Agreement cannot be considered strictly as a 
social pact
15
, but rather as a statement of good intentions, it served to 
legitimize the neoliberal model on the labour side, as parties renounced a 
policy of confrontation and assumed the primary role of private enterprise in 
the country’s development, ideas that constituted a break with the historical 
project of Chilean unionism. 
Now this first reading of legitimacy of the neoliberal model as a result of the 
Framework Agreement must also be analysed considering the complexity of 
the union sector, where a strong presence of the extra-parliamentary left 
remained, especially communist militants who opposed the deal.
16
 The 
Communists criticized the policy of consensus with the right wing and the 
responsibilities of the government forces in the slow progress of the 
promised changes, establishing itself as a political force which reflected the 
                                                 
13
 The Labour Plan consisted of a set of decree-laws dictated in 1979 whose objective was 
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legacy of the struggle of Chilean workers, a speech that touched deeply 
sectors of the Chilean labour movement. 
The effectiveness of the social dialogue process was tested in the debate on 
reforms to the Labour Plan, jointly promoted by the government and CUT, 
but with substantial differences regarding the matters to change, since the 
Central demanded the effective right to strike, negotiation by branch and the 
end to unfair dismissal among other matters, while the government was only 
willing to improve the legislation. Thus, the discussion of labour reforms 
represented a milestone in the history of the CUT because it questioned its 
influence in the areas of power, especially within the government and the 
parliament. The debate was high between the various actors both because of 
the refusal of business organizations to modify the Labour Plan and by the 
insistence of the Central in demanding substantive labour law changes, 
while the Aylwin government tried to mediate between the two players with 
the aim to secure an agreement on some reforms. 
CUT leaders made several attempts to get support from Congress for their 
proposals, supported by parliamentarians of union origin. Thus, there were 
numerous summonses by the Central to the Congress to approve changes to 
the Labour Plan, even threatening protests if changes were not supported. 
However, there was no will to interpellate congressmen, who negotiated the 
reform process according to parliamentary dynamics itself, leaving CUT 
relegated to an interlocutory role in the social sphere but lacking binding 
powers. Thus, the discussion for labour reform was centred in the Congress, 
with no real presence of social actors, who have become mere spectators in 
a scenario that ceased to belong to them. 
After several months of parliamentary debate, the pressure of the rightist 
bloc in the Senate persuaded the government to accept a counterproposal 
reform even if it was rejected by CUT, which regarded that most proposals 
were left out of the debate. Therefore, the negotiation process reflected the 
limits of the transitional process, as the approved changes were made “to the 
extent possible”, that is to say, according to the correlation of forces and the 
current economic thinking, inclined to neoliberalism, but with a different 
name. 
Thus, the result of this first debate was negative for the Central because it 
could not successfully defend their approaches, losing the political initiative 
against the government and parliament. Despite this failure, the leading 
members of CUT refused to change their policy, due to the relationship of 
loyalty and collaboration established with the government, which led them 
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to value the obtained changes to the legislation, a position defended by the 
unions linked to the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party.
17
  
However, the debate sparked by the reforms eroded the official leadership 
of the Central, who were questioned by the leftist extra-parliamentary 
opposition and a number of union organizations. The official position of 
most leaders of the Central provoked the departure of a number of 
organizations that once supported the formation of CUT with the result of a 
gradual reduction in members. Therefore, the debate over labour reforms 
put a strain on the Central and divided its leadership, and strengthened the 
position of the Communist Party, an organization that was slowly 
recovering in the union world that it had lost after the reconstitution of CUT 
in August 1988. 
The insufficiency of the approved reforms and even the negative effects of 
some changes, as occurred with the addition of the “business necessity” 
clause instead of the “without-cause” dismissal, led to new demands from 
trade unions, which continued to demand changes to the labour laws 
inherited from the dictatorship. Thus, expectations of change for the trade 
union movement during the Aylwin government were frustrated by the lack 
of reforms to consolidate the Labour Plan. In addition, CUT weakened due 
to questionings of its leadership and the development of a series of 
processes that demonstrated the existence of a crisis in union activity, such 
as the reduction of its rate of membership and the coverage of collective 
negotiation after a brief rise in union activity indicators from 1990 to 1992. 
These problems showed a phenomena existing not only in Chile, but 
globally, where unions lost influence as social organizations at the expense 
of individualistic practices in free market societies, while traditional labour-
based leftist parties experienced changes of leaders and militants, as 
occurred with the Chilean Socialist Party. 
Dissatisfaction with labour reforms was reflected in the proposals by CUT 
to the presidential candidates in 1993, being favourably considered by 
candidates from the leftist Movimiento de Izquierda Allende, Eugenio 
Pizarro, and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle from the CPPD. The latter was 
supported by Manuel Bustos and Arturo Martinez, despite existing 
disagreements between the Central and the Aylwin government. The 
candidate Frei Ruiz-Tagle promised to make further changes to labour 
legislation, an understandable position within the electoral situation, but 
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observers cast doubts on the real will to change according to the political 
trajectory of the coalition and the continuity of the authoritarian enclaves.
18
 
The CPPD retained power by the triumph of Frei Ruiz-Tagle while Pizarro, 
the candidate supported by the Communist Party, counted with a small 
percentage of votes. In Congress, a correlation of forces remained favorable 
to the Coalition, although it was influenced by the presence of designated 
senators, a fact that anticipated difficulties in the compliance of labour 
promises made by Frei Ruiz-Tagle. 
Therefore, at the beginning of the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
(1994-2000), the labour movement found itself in a situation of latent crisis, 
which increased during the years of the second Christian Democratic 
president. The absence of a cordial relationship between the Central and the 
new government became apparent with the failure of the minimum wage 
negotiations of that year, since the government did not accept the proposal 
by CUT, sending the readjustment bill without agreement from social 
actors, a situation which also represented a failure of the almost exhausted 
social coordination policy.
19
 The discontent in the Central was also 
expressed in its removal from the trilateral commissions, arguing against 
neoliberal turn of the CPPD governments and showing dissatisfaction with 
the changes to labour legislation.
20
 The executive branch, meanwhile, 
rejected this argument and even seemed to accept the claims from union 
members to decide to raise a new bill to the labour reform in 1995. 
The constant clash of positions between CUT and the government finally 
took its first political victims in the trade union sector. Indeed, the Bustos 
leadership, worn out by years of presidency and work with the government, 
was questioned by the opposition represented by the Communists and by 
sectors linked to socialism.
21
 Moreover, the proposed new labour reforms 
introduced in 1995 continued with the dynamics of the previous proposal, 
that is, they had to be negotiated in Parliament under the conditions of the 
parliamentary right, which had power of veto to prevent changes that were 
contrary to their interests, while the CUT tried to pressure the Parliament 
through demonstrations or public campaigns denouncing parliamentarians 
opposed to labour reforms. 
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 In the commemoration of 1 May 1995, Manuel Bustos was attacked by left-wing 
extremist protesters. La Época, 2 May 1995, p.12. 
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Thus, CUT was unable to obtain positive results in the discussion on labour 
reforms, which contributed to a breakdown of the rule of the Central during 
the elections of April 1996. This situation was relevant, because unlike the 
previous elections, there was no unanimity within the union currents about 
the presidency of the entity, as had happened with Manuel Bustos, who had 
exercised leadership in the trade union movement since the late 70s when he 
presided the Coordinadora Nacional Sindical (National Union Coordinator). 
The parties linked to the CPPD were on separate lists, a fact that favored the 
Communist Party, who went upward in relation to its support among 
working sectors. The Communists aspired to regain their seat in the union 
movement, protected by base work and electoral successes in social 
organizations, where they picked up the discontent of sectors disenchanted 
with CPPD policies. 
In March 1996, the Communists announced their proposal to workers, 
containing various thematic areas with an approach based on their 
conception of CUT. Thus, the Communists proposed as objectives for the 
Central: “We promote the need for a class-conscious, powerful, unitary, 
broad, democratic, representative, pluralistic and unique organization, 
qualities that should be the conclusion of a collective consciousness that 
reach workers”,22 and with it they defended the autonomy of the labour 
movement. Finally, the Communists proposed the formation of strong 
unions that were able to make their agreements respected by the government 
and business organizations, moving towards the unity of the unions by 
industry. 
Therefore, there were many factors involved in the internal elections of the 
Central, even though political influence had diminished compared to the 
beginning of the new democratic period. The results were favourable to the 
Communists who upped their number of directors from 10 to 16 while the 
Christian Democrats fell from 17 to 11 directors and the Socialist Party fell 
from 16 to 15 directors. The Communists interpreted these results as a 
triumph by becoming the main political force in the Central, an 
accomplishment that came to confirm their questioning approach of the 
model, expressed in the adhesion of sectors that had previously voted for 
candidates linked to the Coalition. 
After complex negotiations, an intermediate formula was reached, by which 
a socialist leader with little public presence, Roberto Alarcón, was elected 
president. This was consequence of an agreement between the Communists 
and the supporters of Arturo Martinez. The new direction would be 
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temporary, promising to hold elections in 1998, which would be a future 
factor of instability for the Central. 
The change in the correlation of forces had a twofold effect: on the one 
hand, it weakened the internal cohesion of the Central, with the emergence 
of a constant antagonism between those linked to the Coalition and the 
representatives of the leftist trade unions; and on the other hand, it 
questioned the foundations of the union sector, on which union action was 
based, as a discussion was held on the legitimacy of the neoliberal model 
and the continuity of it during the democratic governments, a problem that 
would be reflected in the debate over labour reforms. Thus, the trade union 
movement represented by CUT was turning to questioning the neoliberal 
model, considering formulating an alternative project that considered the 
historic demands of Chilean unionism, for which it defended the validity of 
social mobilization as an instrument of struggle, but also being aware that 
the structure of political opportunities was not favourable to that expression 
of collective action. Therefore, many times throughout the study period, 
threats to call strikes remained at the rhetorical level, reflecting a language 
that some critics would consider as stagnant and outdated. 
Finally, we note that the weaknesses and contradictions of the labour 
movement represented in CUT were again put in evidence during the debate 
on new labour reforms, a project whose state of discussion remained in the 
background in the context of a new electoral situation in the 1999 
presidential elections, in which the socialist Ricardo Lagos from the CPPD 
was presented as a candidate. In this electoral context, the government 
treated with utmost urgency the labour reform bill, which had been stalled in 
Congress since January 1995, forcing the Senate to vote on it in November 
1999. The Frei government's decision attracted immediate rejection from 
business organizations and in the debate the reforms became polarized 
between supporters of both candidates because the right wing was strongly 
opposed to its approval by appealing to the majority it had in the Senate, so 
that the project was rejected in an intense voting session, which was 
postponed until the new year. Now, the CUT had no more interference in 
that debate, which stood at a parliamentary level, where its influence or 
pressure was lower compared to the employers’ organizations. The Central 
supported the project, rejecting the attitude of employers and some 
government MPs who were likely to again postpone the parliamentary 
process. 
The position of CUT was expressed by the acting president, the Communist 
Etiel Moraga who along with other leaders argued that although “the 
proposed reforms are still insufficient, they consider them at least a partial 
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advance, warning that its approval does not mean that the Central would 
stop to insist on a serious and profound reform to the legislation that 
governs us”.23 Therefore, the possible rejection or approval of the labour 
reform bill would not mean that the CUT would renounce its demands for 
changes, bearing in mind that the forthcoming Ricardo Lagos government 
announced, in theory, a new political air in the country. 
 
A new CUT? The union movement in the XXI century 
The government of Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006), was a milestone for the 
development of democratic governments, as he was the first socialist 
president after Salvador Allende. The new Minister of Labour, the socialist 
Ricardo Solari, maintained a collaborative relationship with the president of 
CUT, Arturo Martinez, as both shared militancy in the SP. The leader of 
CUT had managed to be elected president of the Central, in August 2000, 
replacing the communist leader Etiel Moraga, who was the acting president.  
Despite the presence of a socialist militant in the Ministry of Labour, the 
dynamics of negotiation of labour reform bills did not experience major 
changes, continuing the transactional logic born in the Aylwin years. That 
is, the government sought consensus among the actors involved: workers 
and employers during the pre-legislative work, in order to facilitate 
discussion in Parliament and subsequent approval of the project. However, 
this method of working was detrimental to CUT, because both the Central 
and employer organizations had irreconcilable differences over the so-called 
“hard reforms”, such as collective bargaining by branch, the end of 
replacement workers during strikes or the regulation of outsourcing.
24
 In 
essence, the approach of CUT corresponded to the pending debt of the so-
called transitional process, demands that had been systematically postponed 
because they would affect the foundations or pillars of the neoliberal model, 
a reason that would explain the cutting rejection from business to 
incorporate them in the debate on the reform of the Labour Code. 
In addition, an important part of the debate was confined to parliament, a 
stage that remained immune to possible pressure from social movements, 
but prone to the practice of lobbying, especially from the business sector. 
However, CUT leaders themselves established relationships with the 
government, failing to debate the reforms among its union base, a practice 
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that did not stimulate the development of a more active trade union 
movement. 
The debate also raised differences within the CPPD, since the “liberal wing” 
of the Christian Democrats opposed aspects of the proposed reform, 
coinciding in their positions with the parliamentary right and the business 
sector. On the other hand, the employers’ associations developed a strong 
media campaign against the reforms, also supported by the unfavourable 
economic context marked by the “Asian crisis” that served to justify the 
fears of a deceleration in economic activity because of rules that would alter 
labour flexibility or stimulate the power of the unions. 
Finally, the Lagos government supported a bill that would consider the 
points that were agreed between entrepreneurs and workers, leaving matters 
where there was no consensus aside, as was the case of the “hard reforms”. 
Thus, a transitional logic that is not justified considering the changes in the 
situation was followed, represented in the loss of power of General Pinochet 
and therefore in the threat of an authoritarian regression, an argument that 
had been useful to align positions in complex moments of parliamentary 
discussion. Basically, the type of political practice of the Aylwin and Frei 
Ruiz-Tagle governments were anachronistic in the new century, a problem 
that contributed to the separation of the political class from civil society. 
The CUT attended, with no power, to the development and approval of the 
new package of labour reforms in September 2001, a process that generated 
much criticism against the government senators who supported the business 
approaches. The secretary general of the Central, the communist Jose Ortiz, 
declared: 
While the current project is less bad than current legislation and that 
which emanated from the Senate project, the reforms ‘do not meet 
expectations or the workers or the CUT’, because the more substantive 
topics remain unresolved, such as eliminations of intercompany 
strikebreakers and negotiation, and the concept of what a company is is 
quite diffuse.
25
 
Although the new approved norms constituted a breakthrough, with Frías
26
 
arguing that the new legislation ended the union transition, the continuity of 
demands for further changes to the Labour Code revealed the dissatisfaction 
of many working sectors to the policy followed by the Central, a 
disaffection that contributed to the permanent crisis of CUT. 
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Now, CUT sought to adapt to the challenges of the XXI century by updating 
its mission statement, but without renouncing traditional instruments of 
struggle such as strikes. Thus, the Central began a slow path to social 
opposition against the Lagos government, despite its socialist militant 
President Martinez. Given the government's decision to advance in the 
signing of free trade agreements without considering the opinion of the 
workers’ organizations and suggesting the possibility of studying the 
application of rules of labour flexibility according to requests from business 
associations, CUT resolved to call for a general strike on August 13, 2003. 
This call for a national stoppage was the first of its kind since April 1989 
and marked a turning point in the history of trade unionism, increasingly 
aligned to anti-neoliberal positions. While the labour movement had no 
ability to conduct a strike that would alter production processes, it could 
question the apparent unanimity against the neoliberal model, considered as 
a key task by the CPPD a decade ago. The strike was carried out despite the 
dissent of leaders linked to the ruling party and the hostile right wing media 
campaign. For the leaders, the strike was successful because it had shown a 
mobilized people, with El Siglo remembering the old days against the 
Pinochet dictatorship. 
In parallel to the call for a general strike, there was also a refoundational 
Extraordinary Congress of CUT, which ended on 24 August 2003. This 
instance, the highest level contemplated according to the statutes of the 
organization, aimed to develop and update the statement of principles and 
platform of struggle according to the changes experienced by the country 
over the past 15 years since Chile had consolidated its position in the 
globalized world. 
According to reports from El Siglo, Congress resolutions determined the 
rejection of the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the USA and the 
support for regional integration initiatives such as MERCOSUR (Southern 
Common Market). In addition, resolutions argued that “through its actions, 
CUT must pursue to influence the reorientation of national economic 
growth and distribution of wealth that would mean greater investment in 
health, education and social security,” adding that “it is urgent to build a 
solidarity state for equity, concerned for welfare, democratic, pluralistic and 
participatory. For these reasons, the Congress resolved to fight to re-
nationalize the basic services that were privatized”.27 
Finally, the Congress concluded with a resolution that proposed the 
transformation of CUT into a socio-political movement that would lead the 
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fight against neoliberalism. Therefore, this instance was important because 
it placed the Central in a position of clear opposition to neoliberalism, 
unlike the earlier declaration of 1988, so that the traditional character of 
unionism was reconsidered as an agent of change, a fact that for some 
leaders was a regression within the modern definition of unionism while 
others embraced the deep sense of unionism as a social movement. 
Arturo Martinez added that defining unionism as a socio-political movement 
involved: 
persevering for an integral quality-life for workers contemplating the 
conquest of work and decent wages, the right to health, education, social 
security. Rights that can only be achieved and exercised in a true 
democracy, with liberty and justice. Because democracy is not only 
electing and being elected, democracy also means rights and if they have 
not reached the people, democracy will not have reached them.
28
 
Therefore, the CUT president referred to a substantial concept of 
democracy, based on the full enjoyment of economic and social rights by 
citizens, a goal the Central aspired to reach, while it also openly criticized 
the problems of inequality that had increased during the democratic 
governments.
29
 
The conclusions of the Congress pointed to an aggiornamiento from the 
Central and an increase in its membership to strengthen the union within an 
unfavourable context for collective action. However, despite the challenges 
to the validity of the union as an effective and legitimate tool for defending 
the interests of workers, the fundamental element of union action, the 
collective action of a group of people who share certain working conditions, 
will remain in force and will continue in the next few years with the 
emergence of new trade unions. 
Thus, the concept of the “new social question”30 becomes relevant due to 
the formation of a new political and social scenario marked by the 
precariousness of working conditions and the emergence of labour 
organizations that contradicted the voices that claimed the anachronism of 
the union. Indeed, we propose that during the first government of Michelle 
Bachelet (2006-2010), there would be a revival of the labour movement 
from the base, surpassing the margins of action of CUT itself. Indeed, from 
the most dynamic areas of the national economy, such as the fishing 
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industry, forestry and mining new representative organizations of workers 
emerged, who would try to conduct negotiations by branch despite its legal 
prohibition bearing in mind that the vast majority of them corresponded to 
subcontracted workers. Therefore, new demands aimed at improving the 
contract conditions of those considered as second-class workers due to their 
lack of labour and social rights. 
The subcontractors’ movements had mixed results according to the 
collective force they managed to gather: the most successful mobilization of 
subcontracted workers being at the state mining company, Codelco, which 
won a number of concessions from the company, while they also created a 
stable union, the Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (Confederation 
of Copper Workers)
31
, of great relevance to the present by its impact on a 
strategic sector of the Chilean economy. 
In the face of the union challenge, the state reacted in the traditional way, 
using, on the one hand, a policy of repression, resulting in injuring and even 
killing workers, such as the murder of a forestry worker by a police bullet 
during a clash with the police.
32
 On the other hand, the first Bachelet 
government tried to make a new labour reform initiative that was supported 
by the Minister of Labour Osvaldo Andrade. The project was directed to 
solve the problems of subcontracted workers clarifying the responsibilities 
of the parent companies and subcontractors, for which a broad concept of 
“company” was defended. In turn, the ministry and the Labour Directorate 
had a more sympathetic position towards the trade union movement, even 
when they conducted illegal strikes, contrary to the reluctance of the 
Finance ministry to accept changes in labour questions.
33
 
This situation was relevant for the labour movement in general, because it 
put a strain on a political system that increasingly showed signs of 
exhaustion and the delegitimization of its institutions. However, the action 
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of political authorities continued the logic of the past decade, that is, 
formation of commissions, dialogue between political leaders and debate 
within the Congress, so that any changes to labour legislation were softened 
as had already happened in 1990 and 2001. Moreover, as a symbol of the 
limits of Chilean democracy, the concept of enterprise approved by 
Congress that favoured workers, unionized or not, was appealed by two 
opposition senators to the Constitutional Court, making the definition of 
Enterprise in the subcontracting law unconstitutional. That is, ultimately, the 
Constitutional Court became a brake on the demands of the CUT, an 
organization that in spite of its combative speeches had persisted in their 
struggles for change through institutional channels. 
Despite these problems, CUT renewed its program, outlining in short the 
installation of a Solidarity and Democratic Social state that would replace 
the Subsidiary state, a pillar of the neoliberal model
34
, an essential demand 
that summarized the history of struggle of trade unionism in the democratic 
period. It would face a new challenge at the end of the Bachelet government 
with the return of the right wing to power by democratic means, after 20 
years of Central-left governments. Thus, with an uncertain scenario, the 
Chilean labour movement will face a new challenge, having the political 
heirs of the military dictatorship as an interlocutor in the government. 
 
Conclusion 
Finally, we argue that the evolution of the CUT during the period ranged 
from a collaborative relationship with the government to a position 
questioning the neoliberal model. Indeed, in the first leadership of CUT the 
majority favoured the policy of consensus as a tool to ensure the success of 
a complex transitional process to democracy while the old power bloc, 
represented in the figure of Pinochet as army commander in Chief, was still 
present. Therefore, the demands of the labour movement remained subject 
to the objectives of governance and the confines of social peace of 
democratic governments, so that changes made in labour matters were lower 
compared to the expectations of workers. Thus, this shift is largely 
explained by the failure in its policy of supporting social agreements and the 
few achievements regarding changes in labour legislation.  
Therefore, the internal crisis of the CUT was a reflection of the problems 
faced by various social movements, unable to adapt to the new political 
scenario, but also disappointed in the results of democratization process, 
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which aspired to be heard and especially be recognized as key players in the 
new democracy that emerged on 11 March 1990. However, the trade union 
movement and other social actors maintained a constant struggle to move 
towards a more inclusive type of democracy, seeking to move the 
boundaries of the “possible”, in other words, to undo the legacy of an 
unfinished transition. 
 
 
  
 
What is the nature of the crisis in French unionism? A 
reading from the perspective of models of production 
José-Angel Calderón1 
 
ntroduction:  A somewhat paradoxical crisis in French unionism 
The crisis in French unionism has been a commonplace in the literature for 
decades, to the point that it has become hard to even think about unions in 
France apart from the crisis that besets them. Objectively, this crisis is 
undeniable if you go by the trend in membership rates in French unions. In 
2010, they represented only 7.8% of French employees and 5% of public 
employees, the lowest unionization rate in the OECD besides Turkey, 
whereas the membership rate in 1973 was 23%. 
It is true that France has never been a country of mass unionism, for reasons 
stemming from its history of slower industrialization and from the 
emergence there of a less urbanized working class than in England or 
Germany, for example. Additionally, it never adopted the Ghent system, as 
did the countries of Northern Europe. Still, union organizations have long 
had an extensive, involved activist base in business and government, and 
this decline in membership raises concerns. 
The image of unions as measured by public opinion polls since the 1970s 
has also changed over time. This research surveys representative samples of 
wage earners about their confidence in unions to defend their interest. 
Though confidence prevailed in the late 70s — more than 6 employees in 10 
trusted the unions to defend their interest in 19792— this level has dropped 
sharply since then. Just relying on CSA figures, only 4 employees in 10 on 
average claimed to have confidence in unions during the 1993-2001 period, 
                                                
1 Assistant professor of Sociology, Lille University of Science and Technology, France. 
2 Baromètre annuel du Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel, 2004 - 12thwave.  
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although the level rose back slightly in the subsequent period.3 Compared to 
the other OECD countries, French employees' mistrust of unions is also 
more pronounced. Figures from the World Value Survey in 20074 reveal 
that, although 35% of French employees say they trust the unions (vs. 37% 
on average in the OECD), 51% of French employees say they have “no 
confidence” in unions to represent them, vs. 8% in Norway and 20% in 
Sweden. This last indicator is interesting in that it suggests a sharper 
polarization in France than in other countries between employees who 
consider themselves rather well protected by their unions and those who feel 
rather neglected.  
Contrasting these findings with the DARES5 data on union presence, we see 
that despite the decline in unionized workforces in the last two decades, 
unions have slowly but increasingly set up in more companies and 
government bodies where they had been absent. In 2005, 56.0% of 
employees stated that one or more unions were present in their company or 
government body, as against 50.3% in 1996. And taking as the variable 
union presence in the workplace, 41% of private and public employees said 
they were covered by a union in 2005, as against 37.5% in 1996. If the 
number of members is down over the long term, that does not mean that 
France is the country where unions have less contact with employees—quite 
the opposite, since in the most recent period the unions have gained 
representation in workplaces to a greater degree than the European average.  
 
The debate in France about the (false) problem of institutionalized 
unionism 
Employees’ distrust of unions has been a hotly debated issue in France, 
though not always very scientifically. On one hand, you have lower 
membership; on the other, an increasing presence in companies and 
government bodies. A number of analysts and commentators on the crisis in 
unionism have attempted to resolve this paradox by pointing out the 
supposedly “excessive” institutionalization of French unionism, and this 
criticism came from both the Left and the Right. In France, as Karel Yon 
describes it, institutionalization is often taken in a negative sense, to mean 
the unions are becoming self-sufficient, closed off and bureaucratic.6 Since 
the 1980s France has seen an endlessly repeated debate growing, in which 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
4 World Value Survey (2007), http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
5 DARES (DARES REPONSE, 2008) 
6 YON, K. “Représentation du travail et représentativité syndicale aux marges du salariat: 
le cas de la distribution directe”. Travail et Emploi. n. 31, 2012. 
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the institutionalization of the unions is thought to be the cause of their crisis 
of representation. In the view of Pierre Rosanvallon, 7  if representing 
workers functions doubly as social agency and social movement, what we 
see now is an imbalance between social agency, which is to say all social 
functions inhering in an institutional role that has largely been developed 
and made self-sustaining, and social mobilization, which has languished. As 
Rosanvillon sees it, the union is becoming a sort of social civil servant, a 
quasi-public organization that allegedly no longer has the capacity to be a 
force in negotiations or grievances. It does not matter if reality undercuts his 
thesis: the massive strikes of November-December 19958 can be explained 
as a mosaic of defensive battles and corporate push-backs that hamper the 
necessary process of making the French economy more flexible, thereby 
revealing that unionism basically continues to be viewed by certain 
segments as an impediment to the “modernization” of France. In the 
opposing camp, Pierre Bourdieu, who was heavily involved in the 
demonstrations of 1995, called for an overflowing of the unions and the 
production of new leadership to reinvent anti-free market unionism9. But the 
work that has most sharply questioned the institutionalization of the unions 
was published by Dominique Andolfatto and Dominique Labbé in 2006, in 
which they relentlessly attacked the “weakness of the social roots of 
unionism”.10 Pointing to “increasingly problematic authority to represent”, 
they paint the union officials as “professional representatives . . . who no 
longer have ties, beyond elections, to the employees they are supposed to 
represent and who now have only a rather theoretical knowledge of the 
actual situation and of the wants and needs of those employees”.11 One 
should be aware that the thesis of Andolfatto and Labbé greatly influenced 
                                                
7 ROSANVALLON, P. La question syndicale. Paris: Hachette, (1st ed. 1988). 
8 The 1995 strikes in France against the Juppé plan to reform the social security system and 
retirement benefits were the largest seen since May 1968. The number of strikes in 1995 
was six times greater than the annual average from 1982 to 1994.  BÉROUD, S. and 
MOURIAUX, R. Le souffle de décembre. Paris: Syllepse, 1997. Starting in 1995 the first 
SUD unions were formed in the largely unionized sectors (education, railroads, metallurgy, 
etc.) by activists leaving the CFDT and the CGT whose orientation was towards producing 
an organizing tool for structuring battles in the social arena. SUD-Solidaires would manage 
to unionize 60,000 members—still, far below the so-called historical unions. A new 
political cycle began in 1995 (the Jospin government, radical reform of the Ligue 
Communiste Révolutionnaire, etc.), which would culminate in France's No vote to the 
European Constitution. 
9 In this regard, see the article by BÉROUD, S. “Un renouveau de la critique syndicale”. 
Mouvements, nº  24, 2002. 
10 ANDOLFATTO D., LABBÉ, D. Histoire des syndicats (1906-2006). Paris: Seuil, 2006; 
ANDOLFATTO, D. and LABBÉ, D. “La transformation des syndicats français. Vers un 
nouveau modèle social ?”. Revue française de science politique. Vol.56, n.3, 2006. 
11 Ibid.	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French lawmakers, who in the new Union Representativity Law (2008) 
repealed the “unshakable presumption of union representation” by the five 
traditional labour federations in favor of a procedure that bases 
representation on voting, thought to be the best way to bring the union 
organizations closer to their membership and encouraging them to establish 
themselves on a strong activist base. (See Text Box 1) 
 
 
Text Box 1: Unionism in France and measuring representativity 
 
In France, until the Union Representativity Law of 2008, five “historical” 
labour federations were recognized as “lawful” representatives (Decree of 
March 31, 1966): the CGT (Confédération Générale des Travailleurs, or 
General Confederation of Workers, the leading French labour organization, 
founded in 1895, heir to la Commune and the A.I.T.), the CFDT 
(Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail, or Democratic French 
Labour Federation, currently the number two organization in number of 
members, which split off from the CFTC in 1964 and has swung from 
defending worker management and control by the base to much more 
reformist, co-management positions currently), the FO (Force Ouvrière, or 
Labouring Force, which split from the CGT in 1945 with a minority of non-
communists), the CFTC (Confédération Française des Travailleurs 
Chrétiens, or French Confederation of Christian Workers, founded in 1919 
in the tradition of Social Catholicism) and the CGC (Confédération 
Générale des Cadres, or General Confederation of White Collar Workers, 
created in 1944 by managers and engineers who wanted recognition of their 
particular jobs in the business economy). Only these unions could sign 
national or trade agreements, and within a company any trade union 
affiliated with one of these representative organizations was considered an 
official representative. Other organizations existed, but with more limited 
rights. The main ones were the UNSA (Union Nationale des Syndicats 
Autonomes, or National Union of Independent Trade Unions, founded by 
five union organizations not in the confederations), Solidaires (which 
includes the various SUD unions, which split from the CFDT in the late 
1980s and lay claim to the worker-management tradition) and the CNT 
(Confédération Nationale du Travail, or National Labour Confederation, an 
anarchist group dissenting from the CGT and founded in 1946).  
Since the Law of August 20, 2008, representativity has been measured 
based on the results of employee elections. Union organizations are given 
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authority to represent if they receive over 10% of the votes at the company 
level and over 8% at the trade or industry level. These organizations, 
moreover, must satisfy all six criteria. A labour organization recognized as 
representative at the national and industry level will be deemed 
representative of all trades, no matter its level of support in those trades. 
Following the employee elections of 2013, five organizations that reached 
the 8% threshold (the five historical organizations) were declared 
representative at the industry level. The consequences of this 
representativity are significant, for only organizations so designated are 
authorized to sit on joint management bodies and sign collective 
agreements. 
 
Recent empirical studies, however, show another face of institutionalization. 
Based on a study in the threatened retailing sector, and in contradiction with 
the analyses that link institutionalization with de-unionization, Karel Yon 
shows clearly how getting into an institutionalized negotiation process at the 
trade level, instead of separating unions from their base, has led them to 
build “bottom-up” support that ended up putting “top-down” pressure on 
negotiations. These are similar conclusions to those I was able to draw from 
a long observation work that I made of the nuclear power industry. A 
struggle by the direct employees of a government organization to set up an 
on-site CHSCT [health and safety committee] became an opportunity to 
enter into a union relationship with the subcontracted workers, who then 
were able to organize and have a say in the companies they respectively 
worked for. 12  Comparable observations were made with regard to 
developing unionism in a legal sense—use of employment courts, expert 
legal reports, use of layoff plans, etc.—which “far from substituting for 
what was already there, instead supplemented it, while broadening the scope 
of activity” and the activist base.13 Lastly, an interview with Fabien Gâche, 
CGT union delegate at the Renault plant, clearly shows how the unions 
might well make use of the CHSCT's expert healthcare reports, for which 
they have to hire outside consultants, to “de-institutionalize unionism, that 
                                                
12 CALDERON, J. “Démantelement de l’autonomie responsable et repositionnement des 
salariés”. In: Bouquin, S. (dir). Les résistances au travail. Paris: Syllepse, 2008.  
13 WILLEMEZ, L. “Quand les syndicats se saisissent du droit. Invention et redéfinition 
d’un rôle”. Sociétés contemporaines. n.52, 2003. 
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is, bring it closer to its base and key off the expertise of the employees to 
contest management's reorganization plans”.14  
These experiences in terms of unions using institutions or institutional tools to 
build an opposing force where there is no union or to encourage greater 
participation by employees in the actions undertaken by the union put into 
perspective this notion that union people have somehow settled into place in 
the institutions. But more fundamentally, the criticism of union 
institutionalization overlooks the historical aspects of a process that actually 
preceded unionism itself. In a certain sense, if we track the recent research by 
historians of law and employee relations, it is not that unionism has been 
institutionalized so much as the employer-employee relationship, whereby 
power relationships have been transformed into legal relationships.15 From 
this viewpoint, unionism was for very long time a powerful force for 
including workers in the social, economic and political environment. And the 
unions established themselves by establishing labour laws16, which at the 
same time largely determined what they would become.17 Thought of in this 
way, institutionalization cannot be said to be simply what separates the union 
organizations from their social base, but the space in which forces are 
generated and the relationships, sometimes contradictory, between the unions 
and the employees are woven. That is to say, the institutions of wage-earners 
have been both a framework for inclusion and a framework for dispute that 
has tested, in various historical phases, the sometimes difficult relations 
between union leadership and a certain, ever-changing class make-up. 
 
Return to an analysis in terms of models of production 
The problem of the institutionalization of unionism is in reality a false 
problem that cannot be resolved in terms of theory, but rather in action. That 
is, in the ability of unionism to play in a variety of keys, to penetrate sectors 
hitherto off-bounds and to broaden its scope and its array of actions. To 
judge from a number of recent union efforts in sectors previously indisposed 
to collective action18, these efforts show that the crisis in unionism is not 
                                                
14 GÂCHÉ, F. “L’expertise doit venir en complément de l’action syndicale, pas s’y 
substituer”. Nouvelle Revue du Travail. N. 3, 2013. Interview conducted by S. Fortino and 
G. Tiffon.  
15 SUPIOT, A. Les Juridictions du travail (in Traité de droit du travail, Vol. 8). Paris: 
Dalloz, 1987; FERRETTE, J. “Au-delà de l’action directe et de l’institutionnalisation, les 
conseillers du salarié”. Travail et Emploi. n. 122, 2010. 
16 BORENFREUDN, G. and SOURIAC, M.-A. Syndicats et droit du travail. Paris: Daroz, 
2008.  
17 Friot, B. L’enjeu du salaire. Paris: La Dispute, 2012. 
18 See, for example, in fast food: CARTRON, D. “Engagement dans le travail et dans la 
grève chez McDonald’s”. In: DENIS, J.-M. Le conflit en grève? Tendances et perceptives 
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basically a problem due to spinelessness. The point is not to deny there is a 
crisis, but to think within the power relationships that underlie economic 
arrangements19, which assumes, among other things, imagining the unions 
in an institutional framework where they strive to maximize the resources 
available. To do this, it seems to me essential to return to an analysis of 
unionism in the context of the transformations of production arrangements 
that France has undergone in recent decades. We possess, moreover, a rather 
significant body of research and analysis about the transition the French 
economy has made towards a model of production based on a seeming 
intensification of work and that tries to articulate labour relations on the 
premise of reconnecting the workload and the wage earned. 20  These 
strategies actually reflect in their thinking a disciplining of the workforce in 
a way that requires informalizing, or de-institutionalizing, the wage 
relationship—a necessary condition for which is weakening the union. 
Analysing the institutionalization of the wage relationship from the 
perspective of models of production allows us to broach the contemporary 
union crisis in a different way. This institutionalization by degrees21 had 
made possible a socialization of the wages, i.e., a formal separation between 
                                                                                                                        
de la conflictualité contemporaine. Paris: La Dispute, 2005; in luxury hotels: GUIBERT, 
P., LAZUECH, G., TROGER, V. “Les femmes de chambre de l’hôtellerie de luxe ou le 
déclassement d’une élite invisible”. Formation Emploi. n. 123, 2013; in home care 
providers (April 2009) and the strikes by undocumented workers: BARRON, P., BORY, 
A., CHAUVIN, S., JOUNIN, N., TOURETTE, L. On bosse ici, on reste ici ! La grève des 
sans-papiers, une aventure inédite. Paris: La Découverte, 2011. 
19 SALAIS, R. “Conventions de travail, mondes de production et institutions : un parcours 
de recherche”. L’Homme et la société. n. 170-171, 2008.  
20 DURAND, J.-P. La chaîne invisible. Travailler aujourd'hui : du flux tendu à la servitude 
volontaire. Paris: Le Seuil, 2004; BOISARD, P., CARTRON, D., GOLLAC, M. and 
VALEYRE, A. Time and work: work intensity. Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2003; BOYER, R. and FREYSSENET, M. Les 
modèles productifs. Paris: La Découverte, 2000. 
21  In France this institutionalizing was at first done within the company, with staff 
representatives (1936), works councils (1945) and union delegations (1968). But in France 
it very early became associated with the “creation of two-party and three-party co-
management bodies enabling the unions to take part in the political life of the country”: 
CAIRE, G. “Syndicalisme”. In: Encyclopedia Universalis, 2008. Unionism then became an 
integral part of the welfare state. It involved itself in “handling governmental matters 
(Comité économique et social régional or regional economic and employment committees), 
quasi-public matters (Social Security, the Caisse d’allocations familiales or child benefits 
agency)”: BOUDESSEUL, G. Vitalité du syndicalisme d’action: la CFDT de Basse-
Normandie. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996. It was also involved in an array of organizations 
across the nation: “the Conseil économique et social (economic and employment council), 
the ‘Plan’, the Commission nationale de la négociation collective (national collective 
bargaining commission) and the Conseil supérieur de la fonction publique (civil service 
board)”: MOURIAUX, R. Le syndicalisme en France. Paris: PUF, 2009. Mouriaux, 2009). 
This collaboration did not occur without counterparties, of whom the unions took a certain 
advantage’. See CAIRE, “Syndicalisme”. Op.Cit. 
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the wage received and the individual workload, which in reality was 
consistent with an accumulation regime based on relative surplus value. 
That is, the gradual development of institutional wage bargaining fit with 
work arrangements whose guiding principle was to increase worker 
productivity.22 The economic crisis of the 1970s, in which the real value of 
the labour force fell below legally established wages (owing to the 
decreased cost of reproducing the labour force, to decreased productivity 
and more), had made this one-size-fits-all manner of setting working 
conditions dysfunctional; and as we know, the statutory value of wages was 
adjusted to the actual value of the workforce by deregulating the labour 
markets. The new, lean model of production that has gradually come to pass 
is constructed on an intensification of labour as its organizing principle. 
Specifically, the strategies of businesses have consisted of re-organizing 
production processes by breaking them down into simpler tasks and by 
outsourcing entire jobs to other industries (subcontracting) or other 
geographic regions (off-shoring) to take advantage of new forms of hiring 
permitted by the successive reforms to the labour code. 
In other words, the gradual change in the model of production since the 
1970s produced a heterogenization and polarization of workers’ terms of 
employment—between, on the one hand, a segment of workers with stable 
employment, legal protections and good representation by the unions and on 
the other hand, an increasingly populous segment of peripheral workers who 
were cut of collective bargaining and whose terms of employment were 
“negotiated” individually when they were hired. 
By this analysis, it is not so much the institutionalization of French 
unionism that lies behind its crisis as the de-institutionalization of the wage 
relationship, one of the conditions of which seems to be the weakening of 
the union itself. The unions find themselves in a situation where they alone 
are opposing an increased riskiness in labour relations that, while distancing 
them from the peripheral segments of the workforce, is locking them into 
defensive positions. 
 
Unionization and efforts to individualize labour relations 
The extension of the “netlike firm”23 or the “SME-ization”24 of the great 
diversified multinational corporations makes it possible to characterize this 
process simultaneously as business concentration and downsizing, 
                                                
22 BOISARD, P., CARTRON, D., GOLLAC, M. and VALEYRE, A. Time and work: work 
intensity. Op.Cit. 
23 DURAND, J.-P. La chaîne invisible. Op.Cit. 
24 VELTZ, P. Le nouveau monde industriel. Paris: Gallimard, 2000. 
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outsourcing and division into autonomous, market-oriented units, which 
have greatly contributed to a reduction in membership rates and in union 
presence in companies. 
The workers in public organizations have been privatized. Excluding 
finance, these employed 7.8% of the workforce and generated 11.5% of 
value added in 2000. In 1985 their influence was measured as 19.3 % of the 
workforce and 25% of value added.25 Private sector employees today work 
for larger corporations than they did thirty years ago. These corporations 
include one or more businesses (making what is called a group), which 
themselves include one or more sites. But if companies as centres of 
decision-making and strategy setting have grown larger with time (along 
with growing more remote from the influence of the employees), the same is 
not true of job sites, which are now smaller. Companies have grown, then, 
by assembling more and more sites or facilities. Thus, employees now work 
at smaller production facilities (the sites), but belong more often to a very 
large organization (the company). In 2006, 33% of employees worked in a 
company of over 1,000 employees as compared to 27% in 1985. Against 
that, 38% worked at a site of less than 20 employees compared to 34% in 
1985. 
The development of large organizations went along with the many 
transformations in the French economy, including the increased fraction of 
service sector jobs. While the large industrial sites were declining, the large 
services companies have boomed. Now, every industry has its own way of 
organizing; and service sector sites are smaller than industrial ones, so the 
average size of job sites has decreased. Nevertheless, between 1979 and 
2006 these sites have increasingly been merged into large corporations.26 
With a general trend towards concentration, three major sectors illustrate 
differentiated structural changes: manufacturing, which has lost employees 
every year for 30 years (since 1978, 150,000 jobs have been created on 
average each year in retailing and wholesaling while 60,000 were lost in 
manufacturing), business services, which since 1979 have shown great 
growth due to IT and the outsourcing of support staff (cleaning, accounting, 
R&D, IT, advertising, etc.) and, thirdly, retailing, which has been 
completely made over by the emergence of the big box stores. 
These three sectors accounted for 7 million employees in 2006. In the other 
sectors, which are food, energy, construction, wholesaling and automotive 
                                                
25 INSEE, 2002. www.insee.fr 
26 INSEE, 2008. www.insee.fr 
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sales, other business services, personal services and finance and real estate, 
the same changes are underway, with a few specificities. Thus, for example, 
the finance and insurance sector is the most concentrated. Manufacturing 
and information/communications are organized into large companies. SMEs 
including micro-enterprises (i.e., companies of less than 10 employees) 
employ the majority of employees in personal services.27 
These changes have not been without effects on union membership and union 
presence in companies. We know, for instance, that unions are more strongly 
established, relatively speaking, in the public sector. From 2001 to 2005, with 
15.2% of workers unionized, the unionization rate in the public sector is three 
times greater than in the private sector, where it is 5.0%. Of every ten 
unionized workers, five work in the public sector, four in the private sector 
and one in a government organization. Similarly, there are proportionately 
more employees in the public sector than in the private sector who say there is 
a union at their workplace: one in two in the public sector and one in three in 
a private company. But taking a closer look, the gaps between the public 
sector and the private sector have to be put in perspective. The greater 
unionization of government workers is partly explained by the size of work 
sites in this sector. In the public sector (civil service and government-owned 
organizations taken together), the portion of large sites is greater than in the 
private. But whatever the sector, the bigger the site, the more likely a union 
presence. In reality, in facilities of over 100 employees, the proportions of 
employees belonging to a union are nearly the same in the public and private 
sectors. On the other hand, in facilities of less than 100 employees, employees 
belonging to a union at their workplace are proportionately much less 
numerous in the private sector than in the public sector and government 
organizations, at 15%, 39% and 58% respectively. Though the presence of 
unions is lower than in the public sector, this is because more than two 
employees in three work in facilities of less than 100 employees.  
 
Sources: Ongoing surveys on household living conditions.28  
                                                
27 INSEE 2008, 2010, 2011. www.insee.fr 
28 INSEE 2006. www.insee.fr 
Presence of a union in the workplace 
By size of site (2001-2005) 
Civil Service Gov’t Organizations Private Companies 
Under 10 employees 15.0% 17.0% 2.4% 
10 - 49 employees 34.7% 57.9% 16,0% 
50 - 99 employees 64.9% 77.2% 43.6% 
100 to 499 employees 73.5% 80.6% 64.8% 
Over 500 employees 75.5% 87.8% 79.3% 
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The presence of unions and whether employees belong to them are also 
explained by the way the trades are structured in relation to each other 
within the different sectors. In industry and banking/insurance, employees 
are represented by unions at their workplace in proportions comparable to 
those in the public sector. In industry, 54% of employees state there is a 
union at the workplace, even though few of them are members. By contrast, 
in personal services or business services, where small sites are very 
common, few employees are represented by a union at their workplace, and 
despite the unions’ activities and demonstrations in the sectors described 
above, the unionization rate is lower. Traditionally unionized to only a small 
degree, retailing and construction industries are the sectors where 
unionization rates are lowest, at 2.8 % and 2.2 % respectively. These latter 
two sectors, moreover, are ones where business survival rates are lower and 
which, along with transportation and personal services, have experienced 
the most massive growth in self-employment (1 million people had this 
status in 201429). 
The fluidity that has gradually taken over work and employment has 
brought with it a gradual dissolution of the border between work and 
personal life: tele-commuting, flextime and part-time, for instance—all 
forms and fashions of these new, fluid and hard-to-regulate work 
arrangements that impede or tightly restrict broader unionization. It is not 
surprising that all these transformations have been accompanied by the 
appearance or dissemination of various forms of work intensification, which 
came late to France but faster than to other European countries. It took place 
in the latter half of the 1980s due to increased competition among 
employees, from persistent high unemployment and de-unionization.30 The 
multiplication of constraints placed on the pace of work was central to the 
transformations of economic relationships and business management. 
According to a survey by the French Ministry of Labour and INSEE on 
working conditions, the fraction of employees saying that their pace of work 
depended on an external request needing to be filled immediately went from 
28% in 1984 to 54% in 1998. At the same time, the fraction of those whose 
pace depends on the automated movement of a product or part, on the 
                                                
29 The legal category of “self-employed individual”, which is not unlike the Spanish 
“independent worker”, was created in 2009. At the border between wage-earner and 
freelancer, it actually serves as a tool for managing under-employment and often allows 
customers to cloak dependent relationships while outsourcing costs to the self-employed 
person. See in this regard, ABDELNOUR, S.“L’auto-entrepreneuriat : une gestion 
individuelle du sous-emploi”. La Nouvelle Revue du Travail. n. 5, 2014.	  
30 GOLLAC, M. and VOLKOFF, S. “Citius, altius, fortius. L’intensification du travail”. 
Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. Vol. 114/1, 1996, p.55. 
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automatic rate of a machine, on production standards or daily (or less) time 
limits, or who worked on an assembly line increased from 23% to 45%. And 
the number of people whose work rate was determined by management 
oversight, the needs of co-workers or the vagaries of the production process 
increased in a similar fashion.  
As Gollac and Volkoff wrote: “The weakness of the unions and the limited 
ability of employees to express themselves not only prevent them from 
opposing manpower reductions and increased work rates, they also worsen 
working conditions after organizational changes carried out in complete 
ignorance of the realities of the work”.31 Citius, altius, fortius32—this is the 
Latin motto Michel Gollac and Serge Volkoff use to describe the demands 
of management on their employees. Workers with more endurance, 
involvement and enthusiasm. And if possible, not too unionized. Since 
2003, we have stopped keeping statistics on union suppression by 
companies. However, we do know, for example, that 25% of sites with over 
20 employees have no representative bodies for employees. This means that 
in France nearly one employee in five has no representation at his or her 
company. This is also the case in 10% of sites with 50 to 100 employees. 
Either the employer did not set up elections, which is illegal, or no list was 
presented. The existence of anti-union pressures also comes up in 
monograph surveys conducted in small and medium enterprises. According 
to the barometer of workplace discrimination created for the Défenseur des 
Droits (French ombudsman) and the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), in 2013 48% of private sector employees and 37% of civil service 
workers thought it was a disadvantage to be unionized. 
 
Change in union activity over time and the problem of “negative 
freedom” 
Union activity in companies was greatly disrupted by the remoteness of 
corporate decision-making as well as by changes in corporate governance. 
The gradual privatization of business capital and the expansion of equity 
financing since the early 1980s put an end to “managerial capitalism”33 in 
favor of strategies whose purpose is to meet the constraints of competition 
and return on equity. The unions have therefore found themselves deprived 
of a means during negotiations to weigh in on company strategy. These 
highly unequal relationships have moved union activity, on the one hand, 
                                                
31 Ibid., p.56. 
32 In English: Faster, higher, stronger. 
33 BACHET, D., FLOCCO, G., KERVELLA, B., SWEENEY, M. Sortir de l'entreprise 
capitaliste. Paris : Éditions du Croquant, 2007.	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towards monitoring working conditions and changes in the work (relations 
with supervisory personnel, improper penalties or dismissals, unpaid time, 
difficult conditions, etc.), thereby considerably helping to move the core of 
union efforts from the works council to the health and safety committees 
(French acronym: CHSCT); and on the other hand, the gradual deregulation 
of traditional labour law and social law has created a broadening of union 
responsibility in a number of areas that hitherto were not negotiated within 
the local site: arranging work schedules, individualized pay, job 
classification, ongoing training, supplementary retirement, etc. This 
importance of collective bargaining at the company level is explained in part 
by an aspect particular to France, where an agreement may under certain 
circumstances supersede the law. This French particularity received a 
decisive push when the Aubry Law concerning the 35-hour week was first 
applied, as it provided benefits to companies that signed an agreement.  
But the agendas of negotiations are very largely decided by management, 
which sets the content of the negotiations and forces the unions into often 
defensive postures. Unions are increasingly pushed into a corner, whether 
on the shop floor or in site or company negotiations, standing up to the 
slightest wrong to the employees. I remember having done a survey in a 
metal-working company in which the staff representatives had petitioned to 
have a timer installed so they could prove that the work rates that the 
workers at their stations had to endure were intolerable. When the demands 
of management are hard to meet, the union organizations can bet on a 
broadening of the demonstrating activities, often trying to get their struggle 
onto media to attract public and media attention. The experience of workers 
at Cellatex, a factory under court-ordered liquidation whose workers 
threatened to use chemicals to blow up the plant and pollute the Meuse 
River, exemplifies the combativeness that often overcomes company 
negotiations and how the employees and their representatives are 
themselves in a highly unfavourable position. The relative success of this 
experience (the employees were able to obtain more significant assistance 
programs) inspired other types of action such as the marches of Lorraine 
workers and the confinement of bosses, which for the first time in many 
years resulted in a court order, sentencing 8 employees of the multinational 
Goodyear to prison terms. This was largely reported in the union press as an 
unprecedented intent to criminalize union actions in a country that for years 
has been judicializing labour relations.34  
                                                
34 PÉLISSE, J. “Judiciarisation ou juridicisation ? Usages et réappropriations du droit dans 
les conflits du travail”. Politix. n. 86, 2009. 
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Nationally, after the failed reforms of 1995 and the so-called First 
Employment Contract (Contrat Première Embauche, CPE), in 2006, the 
major national reforms have very much been part of the discussion in what 
is called “the social dialogue”. In accordance with the Law of January 31, 
2007 known as the Larcher Law, before preparing a bill affecting labour 
law, the government must call in employer and employee representatives to 
consult on the topics in question, to negotiate, if they wish, an agreement, 
the contents of which will be included in the bill submitted to Parliament. In 
the event, the unions act as “pre-legislators”. This prerogative has resulted 
in a large number of laws over the last few years, having to do with reform 
of the labour market, occupational training and union representativity. The 
problem, of course, is that the unions do not necessarily choose the areas in 
which they must get involved and are often in the position of having to 
soften “reforms” whose effect on employees would have been much more 
severe had the unions not participated in these pre-legislative committees. 
Furthermore, and given the disintegration and discordance of the unions, the 
government retains very broad leeway on these committees. It was not 
surprising that as a presidential candidate François Hollande made 
“constitutionalizing” the Larcher Law—i.e., the “social dialogue”— part of 
his platform. 
Unionism in France has always been a force for liberal democracy, but it 
finds itself today in a position where its participation in the various places 
where negotiations are carried out legitimizes the systematic attacks on 
labour law and social law. Even so, should unionism give up on profit 
sharing and co-management, as Pierre Bourdieu asked in 1995, to 
“transform itself into an agent of disruption and anti-free market criticism, 
thereby rediscovering its original nature”? If it is true that co-management 
opens it up to increasing porosity to the dominant ideology, rejecting 
participation in the system condemns it to accepting its own marginalization 
by the great majority of wage earners. 
  
 
Trade union renewal and responses to neo-liberalism and the 
politics of austerity in the United Kingdom: the curious 
incubation of the political in labour relations 
Miguel Martínez Lucio1 
 
his article discusses the developments and challenges facing the UK’s 
trade union movement in a context of increasing globalisation, neo-liberal 
state strategies and economic austerity. The challenges facing the movement 
have been highly significant and multidimensional,2 and in the UK the 
greater emphasis on neo-liberal policies since the 1980s and a lack of 
consistent support and on-going changes in terms of the state regulation of 
collective and individual rights means that trade unions have faced a 
significant challenge compared to other OECD and comparable northern 
European states. Whilst there are significant signs of trade union renewal 
and a range of responses across specific questions – and an on-going 
transformation of how trade unions organise and coordinate in the face of 
neo-liberalism and austerity – the outcomes of such strategies and 
repositioning are not clear. In this article, I will argue that the trade union 
movement exists in a hyper-globalised context and within a political system 
that has been highly problematic for the rights of workers. Despite the fact 
that since 1979 there has been a range of right-wing and systematically anti-
trade union governments, there were also 13 intervening years of social 
democratic government. The on-going challenges of a fragmented 
workforce and economy which is controlled and regulated through various 
complex international networks have brought real dilemmas to the 
                                                
1 The University of Manchester. 
2 MARTINEZ LUCIO, M. “Trade Unionism and the Realities of Change”. In: ALONSO, 
Luis Enrique and MARTINEZ LUCIO, Miguel, eds. Employment Relations in a Changing 
Society. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.  
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movement in terms of how it seeks to plough a more progressive and 
socialist furrow within the UK.  
I start with a brief review of this highly globalised and corporatized context. 
I then look at how over the past half-dozen or so years especially, the trade 
union movement has, in the words of Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman,3 
tried to reimagine its role and developed responses to the current context. 
This has built on an on-going context of trade union renewal and 
modernisation that has underpinned some of the significant developments in 
terms of a community and organising direction within its strategies. 
McIlroy4 in his review makes a point that we need to put these responses 
into the context of the on-going trade union changes that began before the 
current crisis. I deepen this argument further by showing how the lessons 
learnt from the 1980s and 1990s configure the responses of organised 
labour. In this context, the role of the political and the absence of any 
significant support from the political Right or the social democratic 
traditions is key. However, the emergence of a new set of left-wing 
coalitions around and within the trade union movement – of which the 
election of Jeremy Corbyn to the leadership of the Labour Party is an 
example – means that there were possibilities of a new political counter-
climate that was more sensitive to trade union needs and roles regardless of 
the stability and sustainability of that ‘left’ project within a social 
democratic framework.   
However, I will argue that the uneven leadership of a discourse of anti-
austerity within the trade union movement and the fragmented nature of its 
responses remain significant issues in the configuration of what are in fact 
weak counter-politics to austerity. The inconsistency or lack of coordinated 
strategies around alternative workplace and community dimensions also 
weakens the more systematic response to government policies, although 
there have been a range of mobilisations, new forms of conflict and general 
responses across many trade unions. The uncertainty and internal 
differences within unions and across them mean that many of the 
innovations and responses have been uneven and at times inconsistent. The 
main challenge though has been the nature of the assault on workers’ rights 
and the move to forms of employment in terms of permanent stable work 
(extensive performance measurement and surveillance) and unstable 
                                                
3 GUMBRELL-MCCORMICK, R. and HYMAN, R. Trade Unions in Western Europe: 
Hard Times, Hard Choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
4 MCILROY, J. “Britain: How Neo-Liberalism Cut Unions Down to Size”. In: GALL, 
Gregor, WILKINSON, Adrian and HURD, Richard. The International Handbook of 
Labour Unions: Responses to Neo-Liberalism. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011, pp. 82–
103. 
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employment (the on-going use of much individualised forms of employment 
such as zero-hours contracts). Added to this has been a political strategy 
from the Right that has, on the one hand, further developed policies and 
legislation of an anti-trade union nature and, on the other hand, literally 
stolen policies from the Left, redefined them in neo-liberal terms and 
undermined the social criticism of the neo-liberal state (e.g. the redefining 
of the living wage). Nevertheless, the trade union movement remains highly 
innovative and broader in its social and political direction when compared to 
the past, although the argument in this paper is that innovation has serious 
limitations and can become an end itself. What is more, the absence of a 
supportive political dimension, irrespective of the formalised link with the 
Labour Party, has meant that trade unions are more isolated and have to 
create their own political ‘eco-spheres’ to represent workers more fully. In 
addition, the impact of globalisation has been contradictory because, 
although it has on the one hand been a development that appears to have 
revitalised the innovative and international dimensions of trade union 
activity, on the other hand it has led to further forms of fragmentation and 
coordination challenges at the national level.    
  
The context: the UK as a modern Mordor?   
The UK has always been a highly internationalised economy due to its 
imperial dimension which in the main continued until the 1960s, although it 
still has a strong neo-colonial presence in various parts of the world. Its 
system of capital has had, and has, a broad extensive reach beyond the 
nation itself. The position of multinationals in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
defence industries and banking have been an important feature of the 
economy. In the 1980s, the neo-conservative government under Margaret 
Thatcher developed a systematic approach to privatisation in key sectors 
such as telecommunications and energy utilities which has continued in 
various forms up until the present day. Globalisation was more inward in its 
direction as a range of key aspects of the economy such as electricity, 
telecommunications, airports, railways, car manufacturing and others 
became exposed to a more globalised and foreign system of ownership and 
control. In effect, large parts of the economy became directed externally, 
irrespective of the systems of regulation put in place by the state. In a recent 
book, Colin Crouch5 has shown how financialisation and privatisation has 
                                                
5  CROUCH, C. The Knowledge Corrupters: Hidden Consequences of the Financial 
Takeover of Public Life. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015. 
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impacted on British society and the state, creating a challenging set of 
corporate networks and problems of accountability.  
Trade unions have opposed many of these privatisations and processes of 
commercialisation since the 1980s through a range of campaigns; yet they 
have not been able to halt their development and, during the (New) Labour 
Government of 1997–2010, the belief in privatisation was significant and 
unassailable. 6  The obsession with management education and 
managerialism7 was a defining feature of the Tony Blair and Gordon Brown 
Labour Governments of that period, with Brown and his economics minister 
Alistair Darling taking up prominent positions within international financial 
corporations in 2016. The cult of the market has been a common feature of 
nearly all countries, but in the UK it has been a significant feature of its left 
politics with its requirement and belief that successful governments have to 
be ‘pro-business’ if they wish to be seen as credible and ‘electable’.8   
What is more, since the 1980s there has been a greater move to outsourcing 
in terms of the private sector, along with the use of employment agencies.9 
In the public sector, the use of outsourcing for catering, cleaning and 
information technology has been intensified, with increasing parts of the 
public health services being pushed into the private sector on the basis of a 
contracting model.10 This has led to greater fragmentation in terms of 
services and employment. The growing use of a more vulnerable workforce 
in these areas of work (migrant, poorer elderly, and disabled workers for 
example), and a greater presence of practices such as zero-hour contracts, 
are increasingly apparent. What is more, within the workplaces of more 
permanent or stable workers, we have seen an extraordinary use of 
performance management regimes and management-led surveillance.11   
                                                
6 FINLAYSON, A. Making Sense of New Labour. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2003. 
7 Ibid. 
8 During the election for the leadership of the Labour Party, most candidates argued this, 
such that even the left alternative had to engage with the concept, albeit from a more 
alternative perspective.  
9 MACKENZIE, R. and FORDE, C. “The Myth of Decentralization and the New Labour 
Market”. In: ALONSO, Luis Enrique and MARTINEZ LUCIO, Miguel. Employment 
Relations in a Changing Society: Assessing the Post-Fordist Paradigm. Op.Cit., pp. 69–85. 
10 BOWMAN, A., ERTRUCK, I; FOLKMAN, P; FROUD, J; HASLAM, C; JOHAL, S; 
LEAVER, A; MORAN, M; and TSITSIANIS, N. What a Waste: Outsourcing and How it 
Goes Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
11 Since the early 1980s we have seen a systematic fall in the levels of organised labour 
caused by and in general accompanying the changes outlined above. Trade union 
membership has virtually halved since 1980, from about 12 to under 6 million during that 
period, although 1980 did represent a peak in some respects and the outcome of two 
decades or so of substantial growth. 
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The Labour Governments mentioned earlier did not pursue a strategy of 
revoking earlier legislation that made it much more difficult for trade unions 
to engage with industrial conflict and passed what seem to be laws that 
minimally supported the recognition of trade unions within the workplace.12 
The general thrust of policy was that trade unions were not a major feature 
of the economy and of society, with their political influence steadily being 
reduced, although not eliminated, within the Labour Party. There were 
attempts at creating a more commercially oriented business unionism and 
system of social dialogue with businesses, but these were premised on not 
strengthening the trade union side of the equation in terms of regulation.13  
This has led to an intensification of trade union mergers as they tried to 
share their facilities and coordinate and organise a more disparate 
workforce.14 In fact, in terms of collective action, the focus in the past five 
or so years has been mainly in the public sector, with the private sector 
registering some of the lowest levels of industrial conflict in the country’s 
history, suggesting a more business focused or partnership based system in 
that sphere. This created significant organisational tensions in some cases, 
where different trade union cultures and worker traditions and identities 
were brought closer, which, as we will discuss later, has led to the 
emergence of a more coordinated and focused approach, in some cases, both 
in terms of sector politics and political identity (e.g. the case of the trade 
union UNITE).  
Yet, the situation since the beginning of the Great Recession of 2008, the 
election of a centre-right coalition in 2010, and a solely right-wing 
government in 2015 has brought a new challenge to the labour movement. 
This has focused on reducing public expenditure in social terms and 
restructuring large parts of the state. There have been further moves to the 
deregulation of public service provision in health and local councils. It has 
questioned the boundaries of the private and public with an eye to 
internationalising ownership of key parts of the UK economy. It has 
reinforced the vision of a contract state, with some local city councils seeing 
themselves as contractors of services offered and supplied by transnational 
                                                
12 GALL, G. and MCKAY, S. “Facing ‘Fairness at Work’: Union Perception of Employer 
Opposition and Response to Union Recognition”. Industrial Relations Journal. Vol. 32, n. 
2, 2001, pp. 94–113. 
13  MARTINEZ LUCIO, M. and STUART, M. “Swimming against the Tide: Social 
Partnership, Mutual Gains and the Revival of ‘Tired’ HRM”. The International Journal of 
Human Resource Management. Vol.15, n.2, 2004, pp. 410–24. 
14 It should be noted that these financial considerations have been a major driver of union 
reorganisation through the use of mergers. 
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corporations. In effect, it has intensified the emergent neo-liberal policies of 
the 1980s which were incubated and partially developed in the intervening 
right-leaning social democratic period.   
 
The new approaches to struggle: new forms of conflict and alliance 
building  
So how have trade unions in the UK begun to respond to these 
developments? First of all it will be difficult to capture this in such a short 
space of time so there may have to be some generalisations and broad 
examples, though we will be able to see the wider manner in which 
responses have taken place.  
Mobilisations have been significant at the national level around specific 
demonstrations and marches – normally held on non-working days and in 
the centre of larger cities. These have been organised through the National 
Trade Unions Confederation in alliance with specific movements that have 
emerged against the public cutbacks initiated by the government since 2010. 
They have been significant in some cases, as in the London demonstration 
of 26 March 2011 – the ‘March for the Alternative’ – with estimates ranging 
from a quarter to a half a million individuals. Alternative economic 
arguments were presented by various trade union organisations which 
countered government policy on the need for reductions in state expenditure 
in the face of the fiscal crisis. Such mobilisations have not been common or 
consistent. Some argue that there was a concern that such demonstrations – 
especially when they broke down into rioting or acts of violence against 
banks, perpetrated by a minority – could have a negative electoral impact on 
the Labour Party. The media in the UK kept focusing on these specific 
features of the demonstrations, which is common in the depicting of 
industrial relations issues.15 Others argued that there was concern as to 
whether the high numbers could be kept up, with any decrease being 
perceived as a decline in the opposition to the government. It needs to be 
said that these large scale demonstrations have not been that common with 
the focus being on smaller regional level demonstrations.  
Short one-day strikes have been seen in local government/council 
organisations involving various types of public sector workers, as in the 24-
hour strike on 10 July 2014, which was one of the largest in that sector’s 
history. We have seen a range of public sector workers, from teachers to 
                                                
15 See the right-wing newspaper the Daily Mail for 29 March 2011 as an example of this 
narrative:   www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1370468/TUC-anti-cuts-march-200-arrested-
protesters-cover-Trafalgar-Square-graffiti.html?ito=feeds-newsxml.  
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local city council administrators, having their pay reduced in real terms, 
pension conditions changed, and working conditions worsened by the 
impact of restructuring. Increasing levels of disputes in terms of local 
transportation, such as with London Transport, have been common 
throughout the past few years and have addressed the cuts in the provision 
of services and changes to them and attempts to reduce staff. In the area of 
private sector transportation, British Airways has witnessed a series of 
disputes on pay and supplements as managers have aimed to shift the 
culture and create different conditions for entrants and incumbent staff alike. 
In the case of the national postal service, the Royal Mail, which was 
privatised during the 2010–15 coalition government, disputes of an 
unofficial nature emerged around the treatment of local staff, the use of 
disciplinary procedures and the general culture of management bullying 
within the organisation.16 The steady radicalisation of public sector trade 
unions that had started – very generally – in the 1970s has continued, 
although these disputes are both national and local in orientation, given the 
nature of the employers. On the other hand, the level of collective action in 
2015 in private sector manufacturing was almost negligible.  
The development of short one-day or similar forms of strikes that raise the 
profile of the issues and have a strong media orientation have become 
increasingly common. In the private sector – especially in manufacturing – 
this has been less common, as stated earlier, but the role of disputes has 
been key to galvanising and developing new activists and cementing a more 
radical politics in the public sector trade unions generally, especially in the 
civil service trade union, the PCS. There have been concerns that strikes are 
still generally in decline and that, due to the legislative environment and the 
internal politics of some trade unions, activists have less autonomy from 
their trade union officials on such matters. 17  So this strengthens the 
argument that the nature of collective action is very different now than what 
it was and that alternative worker occupations of their workplaces have not 
been as extensive as one would imagine.18 
In addition, many trade unions, especially in the public sector, have 
developed counter-strategies around individual responses to performance 
                                                
16 BEALE, D. and MUSTCHIN, S. “The Bitter Recent History of Employee Involvement at 
Royal Mail: An Aggressive Management Agenda versus Resilient Workplace Unionism”. 
Economic and Industrial Democracy. Vol.35, n.2, 2014, pp. 289–308.  
17 JOYCE, S. “Why Are there So Few Strikes?” International Socialism. N. 45, 2015, 
http://isj.org.uk/why-are-there-so-few-strikes/.  
18 GALL, G. “Worker Resistance and Response to the Crisis of Neo-liberal Capitalism”. 
Employee Relations. Vol.33, n.6, 2011, pp. 588–91. 
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management and the increasing quality monitoring by organisations such as 
schools and colleges. Be it the civil service, the education system or the 
health service, the use of quality audits and individual performance 
measures have intensified in recent years (on the civil service, a good case 
study is Carter et al.19). During the intervening period of the Labour 
Government (1997–2010) such developments were not restrained, quite the 
contrary. Trade unions increased their representation on cases related to the 
misuse of performance management and intervened heavily in cases such as 
the university system, in some cases to mediate and negotiate the nature of 
such systems in terms of equity and fairness. The growing number of 
individual legal and internal organisational cases supported around bullying 
and harassment of staff and management is one response which curiously 
does not get much academic attention as it does not fall into the rubric of 
collective responses, although one could argue that trade unions and 
workers’ responses are collective in the way they deal with these individual 
cases.20      
However, there remain many cases where trade unions in the public sector 
have attempted to engage with management in local city councils or national 
public administrative bodies to limit or determine the impact of the 
government’s cuts in public services and managerial strategies of ‘change’. 
In some cases, the fact that it is central government that determines the 
reductions in resources is what has allowed in some city councils and public 
bodies a narrative to emerge in which the changes are perceived as not being 
the responsibility of the organisation’s management – that it was in the 
interests of all sides to collaborate and work on a social dialogue based 
approach to the ‘problem’.21 In fact, it would be premature to argue that the 
social partnership approach that the previous Labour Government had tried 
to develop was not persisting in certain dimensions of the state. In this 
respect, social partnership of a defensive nature did not dissipate, but 
sustained itself, albeit in less grandiose terms, as an option for trade unions 
in their response to austerity and the crisis, especially within the lower 
                                                
19  CARTER, B., DANFORD, A; HOWCROFT, D; RICHARDSON, H; SMITH, A; 
TAYLOR, P. “‘All They Lack Is a Chain’: Lean and the New Performance Management in 
the British Civil Service”. New Technology, Work and Employment. Vol. 26, n.2, 2011, pp. 
83–97. 
20 MARTINEZ LUCIO, M. and STEWART, P. “The Paradox of Contemporary Labour 
Process Theory: The Rediscovery of Labour and the Disappearance of Collectivism”. 
Capital & Class. Vol.21, n.2, 1997, pp. 49–77. However, it must be said that many cases 
are often between fellow workers and absorb an inordinate amount of time in terms of trade 
union resources.  
21 Interview by author with two human resource managers from a leading city council and a 
major government agency. 
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reaches of the public sector.22 In terms of the private sector, this use of a 
truncated version of social dialogue has been at the heart of international 
trade union strategies through the use of European Works Councils and 
other forms of consultation within multinational corporations. The attempt 
to build a greater degree of engagement within these forums, when 
compared with the UK’s relatively low-trust industrial relations system as a 
whole, has been a major focus of trade union action in terms of education 
and strategy. These have been key international spaces for union activity, 
although the extent to which they have spill out effects on local trade 
unionism depends very much on the company and workplace traditions in 
question.    
Another dimension to the trade union response is the use of social alliances. 
In the UK, this has been built over time around anti-racist struggles and 
LGBT issues, amongst others.23 This very much links to the notion that 
what is needed is a new utopian counterpoint in the discourse of the trade 
union movement that connects to a social and broader identity.24 Boothman 
argues that this approach to social movement unionism was driven in large 
part by certain aspects of the far left in its attempts to engage with ethnic 
communities and the women’s movement in the 1970s and after.25 
The role of trade unions and trade unionists – not always the same thing – in 
anti-austerity movements such as the People’s Assembly Against Austerity 
has been an important feature. Both formally through their trade union 
structures and also informally through trade union activists and 
representatives, the national and local structures of the People’s Assembly, 
which leads local campaigns against the restructuring of the welfare state, 
have been a focus of much support. In the initial years of the Coalition 
Government of 2010, it was increasingly active. This movement was able to 
create a new type of social alliance around a range of campaigns (the social 
welfare reforms around disability was one feature that was highlighted in its 
campaigns).26 What was noticeable too in the case of the UK, and which 
                                                
22 Whilst critical of this position, I differ from positions that see social partnership as 
having run out of steam (McIlroy, “Britain: How Neo-Liberalism Cut Unions Down to 
Size”. Op.Cit.), although it is not the ‘engaged’ high trust approach initially expected of it. 
23 GUMBRELL-MCCORMICK, R. and HYMAN, R. Trade Unions in Western Europe: 
Hard Times, Hard Choices. Op. Cit., p. 147.  
24 Ibid., 191–205.  
25 BOOTHMAN, D. “El nexo clase-etnia: inmigracion en Gran Bretaña: una lectura a partir 
de Gramsci’. In: PALA, C; FIRENZE, A;  GARCIA, J. Mir. Gramcsi y la Sociedad 
Intercultural. Barcelona: Montesinos, 2014.   
26  For an outline of the range of trade union support, see 
www.thepeoplesassembly.org.uk/supporters.  
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reflects the importance of alliances around race and ethnicity issues, is the 
emergence of black and minority ethnic activists who led groups against the 
government policies of austerity, such as BARAC (Black Activists Rising 
against the Cuts). BARAC is an organisation with a strong presence drawn 
from highly regarded and active trade unionists amongst others who have a 
black and minority ethnic background. They have highlighted specific and 
general outcomes of the reductions in welfare support and services, and the 
impact in terms of the loss of jobs. They also ensure that key trade union 
annual conferences consider and hold meetings on such issues. These social 
responses are not simply alliances as such, but actually have trade union 
organisations and activists playing lead roles and linking such bodies 
together across the labour movement. They represent a network of activism 
which has come to the fore in the past ten or so years in the UK, based on a 
history of increasing sensitivity to social struggles.    
An offshoot of this, and by no means a recent phenomenon driven by the 
question of austerity, but more a response to the question of an emerging 
vulnerable workforce, has been the appearance of a community orientation 
within the trade union organisation. For some time the trade union 
movement in the UK has taken an interest in the potential for community 
unionism and has looked closely at the USA.27 There have been various 
dimensions to this strategy which will be commented on more objectively 
later. On the one hand, there have been attempts to run local campaigns 
from local offices where community groups could meet – although this was 
not very common. The General Municipal and Boilermakers Union began 
initiatives to link with local community groups and create forms of dialogue 
and, in some cases, joint training programmes. The more radical National 
Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) – as a union which 
disaffiliated from the Labour Party and moved further to the left – has been 
systematic in its attempts to link cuts in transport jobs with the negative 
impact of transport commuters in terms of their travel experiences: this 
broadening of the agenda of industrial relations had a strong political 
dimension and represents a widening of the union agenda.28 In the case of 
UNITE, there has been the development of a community membership and 
community representative programme aimed at organising around local 
campaigns and bringing the trade union into the community.29 They have 
                                                
27 SIMMS, M., HOLGATE, J; HEERY, E. Union Voices: Tactics and Tensions in UK 
Organizing. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2012. 
28 DARLINGTON, R. “Britain: Striking Unionism with a Political Cutting Edge”. In: 
Heather CONNOLLY, Heather; KRETSOS, Lefteris; PHELAN, Craig, eds. Radical 
Unions in Europe and the Future of Collective Representation. Oxford: Peter Land, 2014, 
pp. 69–88. 
29 See www.unitetheunion.org/growing-our-union/communitymembership/. 
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developed a community representative network in an attempt to create local 
links and connections with the more marginalised parts of the workforce. 
These have organised in various ways around local work and social 
campaigns.  What is more the work of trade unions around learning and 
development which have in part been funded by the Union Learning Fund – 
which receives support from the government, although this support has been 
reduced and is subject to constant negotiation – has tended to use trade 
union learning centres and workplace based learning representatives as a 
way of reaching out to more vulnerable workers in the community.30 Hence, 
the trade union movement has developed various strategies for raising the 
plight of those affected by austerity and neo-liberalism more generally, but 
also provided new forms of support services although the extent of such 
developments is uneven.  
At the heart of the move to a new community and locally based approach, 
which has been constructed as the main vehicle for reaching the lesser paid, 
more vulnerable and hyper-exploited workforce, is the living wage 
campaign. This concept has a long history in economics and a diverse and 
complex set of political origins. The idea that we should go beyond a 
minimum wage and engage with the actual costs of living for a more 
dignified life has become a major reference point for trade unions and social 
organisations in relation to what is commonly termed the ‘hard to reach’ 
workforce. There has been a strong involvement from social movements and 
even religious social movements, as in the context of the London Living 
Wage Campaign.31 The use of local alliances between trade unions, social 
movements and even more forward thinking employers – along with the 
support of the local state – has been a highlight of the campaign against 
austerity which has built on the politics of trade union renewal and the 
community unionism which emerged over the past 15 or so years. It also 
                                                
30 WALLIS, E., STUART, M.; GREENWOOD, I. “‘Learners of the Workplace Unite!’ An 
empirical examination of the UK trade union learning representative initiative”. Work, 
Employment & Society. Vol.19, n.2, 2005, pp. 283–304; RAINBIRD, H., & STUART, M. 
“The state and the union learning agenda in Britain”. Work, Employment & Society. Vol.25, 
n.2, 2011,  pp.202-217. 
31 WILLS, J., DATTA, K; EVANS, Y;  HERBERT, J; MAY, J; MCILWAINE, C. 
“Religion at Work: The Role of Faith-based Organizations in the London Living Wage 
Campaign”. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society. Vol.2, n.3, 2009, pp. 
443–461; WILLS, J. “The Geography of Union Organising in Low Paid Service Industries 
in the UK: Lessons from the T&G's Campaign to Unionise the Dorchester Hotel, London”. 
Antipode.Vol. 37, n.1, 2005, pp. 139–59. 
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forges an alliance between indigenous and migrant workers, broadly 
speaking.32 
Hence the trade union movement has managed to respond to the context of 
neo-liberalism in a variety of ways and build on its traditions of renewal 
which have come out of earlier struggles and moments of reflection. 
McIlroy has argued that any attempt to understand responses to 
globalisation or neo-liberalism – or now austerity – must be guided by a 
historical sensitivity to the broader politics of renewal of the past few 
decades within the UK, although how successful that renewal has been is 
another matter.33 There have been greater strides in terms of international 
coordination, especially around the European sector trade union federations, 
and the use of bodies, as noted above, such as European Works Councils. In 
terms of learning and training, trade unions have begun to do more on the 
skills and development of the workforce generally through specific types of 
public funds, although political trade union education has declined and the 
focus is on specific aspects of social inclusion.34 What is more there has 
been a major push towards union organising since the early 1990s in the UK 
which have been focused on targeting new members and hard to organise 
workplaces, although the extent to which this has been systematically and 
politically coordinated is another matter.35 Trade unions have developed 
cadres of people with specific project briefs to organise workers and build 
and sustain union organisation within various workplaces. What is more the 
Union Modernisation Fund, which was a project financed by the Labour 
Government in the first decade of the millennium, provided resources to 
trade unions for the purpose of, amongst other things, reaching out to the 
more vulnerable workforce through leadership training, equality training, 
mentoring schemes, disability strategies and other forms of inclusion 
strategies.36 In fact, the greater sensitivity – relatively speaking – to equality 
strategies have allowed trade unions to build a broader agenda around the 
                                                
32 However, in some cases trade unions have been ambivalent about their links with specific 
religious organisations due to their position on gender politics. 
33 MCILROY, J. “Britain: How Neo-Liberalism Cut Unions Down to Size”. Op.Cit.  
34 There is a fascinating discussion on the question of how strategic such learning strategies 
are for those interested in: RAINBIRD, H. and STUART, M. “The State and the Union 
Learning Agenda in Britain”. Work, Employment & Society. Vol.25, n.2, 2011, pp. 202–
217; MCILROY, J. and CROUCHER, R. “British Trade Unions and the Academics: The 
Case of Unionlearn”. Capital & Class Vol.37, n.2, 2013, pp. 263–284.  
35 MARTINEZ LUCIO, M. and STUART, M. “Organising and Union Modernisation: 
Narratives of Renewal in Britain”. In: GALL, G. ed., Union Revitalisation in Advanced 
Economies. London: Palgrave, 2009, pp. 17–37. 
36  STUART, M., TOMLINSON, J; MARTINEZ LUCIO, M. “Women and the 
Modernization of British Trade Unions: Meanings, Dimensions and the Challenge of 
Change”. Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 55, n.1, 2013, pp. 38–59. 
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negative impact of neo-liberalism and related strategies, although the use of 
conflict strategies are not always central to these.  
 
The challenging context of UK trade union politics: the problems of 
unbalanced and unsupported ‘revitalisation’  
As noted earlier, the context of the UK is one of a liberal market system 
based on financial priorities and employer oriented state policies.37 This is 
relevant because with a further internationalisation of capital the space 
within which industrial relations is conducted makes reciprocal action and 
consistent forms of regulation between different actors more difficult. 
Within this context there are employer traditions that are increasingly 
bypassing the trade union movement in a variety of ways.38 There are four 
further issues which are important to consider in relation to the specific and 
not just contextual challenges facing union revitalisation.  
Firstly, the structural changes and the fundamental decrease in the resource 
base of the union movement means that it is difficult for unions, and union 
officials and representatives especially, to run with a range of projects and 
areas of activity in a consistent manner. Membership decline implies the 
need for a more scrutinised use of resources and a more difficult context 
within which to organise activity consistently. Many projects within the 
movement – such as recognition campaigns, alliance building and even 
internal development – are often reliant on specific key individuals whose 
working patterns are more stressed and unsupported. The lack of resourcing 
and the problems of organisational memory within unions have been spoken 
of in various studies, as it means longer term planning and strategy is 
affected.39  As we stated earlier, the fragmentation of conflict and the 
individualisation of conflict (including inter-worker conflict of an individual 
nature) means that many resources and capabilities are drawn into these 
issues and away from those of a broader political nature or industrial 
politics.  
                                                
37  HALL, P. A. and SOSKICE, D. eds. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
38  DUNDON, T.and GALL, G. “Anti-unionism: Contextual and Thematic Issues”. In: 
DUNDON, Tony and GALL, Gregor, eds. Global Anti-Unionism: Nature, Dynamics, 
Trajectories and Outcomes. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 1–20. 
39 STUARTt, M., MARTINEZ LUCIO, M; TOMLINSON, J; PERRETT, R. The Union 
Modernisation Fund-Round Two: Final Evaluation Report. London: Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills, 2010.  
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Secondly, coordination between trade unions is a major problem, and in the 
UK context, regardless of the development of larger or merged trade unions, 
there remains a high degree of fragmentation, a complexity of trade union 
identities and a lack of joined-up discussion about revitalisation regardless 
of the coordinating efforts of the main trade union confederation. There is 
not quite the inter-trade union competition of France or Spain for example. 
There is a more shared ‘social democratic’ sensibility within the movement, 
but it is still quite fragmented at the leadership and national levels. There is 
also a reticence with overt political and public mobilisation, as seen with the 
relative abandonment of large scale demonstrations against the right-wing or 
previously centre-right governments’ austerity policies, although one could 
argue, to be fair and balanced (and as mentioned earlier), that the concern 
with not being able to mobilise sufficient individuals or undermining the 
electoral possibilities of the main left-wing party is a factor that trade union 
leaders actively consider when deliberating on these ‘choices’.   
Thirdly, there is still fragmentation vertically as well. The extent of shop 
floor organisation is not as extensive as it was in the 1960s or 1970s for 
example (see Terry40 for a study of such traditions). There remains a lack of 
support of organisational networks that tie trade union representatives on the 
ground across different workplaces within and between sectors. The 
uncertainty towards networks such as the National Shop Stewards 
Network41, and others, within some though not all trade unions, indicates a 
lack of trust within organisations and political concerns with autonomously 
based movements. In part these may be due to the political characteristics of 
some of the networks and the history of parts of the left organising around 
workplace and local representatives,42 but there remain many gaps and 
tensions in connecting with the politics of the workplace. 43  Political 
education and local political activism within trade unionism has diminished 
to some extent, although this may be due to broader political factors and 
barriers we will discuss below. There are also question marks over the 
extent of community unionism and the way in which a stable, trade union 
presence in the community, which is open and resourced, is being 
                                                
40 TERRY, M. “The Inevitable Growth of Informality”. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations. Vol. 15, n.1, 1977, pp. 76–90. 
41 The National Shop Steward Network is a network which brings together workplace and 
union representatives from various industries trying to link them and create mutually 
supportive activities in the absence of systematic support from higher levels of their formal 
organisations. This network creates horizontal relations and engagement with a broader 
political space and is supported by various trade unions in various capacities. 
42 DARLINGTON, R. “Shop Stewards' Leadership, Left-wing Activism and Collective 
Workplace Union Organisation”. Capital & Class. Vol. 26, n.1, 2002, pp. 95–126. 
43 COHEN, S. Ramparts of Resistance: Why Workers Lost Their Power, and How to Get It 
Back. London: Pluto Press, 2006. 
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supported, apart from such exceptions as UNITE. Even then the ability to 
connect with more vulnerable and hard-to-reach workers remains due to the 
lack of a systematic community orientation.  
Hence the horizontal and vertical relations – to use these simple terms – 
within the trade union movement bring challenges, given the extent of 
fragmentation and change within them. This means that there is also a lack 
of consistency in terms of international campaigning and involvement, even 
if the leadership and general senior officers of various UK trade unions have 
played an influential part in the development of the International Trade 
Unions Confederation and the European Trade Union Confederation: and 
even then this is due to the personal negotiating skills and culture, linguistic 
attributes and North Atlantic connections of key individuals within the 
British labour movement in the past 30 years or so. However, many trade 
unionists through political and social networks (especially charities such as 
War on Want) have played a part in key campaigns in terms of worker 
rights in the Indian and Bangladeshi agricultural and textile sectors, 
Palestinian rights, and others. The Trade Union Congress’s international 
department has been a hub for coordinating a range of social and 
international campaigns, although how these link to the workplace and local 
activists varies.   
The fourth factor in terms of challenges is political and emerges from the 
nature of the present political regime in 2016. The trade union movement is 
demonised by the Right and a very large part of the media (much of it 
owned by organisations linked to the media magnate Rupert Murdoch). The 
right-wing Conservative government of 1979–97 passed a range of 
legislation restricting collective action and influencing internal trade union 
affairs, which represents some of the strongest anti-union legislation of any 
developed liberal democratic system. 44  In 2015–16, the Conservative 
Government proposed legislation aimed at making it more difficult to 
develop strike action in any workplace or company: a majority vote in 
favour of collective action would be valid only if a particular percentage of 
those eligible to vote actually participated in the strike ballot in the first 
place. The legislation proposed other conditions as well, and even at some 
point the proposals called on restrictions in the use of social media in certain 
                                                
44 For a detailed discussion on the legal context in general, see the following major 
intervention which focuses on the undermining of basic employment rights and concepts by 
the 2015 elected government: SMITH, P. “Labour under the Law: A New Law of 
Combination, and Master and Servant, in 21st-century Britain?”. Industrial Relations 
Journal. Vol. 5, n.6, 2015, pp. 345–364.   
108	   Miguel Martínez Lucio 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 9, May 2018, p. 93-111 
 
contexts and greater flexibility in the employer use of employment agency 
staff during industrial conflict. Much of this was couched around the ‘right 
to work’ and the perceived impact of strikes in public services on the public. 
The fact that even certain right wing politicians critiqued the legislation, 
likening it to the approach of the previous Spanish dictator Franco, indicates 
how problematic this legal context is for trade unions. 45  Without 
appreciating the very difficult context facing trade unions in the UK one 
cannot really appreciate the limited spaces – or perceived limited spaces – 
that exist in terms of formal counter-mobilisation. On the other hand, the 
current government at the time of writing has developed strategies that, 
whilst focused on reducing the role of the state and in following what are 
generally termed ‘austerity’ strategies to rebalance the public finances, have 
redefined and re-articulated46 the social causes of trade unions in curious 
and in effect quite devious ways. For example, the notion of labour market 
inclusion has been used by the current government as a way of ensuring that 
working is economically more attractive to an individual than being on state 
benefits (especially as the government is reducing such benefits). This has 
brought criticism from trade unions and social movements who have seen 
poorer and/or disabled individuals indirectly forced into work (normally at a 
relatively low level of pay). So in many ways this has pushed the critique of 
austerity into a difficult position. More importantly, the use in 2015 of the 
notion of the ‘living wage’ by the Conservative government – and of 
supporting the development of a recommended living wage albeit at a 
different level to what is normally demanded – has brought a challenge to 
the incumbent living wage campaigners, in part trade unionists.47 This is 
because it highlights the risk of focusing too much on specific and 
disconnected campaigns that can be redefined and undermined in terms of 
their political impact. The trade union movement thus faces a political 
assault which is both coercive, in some forms, but also ideologically nimble 
and astute in others. Hence, while systematically collated data and evidence 
in 2011 pointed to the decline in union power and the role of regulation 
since the early 1980s as in some aspects beginning to stabilise and level 
out,48 the impact of the new current anti-trade union policies and the 
political economy of austerity since about 2010 may create a new set of 
challenges and potential for decline.  With the national political referendum 
vote of June 2016 to leave the European Union the prospect of further anti-
                                                
45 See http://local.teachers.org.uk/wakefield/Campaign_materials/Campaigns.cfm.  
46 LACLAU, E. Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. London: New Left Books, 1979.   
47 See: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33437115.  
48 VAN WANROOY, B.; BEWLEY, H; BRYSON, J; FORTH, S; STOKES, L; WOOD, S. 
Employment Relations in the Shadow of Recession: Findings from the 2011 Workplace 
Employment Relations Study. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
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trade union legislation (as well as legislation which undermines worker 
rights in areas such as health and safety) is a real possibility and further 
challenge should worker rights, partly linked currently to the social 
dimension and legislation of the European Union, be further undermined by 
the state.  
 
 
Conclusion: the challenge of isolation  
One of the problems we have when discussing trade unions today, the role 
of collective action and the academically fashionable question of renewal or 
revitalisation is that we discuss it in terms of trade unions themselves and in 
isolation. Much may be due to the nature of some aspects of the industrial 
relations traditions – or labour and employment relations as the North 
American tradition prefers to use in its attempt to renew the presentation of 
the discipline. However, trade unions exist within contexts and those 
contexts are political, social and economic, and historical, and somehow any 
strategy we discuss makes sense only in terms of the resources, 
understanding, development and context tied to its evolution. In the UK the 
challenge to the presence and role of trade unions since the late 1970s, or 
the absence of political support from the state of a systematic nature when 
allied parties were in power, means that trade unions are isolated in their 
responses irrespective of the ‘choice’ (limited in parts, however) of building 
social alliances. No trade union movement proceeds without creating 
partnerships in the broader sense of the terms with other actors or interests: 
some of these choices as Hyman49 notes can lean towards focusing relations 
with employers, the state and society (or a peculiar combination and 
selection of these).   
The remaking of trade unions has been in the main a solitary project which 
has had good intentions and been viewed by many observers as being highly 
innovative; but these are first steps which require resources, coordination, 
conviction and politics. Within the UK, the understanding of trade unions 
has slipped from much of management and state concerns: there remains an 
absence of awareness of how socially innovative they have actually become 
in many ways. Within social democratic elites they are seen as part of a 
                                                
49 HYMAN, R. Understanding European Trade Unionism: Between Market, Class and 
Society. London: Sage, 2001. 
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historical configuration of the country’s progressive politics, but not integral 
to it.  
However, trade unions and unionists have in some sense incubated and 
guarded the map of social and emancipatory possibilities in terms of its 
internal discussions and in terms of, what McIlroy quite rightly points out 
(although to my mind in somewhat pessimistic terms), the political shift 
towards the left that has been building up since the mid-1990s or so. Within 
the trade union movement of the UK, the Communication Workers Union, 
the PCS public service union, the RMT, the FBU, UNITE and others have 
actually looked to a more political identity and set of priorities by working 
within established networks and relations as in the Labour Party in some 
cases and/or other political networks and movements which have mobilised 
around anti-austerity campaigns. The role of trade union activists – perhaps 
often as individuals or as parts of alternative political networks – have been 
at the heart of anti-austerity campaigns and many social struggles in relation 
to the state. The multiple role and identity of trade unionists is a curious 
phenomenon which the studies of social movements tend to ignore. That 
there has been no automatic reimagining of the Left and the role of swords 
of justice is understandable due to the isolated and demonised role of such 
discourses in the UK.  
Yet whatever happens after the events of 2015 – when Jeremy Corbyn as an 
explicitly left candidate to the Labour Party was elected against all 
expectations as the leader of the Labour Party, in great part due to trade 
unions and their members – the political networks, organisational roles and 
energy of trade unions and trade unionists have shown their ability to 
influence political spaces in curious and discreet ways. For all the 
fragmentation – vertically and horizontally – and organisational challenges 
facing them, the campaigning ability and grounded imagination of the 
movement in general has demonstrated its capacity to innovate politically 
and on occasions influence agendas. This has come from a process of 
political renewal around social inclusion agendas and a greater albeit 
relative sensitivity to the very nature of social and economic fragmentation 
itself. It is this political dimension50 we need to study and nurture as well; a 
need to appreciate what Martin Upchurch calls the curious consistency of 
the current inconsistencies of struggle. 51  Therefore, to understand 
globalisation and the position of organised labour we need to understand the 
                                                
50 UPCHURCH, M; TAYLOR, G. J.; MATHERS, A. The Crisis of Social Democratic 
Trade Unionism in Western Europe: The Search for Alternatives. Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2009. 
51 M. Upchurch, presentation at the Critical Labour Studies Day Seminar held on 14 
November 2015, the GMB, London. 
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way in which these changes are nationally contextualised and lead to new 
forms of fragmentation and new spaces for struggle – which require a 
linking together through political processes and activism.  
 
  
 
Impact of the crisis on associative resources of trade 
unionism. The Spanish case study 
Pere J. Beneyto1 
 
ntroduction  
Over eight years have passed since the onset of the global economic crisis, 
with its devastating effects on the labour market (unemployment, 
precariousness, segmentation), labour relations (legal deregulation, wage 
devaluation, weakening of collective bargaining) and on social cohesion 
(inequality, poverty, vulnerability) throughout the European Union and, 
particularly, in the southern part of the continent, impacting institutions and 
processes of government and representation.2 The objective of this article is 
to analyse the impact of this process of change, particularly during the most 
recent crisis period, on Spanish trade unionism within the European context, 
using that which relates to the structure and evolution of its main associative 
resources (member presence and electoral audience) as reference indicators, 
in permanent and complex interaction with those of a structural (position in 
the labour market) and institutional (participation in collective bargaining 
and social dialogue)3 nature. To do so, I initially conduct a specialized 
literature review on the factors of trade unionism, as well as on the 
empirical evidence derived from different surveys and comparative studies 
                                                
1 Pere J. Beneyto Calatayud, PhD in Sociology and tenured professor in the Department of 
Social Sciences at the University of Valencia.Avda. Los Naranjos, 4b. 46021-Valencia 
(Spain). 
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Industrial Relations in Europe 2014. 2015; MOLINA, O. 
“Sindicalismo y crisis económica: amenazas, retos y oportunidades”. Kultur. vol. I, n.2, 
2014, pp. 171-194; BENNER, M. ed. Before and beyond the global economic crisis. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013. 
3 GUMBRELL-MCCORMIC, R. and HYMAN, R. Trade Unions in Western Europe. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
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of Europe, in order to subsequently focus on the description and analysis of 
changes in the labour market and in labour relations, as well as the context 
of our study, regarding the associative resources (membership and 
representation) of Spanish trade unionism. 
 
1. Indicators of unionism: theoretical approaches and comparative 
empirical studies 
Of the institutions serving to drive representative democracy (political 
parties, civic associations, and business organizations) it is in the trade 
unions where membership plays a major role, in terms of power, resources, 
participation and legitimacy.4 The corresponding relative share operates as a 
privileged indicator of the intervention capacity of the country’s trade union 
movement5, strongly conditioned by structural characteristics and the labour 
relations model of the same. 6  This hinders comparisons, forcing the 
incorporation of other variables into the analysis (electoral audience, 
collective bargaining coverage, institutional participation). 
An exploration of the main database on this subject matter (ICTWSS: Data 
Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts) allows us to take an initial look at two large 
phases in the evolution of trade unions in Europe: the overall growth 
between 1950 and 19807 and the sustained, though unequal, decline over the 
following three decades.8 The economic crisis had a special impact since 
20089 until reaching its current percentage of approximately 23% of the 
wage earning population of the European Union. This overall change in the 
trend has led to a heated academic and union debate regarding its causes and 
effects, resulting in numerous studies and investigations in the field, on both 
a national and comparative level. The resulting literature is broad and 
                                                
4  LEONARDI, S. “Rappresentanza, organnizzazione e democrazia. Modelli e 
politichesindacali a confronto”. Democrazia e dirittto. n. 3-4, 2013, pp. 1-21. 
5 EBBEINGHAUS, B. and VISSER, J. “When Institutions Matter. Union Growth and 
Decline in Western Europe, 1950-1995”. European Sociological Review. Vol. 15, n.2, 
1999, pp. 135-158. 
6 SULLIVAN, R. “Labour market or labour movement? The union density bias as barrier to 
labour renewal”. Work, employment and society. Vol. 24, n.1, 2010, pp. 145-156. 
7 EBBEINGHAUS, B. and VISSER, J. Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945. 
London: MacMillan, 2000. 
8 SCHMITT, J. and MITUKIEWICZ, A.  Politics Matters. Changes in unionization rates in 
rich countries, 1960-2010. Washington: Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2011; 
SCHNABEL, C. “Union membership and density: Some (not so) stylized facts and 
challenges”. European Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 19, n.3, 2013, pp. 255-272. 
9 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2015. 
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diverse, with three major areas of approach or perspectives, guided at 
analysing the factors conditioning current trade union membership, 
strategies for revitalization and member trajectories. 
The first of these research lines focuses on studying the determinants of 
membership, distinguishing between macro (temporary, structural and 
institutional factors) and micro (sociodemographic and cultural) levels. As 
for the macro factors, studies have attempted to evaluate how union 
membership is  influenced by the evolution of the economic cycle10, 
changes in occupational structure from the industrial to the tertiary 
paradigm11, the distribution of employment based on work centre size and 
the public or private nature of the same12 and, at an institutional level, 
changes in collective bargaining coverage and structure13 and the validity of 
the Ghent system of trade union participation in the provision of welfare 
benefits.14  
From a micro perspective, studies have focused on the analysis of the 
weight of the sociodemographic (gender, age, education level, origin) as 
well as on variables related to particular employment (activity sector, 
contract type, years with the company, wage level) that affect the propensity 
to become a member of a trade union.15 And, even those of a cultural nature 
that are related to ideological orientation16 and individual or cooperative 
                                                
10 BAIN, G. and ELSHEIKH, F. Union Growth and the Business Cycle: An Econometric 
Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell, 1976; CHECCHI, D. and VISSER, J. “Pattern persistence in 
European trade union density: A longitudinal analysis 1950-1996”. European Sociological 
Review. Vol. 21, 2005, pp. 1-21. 
11 EBBEINGHAUS, B. and VISSER, J. Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945. 
London: MacMillan, 2000; BRYSON, A., EBBINGHAUS, B. and VISSER, J. “Causes, 
consequences and cures of union decline”. European Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 
17, n.2, 2011, pp. 97-105. 
12 BAIN, G. Industrial Relations in Britain, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983; HARTLEY, J. 
and STEPHENSON, G. Employment Relations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
13 CLEGG, H. El sindicalismo en un sistema de negociación colectiva. Madrid: Ministerio 
de Trabajo, 1986. 
14 SCRUGGS, L. “The Ghent system and Union Membership in Europe, 1970-1996.  
Political Research Quarterly. Vol. 55, n.2, 2002, pp. 275-297. 
15  SCHNABEL, C. and WAGNER, J. “Union Density and determinants of union 
membership in 18 EU countries: evidence from micro data, 2002/03”. Industrial Relations 
Journal. Vol. 38, n.1, 2007, pp. 5-32; FAZEKAS, Z. “Institutional effects on the presence 
of trade unions at the workplace: Moderation in a multilevel setting”. European Journal of 
Industrial Relations. Vol. 17, n.2, 2011, pp. 153-169; EBBINGHAUS, B., GÖBEL, C. and 
KOOS, S. “Social capital and workplace contexts matter: Comparing union membership in 
Europe”. European Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 17, n.22, 2011, pp. 107-124.  
16 RILEY, N. “Determinants of Union Membership: A Review”. Labour. Vol. 11, n.2, 
1997, pp. 265-301; HAGUE, R., HARROP, M. and BRESLIN, S. Comparative 
Governement and Politics. London: MacMillan Press, 1998. 
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values 17  have been considered. As for motivations and incentives for 
membership, a specialized literature18 distinguishes between those of an 
institutional (desire for protection and/or services), identity-based (similarity 
with the values and proposals of the organization) and sociability (personal 
and group relations) nature. 
Overall, the research on the determinants of trade union membership, of 
both a quantitative and a qualitative nature, has generated a great deal of 
empirical work which has validated some of the principal hypotheses. Of 
special significance are the multi-variable analyses conducted by different 
research teams on the European Social Survey19, which considers the net 
rate of trade union membership of the wage-earning population as the 
dependent variable (excluding the employed, retired, pensioners, 
freelancers, etc.) and studies its correlation with the principal dependent 
variables (sociodemographic, structural and institutional) of which it has 
data. 
The reference studies have a high degree of agreement in their results, 
allowing us, for expository effects, to classify the studied variables in three 
large groups, according to their positive influence (greater or lesser) on 
membership tendencies: 
                                                
17 VISSER, J. “Why Fewer Workers Join Unions in Europe: A Social Custom Explanation 
of Membership Trends”. British Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 40, n.3, 2002, pp. 
403-430. 
18 FREEMAN, R. and MEDOFF, J. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books, 1984; 
KLANDERMANS, B. “Psychology and trade union participation: Joining, acting, 
quitting”. Journal of Occupational Psychology. Vol. 59, 1986, pp. 189-204; CREGAN, C. 
“Can organizing work? An inductive analysis of individual attitudes toward union 
membership”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Vol. 58, n.2, 2015, pp. 282-304; 
BLANCHFLOWER, D. “International patterns or union membership”. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations. Vol. 45, n.1, 2007, pp. 1-28; CHECCHI, D., VISSER, J. and VAN 
DER WERRFHORST, H. “Inequality and Union membership: The influence or relative 
earnings and inequality attitudes”, in British Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 48, n.1, 
2010, pp. 84-108; TOUBOL, J. and JENSEN, C. “Why do people join trade unions? The 
impact of workplace union density on union recruitment”. Transfer. Vol. 20, n.1, 2014, pp. 
135-154. 
19 SANO, J. and WILLIAMSON, J. “Factors affecting Union decline in the 18 OECD 
countries and their implications for Labor Movement Reform”. International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology. Vol. 49, n.6, 2008, pp. 479-500; SCHEUER, S. “Union 
membership variation in Europe: A ten-country comparative analysis”. European Journal 
of Industrial Relations. Vol. 17, n.1, 2011, pp. 57-73; SCHMITT, J. and MITUKIEWICS, 
A. Politics Matter. Changes in unionization rates in rich countries, 1960-2010. Op.Cit; 
TURNER, T. and D’ART, D. “Public perceptions of trade unions in countries of the 
European Union: A causal analysis”. Labor Studies Journal. Vol.37, n.1, 2012, pp. 33-55; 
SCHNABEL, C. “Union membership and density: Some (not so) stylized facts and 
challenges”. Op.Cit. 
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a) strong impact: economic cycle (trade union membership has a 
pro-cyclical behaviour, increasing with the growth in 
employment and wages and decreasing in recessions, although in 
both cases, with a certain temporary disparity), a direct 
correlation with company size, the existence of trade union 
structures in the work centre (delegates, business committees, 
union branches) and institutions of the Ghent system (existing 
only in Belgium and Scandinavian countries). 
b) average impact: activity sector (greater membership propensity 
in industry and public services and a lower propensity in private 
sectors), contractual situation (membership rate increases for 
permanent workers and decreases for temporary workers), age 
and education level (curvilinear relationship). 
c) weak impact: in terms of trade union membership, the gender gap 
presents an unequal distribution, however with a tendency to 
decrease and even to inverse in some countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, being some of the most 
significant), with worker nationality of origin also being of low 
significance. On the other hand, the collective bargaining model 
generates an unequal impact on membership based on whether its 
structure (centralization-decentralization) and type of coverage 
(universal-unionized) activates the free-riding mechanisms to a 
greater or lesser degree.  
A multivariate analysis carried out on data from the European Social 
Survey20 concluded that when the most favourable circumstances coincide 
(workers over the age of 30, with permanent contracts in medium to large 
sized companies of the industry or public service sectors, having a trade 
union presence in the work centre) the mean membership rate (23%) 
increased up to 61%, while in the opposite pole (young workers with 
temporary contracts in private service sectors and micro-companies without 
the presence of trade union structures) the rate virtually disappears, 
decreasing to between 1 and 3 per cent. 
To summarize, the membership patterns that have been created over the past 
three years and that transversally affect all of the European countries, while 
having an unequal degree of development of the determinant factors 
analysed, and of the renewal strategies implemented by the respective trade 
union organizations, explain the differences existing between the main 
                                                
20 VAN GYES, G. “The social partners as membership organisations: an overview of forms 
and trends in the Member States”. Industrial Relations in Europe 2006. Luxembourg: 
Comisión Europea, 2006, pp. 19-40. 
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labour relation systems, both in their rates of unionism as well as in the 
recent evolution of the same. 
From a diachronic perspective, the analysis of trade union membership in 
Europe since 1960, considering both absolute and relative values21, provides 
sufficient empirical evidence to dispute the recurrent neoliberal clichés 
regarding the structural crisis and the inevitable decline in unionism22 
caused by globalization, technological change and the (supposed) defensive 
concentration in the old strongholds of industry. The data available, 
however, accredits both the maintenance of major levels of unionism as well 
as the difficulties in its adaptation to the occupational and institutional 
changes occurring since 1980, leading to a reduction in membership rates 
that is apparently neither homogenous in terms of the different occupational 
variables studied, or generalizable to all countries of the European Union. 
This diversity has been maintained, even over recent years in which the 
overall impact of the crisis has not significantly altered the membership 
rankings for the different countries and labour relations models.23  
According to data from the ICTWSS, between 2000 and 2007 the net 
membership rate in trade unions in the 28 countries of the EU (Table 1) 
decreased by 2.9%, dropping from 26.9 to 23.9per cent of the total wage 
earning population, although this was not a generalized trend. Increases 
were recorded in 9 countries and decreases of less than the mean were found 
in six other countries. During the recessive phase of the cycle, the decrease 
was more pronounced (-7.5%) although once again, this was not 
homogenous, with increases in membership occurring in Belgium, Italy and 
to a lesser extent, France and Malta, and very unequal variations in the other 
countries, with special importance being seen in the countries that were 
most affected by the crisis (Greece, Spain, Portugal and those of the Eastern 
area). 
On the other hand, comparative studies have allowed us to verify that the 
membership density of each country or area (Scandinavia, Central Europe, 
Anglo Saxon, Mediterranean and Eastern) is greatly determined by the 
characteristics of the labour relation systems in which the trade unions 
                                                
21 SCHNABEL, C. “Union membership and density: Some (not so) stylized facts and 
challenges”. Op.Cit. 
22 TROY, L. The Twilight of the Old Unionism. New York: M.W. Sharpe, 2004. 
23 BRYSON, A., EBBINGHAUS, B. and VISSER, J. “Causes, consequences and cures of 
union decline”. Op.Cit.; SCHMITT, J. and MITUKIEWICS, A. Politics Matter. Changes in 
unionization rates in rich countries, 1960-2010. Op.Cit.  
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operate24, with common and differentiated patterns existing in each of 
these.25  
Having identified the different determinant factors of membership evolution 
and the power of union intervention, quantifying the uneven impact on the 
principal organizational and labour relation models, more recent debates and 
studies have focused on the design and implementation of corresponding 
strategies for revitalization, having different effects based on the specific 
case at hand, yet which highlight the resistance and renewal capacity of the 
unions during especially difficult times.26  
 
Table 1 
Trade union membership* in Europe, 2000-2014 
 
Country 2000 2007 Var. in 
% 
2000-07 
2014  Var. in 
% 
2007-14 
No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate 
SCANDINAVIAN SYSTEM 
Denmark 1,824 73.9 1,733 70.7 -4.9 1,633 68.8 -5.7 
Finland 1,504 75.0 1,529 70.5 +1.6 1,462 69.0 -4.4 
Sweden 2,989 79.1 2,936 70.8 -1.7 2,878 67.3 -1.9 
Total 6,317 76.9 6,198 70.6 -1.9 5,973 68.3 -3.6 
GERMANIC SYSTEM  
Germany 7,928 24.6 6,604 19.9 -16.7 6,330 18.1 -4.1 
Austria 1,190 36.6 1,029 29.9 -13.5 989 27.4 -3.8 
Belgium 1,936 56.2 2,039 54.7 +5.3 2,120 55.1 +3.9 
                                                
24 EBBEINGHAUS, B. and VISSER, J. “When Institutions Matter. Union Growth and 
Decline in Western Europe, 1950-1995”. Op.Cit.; TRAXLER, F. National Labour 
Relations in Internationalized Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
25 BERNACIAK, M., GUMBELL-MCCORMIC, R. and HYMAN, R. El sindicalismo 
europeo: ¿de la crisis a la renovación? Madrid: Fundación 1º de Mayo, 2015; 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2015. 
26 BERNACIAK, M., GUMBELL-MCCORMIC, R. and HYMAN, R. El sindicalismo 
europeo: ¿de la crisis a la renovación? Op.Cit. 
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Holland 1,574 22.9 1,422 19.3 -9.6 1,265 17.8 -11.0 
Luxembourg 116 42.8 120 38.3 +3.3 116 32.8 -2.7 
Total 12,744 27.6 11,214 23.3 -12.0 10,821 21.4 -3.5 
ANGLO-SAXON SYSTEM 
Cyprus 145 65.1 166 54.9 +14.4 136 45.2 -17.8 
Ireland 495 38.0 562 31.5 +9.7 520 29.6 -7.5 
Malta 76 60.3 75 56.4 -0.9 78 52.9 +3.7 
United 
Kingdom 
7,108 30.2 6,865 27.9 -1.9 6,445 25.8 -6.1 
Total 7,824 30.9 7,668 28.1 -1.9 7,179 26.5 -6.4 
MEDITERRANEAN SYSTEM 
Spain 2,037 16.6 2,879 17.4 +41.3 2,360 16.9 -18.1 
France 1,781 8.0 1,795 7.5 -0.6 1,825 7.7 +1.7 
Greece 631 26.5 710 24.5 +11.8 480 21.5 -32.4 
Italy 5,195 34.8 5,665 33.5 +8.2 6,131 37.3 +8.2 
Portugal 783 21.6 804 20.8 -2.4 665 18.9 -17.3 
Total 10,427 18.8 11,596 18.1 +9.3 11,461 19.0 -1.2 
EASTERN SYSTEM  
Bulgaria 550 23.0 490 17.2 -10.9 454 17.5 -7.3 
Czech  1,080 27.2 736 18.3 -21.9 514 12.7 -30.2 
Croatia 440 37.2 436 34.0 -0.9 352 30.9 -19.3 
Slovakia 623 32.3 383 18.8 -35.3 261 13.3 -31.8 
Slovenia 312 41.6 240 28.1 -27.3 160 21.2 -33.3 
Estonia 77 14.5 44 7.4 -38.9 32 5.7 -27.3 
Hungary 711 22.0 510 15.0 -22.0 360 10.5 -29.4 
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Latvia 175 20.2 156 16.6 -10.8 102 9.0 -34.6 
Lithuania 184 16.8 115 9.3 37.5 103 9.0 -10.4 
Poland 1,850 17.5 1,820 15.6 +14.8 1,540 12.5 -15.4 
Romania 2,043 34.7 2,228 36.0 +9.1 1,233 19.8 -44.6 
Total 8,045 24.8 7,158 20.4 -11.0 5,111 14.4 -28.6 
TOTAL EU 45,177 26.9 43,834 23.9 -2.9 40,545 22.3 -7.5 
 
Source: ICTWSS database. 
* Only membership of wage earning population 
 
The paradigm of the revitalization of unionism arises, initially, from an 
academic train of thought (Labour Revitalization Studies) with Anglo Saxon 
origins.27 Yet it has been progressively adapted to other union models and 
defined as a set of strategies created to intervene in the different sources of 
trade union power (structural, associative, organizational, institutional, 
strategic and narrative) so as to identify the causes of the current union 
representation crisis and to attempt to revert their effects (loss of 
membership and influence) through the deployment, in each case, of the 
corresponding strategies of negotiation, recruitment, organizational 
restructuring, institutional participation, alliances and communication.28  
Based on this multi-dimensional approach, European trade unions have 
adapted their respective organizational models and social environments to 
distinct strategies. They have attempted to identify the soft factors from the 
determinants of union power on which they may intervene (presence in 
work centres, creation of representation structures, coverage and content of 
collective bargaining, service provision, institutional participation, social 
pressure, legal regulation), in order to compensate for the impact of the 
structural hard factors (economic cycle, company size, activity sector, 
technological change, demographic variables) which are not often 
                                                
27 BACCARO, L., HAMANN, K. and TURNER, L. “The politics of labour movement 
revitalization: The need for a revitalized perspective”. European Journal of Industrial 
Relations. Vol. 9, 2003, pp. 119-133; PHELAN, C. Trade Union Revitalisation. Trends and 
prospects in 34 countries. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2007. 
28 FREGE, C. and KELLY, J. “Union revitalization strategies in comparative perspective”, 
en European Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 9, n.1, 2003, pp. 7-24.  
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susceptible to modification due to their direct intervention29, whose recent 
evolution and current situation in the Spanish case shall be analysed below. 
 
2. Returning to the social issue: changes in the labour market and 
in labour relations 
After the first years of the financial crisis (the great recession), the most 
recent stage has been characterized by a coordinated effort between political 
and economic leaders to impose a radical transformation of the labour 
relations model (the great aggression), which has broken the fragile balance 
achieved during decades of social dialogue and which has profoundly 
aggravated the asymmetry between capital and work. 30  This has been 
accomplished through using labour deregulation to weaken the three 
collective devices that have historically acted in defence and protection of 
workers: legal protection, union intervention and business coverage, leading 
to a great regression in terms of labour vulnerability and social inequality. 
We are, therefore, returning to the social issue whose magnitude and drama 
(unemployment, precariousness, poverty and inequality) have contradicted 
the dominant discourse of inevitable austerity and insufficient resources, 
updating the debate on the centrality of work, both in its real (its search, 
exercising, conditions, regulation, etc.) and symbolic (identity factor and 
citizenship) dimensions and confirming the need to construct a new account 
of the causes and effects of the crisis, its actors and alternative strategies. 
In the first case, the evolution of the economic cycle reveals that, even when 
the causes of the crisis do not lie in the labour market and its supposed 
rigidity, but rather, in financial speculation and its true voracity, these have 
been used as a pretext to change the social model and to promote an 
enormous transfer of income from work to capital, devaluing labour rights 
and conditions, cutting welfare provisions and privatizing public services. 
All these have had traumatic effects on both the labour market and labour 
relations and social cohesion. Updating the model applied in the 1980s by 
the governments of Thatcher and Reagan, one of the central lines of the 
conservative strategy in Spain has been to break with the representativeness, 
resources and legitimacy of class unionism, in order to debilitate, if not 
eliminate, its functions as a social actor and gender mainstreaming with 
                                                
29 SCHEUER, S. “Union membership variation in Europe: A ten-country comparative 
analysis”. Op.Cit.; SCHNABEL, C. “Union membership and density: Some (not so) 
stylized facts and challenges”. Op.Cit. 
30 LEHNDORFF, S. “Acting in different worlds. Challenges to transnational trade union 
cooperation in the Eurozone crisis”. Transfer. Vol. 21, n.2, 2015, pp. 157-170. 
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intervention capacity. This obtains both in the processes of the first 
distribution of income (wages, working conditions) through collective 
bargaining, as well as in the very mechanisms of the second re-distribution 
(fiscal policy, state welfare benefits) through institutional participation and 
social pressure. 
Now we shall assess the damage caused by the crisis and conservative 
management which, using the crisis as a pretext, attempted to radically 
change both the scenario (labour market segmentation, employment 
vulnerability), and the institutions (weakening collective bargaining, 
alienating social dialogue) and labour relations actors (de-legitimisation of 
unionism, criminalization of social protest), in order to reinforce their 
political, economic and even cultural hegemony. Thus, in order to 
appropriately contextualize both the impact of the crisis and the labour 
counter-reform imposed in Spain by the conservative government of the 
Partido Popular, as well as the difficulties for union action, it is useful to 
analyse, even schematically, the recent evolution and current state of the 
principal socioeconomic and labour indicators. 
In the first case, and according to the Labour Force Survey, at the end of 
2015, the Spanish wage-earning population was 14,988,900, which is 12.3% 
less than in 2007, with over two and a half million jobs having been 
destroyed. When considering the most significant sociodemographic 
variables, the structure and evolution of paid employment is characterised 
by: 
- gender: increases in the participation of women, who have gone from 
representing 43.8 to 47.9 per cent. 
- age: those under the age of 30 currently represent 14.4% of the total of all 
wage earners, being the age group that was most affected by the crisis, 
having lost some 2,236,800 jobs since 2007. 
-nationality: one out of every ten wage earners is foreign-born, with this 
being one of the groups that was the most harshly affected by the crisis, 
losing some 35.3% of its earnings since 2007. 
- contract: the rate of temporary contracts is 25.7%, ten percentage points 
above the European mean, having a mean duration of 53 days. 
- working day: part time contracts have increased considerably during the 
crisis, from 11.7 to 16.9 per cent, with this being a very feminized 
contractual modality, having rates of 26.2 for women and 8.4% for men. 
- length of service:18.4% of the salaried workers have been working in their 
job for less than one year, 12.8% between one and two and the rest (79.8%) 
have over three years of length of service. 
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- activity sector: the largest group of wage earners are concentrated in the 
private (57.4%) and public (20.1%) services, while industry represents 
14.6% of the total, with construction and agriculture having lower 
percentages (4.8 and 3.2 per cent, respectively). 
- company size: 40.5% of those employed in the private sector (with the 
exception of agriculture and financial services) work in micro-companies 
(with less than 10 employees), a percentage that is much higher than the 
European mean (29.3%). 19.3% work in small companies (10 to 49), and 
medium (50 to 249) and large companies (over 250 employees) employing 
13.5 and 26.7 per cent, respectively, of the wage earners. 
On the other hand, unemployment, in its diverse dimensions (magnitude, 
evolution, composition and duration) represents the most dramatic 
expression of the crisis, currently estimating the number of unemployed 
individuals at 4,779,500, some 20.9% of the active population, with this rate 
having ranged from 8.5% in 2007 to 26.1% in 2013, outnumbering in all 
cases, the European mean. Unemployment rates for women are higher than 
those of men (22.5 and 19.5 per cent, respectively), although it is the age 
variable that has a less equal distribution, reaching the highest levels in the 
cohorts of 16 to 19 years (66.1%), of 20 to 24 (42.5%) and of 25 to 29 
(27.6%). With all of this, the most dramatic situation is associated with long 
term unemployment (43.6% with over two years) and with the loss of 
unemployment benefits, whose coverage rate has decreased by over twenty 
points since the start of the crisis, until reaching 55.2% at the end of 2015. 
The integrated analysis of this data, via the creation of synthetic indices, 
allows us to quantify the impact of the crisis on our labour market, both in 
its temporary evolution as well as comparative assessment with the main 
countries of our region.  
The labour vulnerability index31 measures the global scope of instability 
(unemployment, temporary work and part time jobs), currently placing it at 
56.5% for the overall wage-earning population (employed or unemployed), 
more than twelve points above the EU mean, after having increased by eight 
points since 2007. Similarly, the last version of the employment quality 
index which is created annually by the OECD, describing rates of 
employment, temporary employment and long term unemployment, situated 
Spain, with a score of 2.4 out of 10, in the second to last place in a list of the 
34 most developed countries in the OECD. Spain dropped ten positions 
                                                
31 PRIETO, C. and PÉREZ DE GUZMÁN, S. “La precarización en el marco de la norma 
flexible-empresarial del empleo”. In: TORRES, C. ed. España 2015. Situación social. 
Madrid: CIS, 2015, pp. 629-639. 
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since 2012 and was next to Greece (1.5), Turkey (3.8), Portugal (4.1), 
Slovakia (4.3) and Hungary (4.8) the only countries to fail in said 
classification.  
During this period, there was also strong wage devaluation, causing a 
reverse redistribution, with cuts in the aggregate payment of wage earners 
by three percentage points of the GDP (from 55 to 52 per cent) between 
2009 and 2014. At the same time, corporate benefits increased by the same 
proportion (from 45 to 48 per cent) with the resulting increase in inequality 
(over three points in the index by Gini, being the OECD country in which it 
increased the most) and of poverty, which was situated at 13.4 million 
individuals (29.2% of the population, five points above the EU mean) who 
are at risk of social exclusion.32  
At the same time, the imposed labour reform reinforced the unilateral power 
of companies, leading to a lifting of the sectorial agreements and promoting 
the individualization of labour relations33 at the macro level, in a strong 
impact both on the structure and the coverage of collective bargaining as 
well as on the employment regulations. And at a micro level, it led to the 
standardisation of abusive business practices, directly limiting worker rights 
and the capacity for trade union intervention. While considerable, and at 
times, dramatic, these changing circumstances caused by the crisis have had 
led to long term structural trends that have radically modified the scenario 
since the 1980s, including the global actors and institutions involved in 
labour relations34 and more specifically, those of the European Union.35 
In Spain, the democratic normalisation initiated late in the 1970s precisely 
when the European model (Keynesian economics, Ford-based production, 
corporate labour relations and the Welfare state) started showing signs of 
fatigue following its golden years 36  of economic growth and social 
cohesion, revealed an added difficulty. This foundational anomaly would 
condition both the normative and institutional representation of interests 
such as the organizational and strategic development of the main actors, 
                                                
32 OXFAM. Una economía al servicio del 1%. Informe 210, 2015. 
33 BAYLOS, A. Negociar en crisis. Negociación colectiva en los países del sur de Europa. 
Albacete: Bomarzo Otaegui, 2014; OTAEGUI, A. “Desequilibrio negocial y debilitamiento 
del actor sindical como efectos de la reforma laboral”. Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales. 
Vol. 32, n.2, 2014, pp. 337-360.  
34  BACCARO, L. Labour, Globalization and Inequality: Are Trade Unions Still 
Redistributive? Ginebra: OIT, Instituto Internacional de Estudios Laborales, DP/192/2008.  
35 FERNER, A. and HYMAN, R. La transformación de las relaciones laborales en 
Europa. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo, 2002.  
36 HOBSBAWM E. Historia del siglo XX. Barcelona: Crítica, 1995.  
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particularly of the unions, which only as of the 1990s began to resemble the 
membership patterns of the rest of Europe.37  
 
3. Associative resources of Spanish trade unionism 
Having identified the determinant factors and development patterns of 
European trade unionism, our objective now lies in analysing their validity 
in the Spanish case, considering its historic evolution and structural 
composition. The proposed hypotheses refer, first, to the quantitative 
expansion and qualitative adaptation process followed by Spanish trade 
unionism, from its late and difficult historic configuration, and which we 
consider different in the first case and convergent in the second, with respect 
to the European trade union dynamic. The goal is to determine whether, as 
the recurrent media topic predicts (at times, even with academic support) 
Spanish trade unionism is characterized by its negligible membership and 
representation, limited to the most traditional of sectors (Fordist industries) 
and the most traditional of groups (men, low skilled and in manual 
occupations), without a presence in the emerging areas of the business and 
occupational structure. Or, to the contrary, if it has experienced a major 
process of growth, adaptation to its changing environment, diversification of 
its profiles and trajectories and broad coverage of its institutional 
intervention in collective bargaining and labour relations. Therefore, we 
analyse the associative resources (presence/audience) of Spanish trade 
unionism based on the data available regarding the evolution and 
composition of its membership and electoral representation, provided by 
union and institutional sources as well as surveys and electoral records. 
The legal regulation of Spanish unionism began during the late 1970s (laws 
19/1977 on trade union association and 8/1980 of the Worker’s 
Statute),when the expansive trend of European unionism reverted as a result 
of the economic crisis and of the various social changes caused by the same. 
In the Spanish case, this was further complicated by the uncertainties arising 
with the political transition. The result of this process was a dual channel 
model that was associative (direct membership) and elective (delegated 
representation). Its impact on the development of unionism and labour 
relations in Spain has been the subject of on-going debate (both in the trade 
                                                
37 BENEYTO, P. “El sindicalismo español en perspectiva europea: de la anomalía a la 
convergencia”. Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales. Vol. 26, n.1, 2008, pp. 57-88. 
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union area as well as in legal and academic fields) in regards to unequal 
degree of functionality.38 
It is a system with inclusive will which, on the one hand, appears to 
discourage direct membership as it globalizes the coverage of union 
intervention, while on the other hand, it contributes to indirectly extending 
the area of influence of electoral representation. At the same time, it also 
provides clear democratic legitimacy. In an initial phase, which would 
extend until the late 1980s, union strategy was based on the design and 
implementation of the logic of influence, strengthening its representative 
dimension, in order to legitimize its intervention and ensure its capacity to 
dialogue with business (within and outside of the work centres) and public 
institutions. For this, the dual model was fundamentally designed around the 
electoral axis, both in terms of normative regulation as well as syndicate 
strategy. In the first case, elective representation became the key to the 
system given that not only did it ensure defence and dialogue between the 
company workers (delegates/committees), but also determined aggregate 
union representation (arts. 6 and 7 of the LOLS) and therefore, the rights to 
the overall effectiveness of collective bargaining (arts. 87-89 of the WS) and 
of institutional representation. 
 
3.1. Membership 
Initially, union membership responded mainly to ideological and identity-
based incentives and to defensive strategies, having very low numbers 
(approximately one million members for the overall collective of trade 
unions), with a declining trajectory during the early period. At the same 
time, successive union elections broadened their area of influence and 
intervention, allowing analysts to define the Spanish model as being a 
“unionism of voters”39 with a “greater audience than presence”40. It was 
situated in an intermediate area between an informal movement and a formal 
organization, jeopardising the effectiveness of its recruitment plans and 
membership loyalty.  
 
 
                                                
38 BENEYTO, P. “Fortalezas y debilidades del sistema español de representación sindical”. 
Gaceta Sindical. Reflexión y debate. n.16, 2011, pp. 195-223. 
39 MARTINEZ-LUCIO, M. “España: regular el empleo y la fragmentación social”. In:  
FERNER, A. and HYMAN, R. La transformación de las relaciones laborales en Europa. 
Op. Cit., pp.547-585. 
40 ROJO, E. “Las tareas pendientes”. Política y Sociedad. n. 5, 1990, pp. 31-44. 
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Graph 1. Trade union membership in Spain (1980-2014). 
Absolute values and relative share 
 
 Source: ICTWSS 
 
In the mid-1980s, a change occurred in the mechanisms of union 
membership, from the model based on ideology-identity to one based on a 
more instrumental and practical membership logic and the generic creation 
of material and sociability incentives, derived from the growing capacity in 
the area of the defence of collective interests (the new model of social 
consensus, expansion of coverage and of the collective bargaining agenda, 
union action within the company, social mobilization). While union 
membership decreased in the majority of European Union countries41, in 
Spain it doubled its members between 1988 and 2000, until eventually 
surpassing two million (Graph 1), while at the same time, developing a 
process of change and adaptation of its morphology, from a Fordist 
homogeneity (men, low-skilled, manual jobs in industry and low wages) to 
more heterogeneous profiles, representing the new occupational structure 
and more similar to the modern European unionism. 
Since then, the membership indicators have revealed a clearly pro-cyclic 
behaviour (Table 2), with growth periods in the expansion phase exceeding 
                                                
41 BERNACIAK, M., GUMBELL-MCCORMIC, R. and HYMAN, R. El sindicalismo 
europeo: ¿de la crisis a la renovación? Op.Cit. 
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those of the reference wage earning population (+41.3 and +39.1 per cent, 
respectively between 2000 and 2007) and with decreases during the 
recession (-18.0 and -15.3 per cent from 2007 to 2014), although the 
reversal of the union trend took a few years to be consolidated. 
 
Table 2. Evolution of the wage earning population and trade union 
membership in Spain, 2000-2014 
 
 Wage earning population Union membership 
No. 
(thousands) 
Var. in % No. 
(thousands) 
Var. in % Net rate 
2000 12,285,7 --- 2,037 --- 16.6 
2001 12,786,7 +4.1 2,110 +3.6 16.4 
2002 13,141,7 +2.8 2,187 +3.6 16.1 
2003 14,127,4 +7.5 2,260 +3.3 15.9 
2004 14,720,8 +4.2 2,278 +0.8 15.4 
2005 15,502,0 +5.3 2,338 +2.6 14.6 
2006 16,208,1 +4.5 2,622 +12.1 14.3 
2007 17,095,0 +5.4 2,879 +9.8 15.5 
2008 16,681,0 -2.4 2,953 +2.6 17.2 
2009 15,680,7 -5.9 2,844 -3.7 17.6 
2010 15,346,8 -2.1 2,777 -2.6 17.3 
2011 15,105,5 -1.6 2,678 -3.6 16.9 
2012 14,573,4 -3.5 2,583 -4.3 17.1 
2013 14,069,1 -3.5 2,472 -4.3 16.9 
2014 14,483,1 +2.9 2,360 -4.5 16.3 
 
Source: INE-EPA and ICTWSS 
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Overall, direct membership and social legitimacy grows when the unions are 
perceived as being instruments of improvement for the workers’ labour and 
social conditions, both at a micro (work centre, legal services) and a macro 
(collective bargaining, dialogue, institutional and social pressure) level. 
Conversely, it declines when these are weakened and/or lose effectiveness 
and visibility, as has occurred over recent years, as a result of the crisis, 
labour reform and even their own shortcomings and errors. 
As for membership structure (Table 3), according to a follow-up of the 
membership records and data provided by the Survey on Quality of Life at 
Work (ECVT -Encuesta de Calidad de Vida en el Trabajo-), conducted 
annually by the corresponding Ministry between 1999 and 2010, which we 
have thoroughly analysed in previous studies42, the major transformation of 
its internal composition, consisting of sociodemographic, occupational and 
contractual variables, is highlighted: 
-by gender: with data from the ECVT corresponding to 2010, the 
membership rate for males (20.6%) is higher than that of females (16.8%). 
However, the incorporation and permanence rhythm of women is found to 
be higher, changing from 19.8% of the membership in 1980 to 41.5% 
currently, a percentage that is similar to the European mean (43.8%), 
although continuing to be lower than their participation rate in the active 
population of the country (47.9%). 
- by age the greater rates of union membership are found in the central 
segment (22.5%), being lower in the extremes: while younger workers 
under the age of 35 represent 27.5% of overall employment, they only make 
up 19.2% of union membership, with said membership increasing with age 
and education level. 
 
Table 3. Structure of trade union membership in Spain 
 
 Rate  Rate  Rate 
TOTAL 18.9 OCUPATION TOTAL 18.9 
                                                
42 BENEYTO, P. “Crisi i renovació del sindicalisme. L’afiiació a CC.OO. i UGT”. Revista 
de Treball. n. 9, 1989, pp. 147-162; BENEYTO, P. Reivindicación del sindicalismo. 
Madrid: Bomarzo, 2012; ALÓS, R. Afiliación y representación del sindicalismo en España 
y en la Unión Europea. Informe núm. 96. Madrid: Fundación 1º de Mayo, 2014. 
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GENDER Technicians 21.2 LENGTH OF SERVICE 
Men 20.6 Administrative 21.9 Less than 5 years 11.8 
Women 16.8 Qualified W. 17.1 6-10 16.5 
AGE GROUPS Unqualified 18.4 11-15 22.4 
From 16 to 34 years 13.2 ACTIVITY Over 15 33.1 
35-54 22.5 Agriculture 8.1 CONTRACT 
From 55 to 64 18.1 Indus-Construc. 17.5 Permanent  21.2 
NATIONALITY Services 25.8 Temporary 11.7 
Spanish  20.3 SECTOR WORKING HOURS 
Foreign 7.2 Private 15.0 Full time 19.5 
EDUCATION LEVEL Public  31.2 Part time 14.9 
No studies 19.4 COMPANY SIZE UNION REPRESENT. 
Primary 16.9 -10 employees 7.3 Yes  30.0 
Secondary 18.4 10-49 12.3 No 9.6 
University 20.6 50-250 17.9 Don’t know 6.9 
 + 250 30.2  
 Source: ECVT’2010 
 
- by nationality, the membership rate of immigrants is three times lower 
than that of natives, being an under-represented group in terms of 
membership with respect to their weight in the working population (3.9 and 
10.8 per cent, respectively). 
- in composition by activity branches, the greatest transformation has 
occurred. Whereas in 1980 there was a strong concentration in the 
traditional sectors of industry and construction (66.7% of the membership 
and 34.8% of the total wage-earning population), thirty years later there is a 
more balanced relationship (23.9 and 24.2 per cent, respectively), with the 
public services having 38.1 of the members and the private services having 
36.3 per cent. 
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- as for the contractual variables, we only have the data provided by the 
Survey on Quality of Life at Work (ECVT) according to which, in 2010 
unionism rates were reduced by half for unemployed and workers with 
temporary contracts and part time workers, while at the same time, it 
increased with company size and the existence of representation structures 
in the same (delegates, committees, union branches), with these last two 
variables having the greatest correlation rates with union membership.43  
The evolution and distribution of union membership are derived, therefore, 
from demand factors (company and employment structure, labour 
management models), just the opposite of that defended by labour 
deregulation and union de-legitimization ideologies. Such arguments blame 
labour market segmentation on supply factors, in other words, on the very 
workers themselves and unions who defend themselves without solidarity 
for others, marginalizing unemployed and peripheral workers. 
These strategies of corporate management and legal deregulation of hiring 
have promoted labour market segmentation44, creating a precariousness that 
hinders membership and collective action.45 It is not the unions or the 
current model of social partnership and collective bargaining which has 
caused segmentation: quite to the contrary, they have undergone processes 
of integrated management and universal coverage, collectively articulating 
power resources from the centre in order to extend coverage of rights and 
collective guarantees to the periphery, as accredited by various European 
comparative studies.46  
Ultimately, the previously described trade union membership patterns 
coincide with those of European unionism, although the Spanish case may 
have a greater impact, given the specific features of its occupational 
structure (greater rates of unemployment and precariousness, large 
concentration of employment in micro-companies). By the same token, the 
crisis has highlighted other more cyclical and specific factors of the Spanish 
case such as the fragmentation of membership paths and increasing levels of 
instability and rotation of the same. 
                                                
43 CALLEJA, J.P. Estrategias de revitalización de los sindicatos españoles. Tesis Doctoral. 
Universidad de Valencia, 2016. 
44 PRIETO, C., ARNAL, M. and CAPRILE, M. La calidad del empleo en España: una 
aproximación teórica y empírica. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo, 2009.  
45 ALÓS, R., BENEYTO, P., JÓDAR, P. and VIDAL, S. “La dinámica sindical y las 
trayectorias de sus miembros”. Política y Sociedad. Vol. 50, n.3, 2013, pp. 1065-1096. 
46 REGINI, M. “I mutamentinella regolazione del lavoro e il ressistibile declino dei 
sindacati europei”.  Stato e Mercato, nú. 67, 2003, pp. 83-108; BENEYTO, P. “Presenza, 
audience e influenza sindacale. Il caso spagnolo”. Quaderni Rassegna Sindacale. Vol. 33, 
n.1, 2008, pp. 87-111.  
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 3.2. Representation 
 
As indicated, associative and institutional resources of unions maintain 
close ties, with the presence in work centres and productive sectors 
(membership, organization), correlating with their electoral audience 
(structure and representation coverage) and with both the mechanisms and 
processes of influence (collective bargaining, institutional participation, 
social mobilization). In aggregate terms, the overall scope of said union 
indicators continues to be, in the Spanish case, a sequence that goes from a 
membership rate ranging from 16 to 19 per cent of the working population 
to that of representativeness that almost triples said figure and a collective 
bargaining coverage that practically quadruples it, at least until the 
limitations caused by the 2012 labour reform. The functionality of this dual 
channel system is ambivalent given the leading role that is conferred to the 
representative bodies (delegates and business committees), just as the 
universal effectiveness of that agreed by said bodies in collective bargaining 
may discourage membership and direct participation (free rider effect). It is 
also true that with this, the area of union influence is extended considerably 
and its social legitimacy is reinforced, operating even as a membership 
factor in companies and sectors with great representative implementation. 
The described correlation between membership and representation operates, 
therefore, in a complementary direction (Table 4), such that the mean 
coverage of the representation (57%) increases when there are members and 
decreases when there are none (75 and 19 per cent, respectively). 
 
 
Table 4 
Union representation in companies, 2010 
Coverage rate 
 
 YES NO DK/NC 
TOTAL 47.4 37.2 15.3 
ACCORDING TO SIZE OF WORK CENTRE 
From 1 to 9 employees 25.2 57.2 17.6 
From 10 to 49 48.8 35.6 15.6 
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From 50 to 249 66.9 17.9 15.2 
250 and more employees 81.9 9.6 8.5 
ACCORDING TO ACTIVITY SECTOR  
Agriculture 31.6 43.5 24.9 
Industry 57.0 31.6 11.4 
Construction 31.5 52.8 15.7 
Commerce and hotel industry 34.3 47.7 18.0 
Transport and communications 59.7 31.6 8.7 
Financial services 64.3 24.8 10.9 
Business services 40.0 41.9 18.1 
Public services 61.5 23.9 14.6 
Personal and community services 17.5 62.2 20.2 
UNION MEMBERSHIP 
Yes 75.4 19.0 5.6 
No 40.9 41.5 17.6 
TOTAL 
Projection over total wage earning population 7,104,700 5,578,600 2,295,900 
Source: Ministry of Labour, ECVT 
 
The follow-up and analysis carried out on the electoral data47 highlights that 
the structure and evolution of the union representation has similar patterns 
as those that were described for membership (Graph  2), noting that during 
the expansive phase of the cycle (1995-2007) the coverage of union 
representation increased by 52.5%, until reaching 312,017 elected delegates, 
then lowering to 260,345 elected between 2011 and 2015, in a total of 
                                                
47 ALÓS, R., BENEYTO, P., JÓDAR, P., MOLINA, O. and VIDAL, S. La representación 
sindical en España. Madrid: Fundación 1º de Mayo, 2015; BENEYTO, P. Reivindicación 
del sindicalismo. Madrid: Bomarzo, 2012. 
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70,000 companies, having a total staff of 6,800,000 employees and a mean 
electoral participation rate of 67.9% of the staff. 
 
 
Graph 2 
Evolution of membership and union representation, 1978-2015 
 
 
 
Left axis: evolution of number of members 
Right axis: evolution of number of elected union delegates 
 Source: Spanish Ministry of Labour and trade unions SIC-CC.OO. 
 
As for the coverage of representation and the evolution of its results, it 
should be noted that the regulatory policy of the system excludes companies 
whose staff consists of less than 6 employees, and, according to the 
corresponding directory of the National Statistics Institute, there are 
currently 1,187,234 such companies with a staff that exceeds three million 
wage earners. Therefore, the reference universe of the representation is 
made up of 245,000 companies and approximately twelve million workers, 
of which over half participate regularly in said elections. 
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Table 5 
Workers representation, 1978-2015 
 
 Total 
Deleg. 
CC.OO. UGT Others  Non members 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1978 193,112 66,540 34.5 41,897 21.7 25,953 13.4 58,725 30.4 
1980 164,617 50,817 30.8 48,194 29.3 22,053 13.4 43,553 26.5 
1982 140,770 47,016 33.4 51,672 36.7 25,058 17.8 17,024 12.1 
1986 175,363 59,230 33.8 69,427 39.6 33,998 19.4 12,708 7.2 
1990 237,261 87,730 36.9 99,737 42.0 41,387 17.4 8,407 3.5 
1995 204,586 77,348 37.8 71,112 34.7 49,495 24.2 6,631 3.2 
1999 260,285 98,440 37.8 96,770 37.2 57,006 21.9 8,969 3.1 
2003 283,075 110,208 38.9 103,805 36.7 69,062 24.4 --- --- 
2007 312,017 122,079 39.1 114,973 36.8 74,965 24.0 --- --- 
2011 308,463 116,431 37.7 110,540 35.8 81,492 26.4 --- --- 
2015 260,345 93,877 36.1 86,267 33.1 80,201 30.8 --- --- 
 Source: Ministry of Labour and SIC-CC.OO. 
 
With regards to the results of the union elections (Table 5), it should be 
noted, first, that the consolidation of CC.OO. and UGT as the two most 
broadly supported options (between both of them, we find more than two 
thirds of the total elected representatives) gives them the legal status of the 
“most representative organizations” overall, and thereby ensuring their 
intervention at all levels of collective bargaining and institutional 
participation. The crisis’ impact is also seen here, with a reduction in the 
total number of representatives elected and in some significant changes in 
their composition. In the first case, between 2007 and 2015 the coverage of 
union representativeness decreased by 16.5%, although not in a 
homogenous manner, with a greater decrease in the large confederations (-
23.1% in CC.OO. and -24.9% in UGT) and recording slight increases for 
136	   Pere J. Beneyto 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 9, May 2018, p. 113-137 
 
the other minority and corporatist options. Finally, it is this accumulative 
representativeness in the elections held in the work centres that serves to 
legitimize the institutional power of the unions and their intervention in 
collective bargaining (Table 6), both for the companies and for the sectors, 
with predominating levels of coverage, despite the limitations imposed by 
the most recent labour reform. 
 
Table 6 
Union representation in collective bargaining (2007-2015) 
 
 Agreements Workers Representatives 
No. % No. % No. % 
 
2007 
CC.OO. 3,213 65.1 9,488,000 96.6 10,336 39.0 
UGT 3,213 65.1 9,543,000 97.1 10,063 37.9 
Others 1,585 32.1 2,830,000 28.8 4,480 16.9 
       
Non members 713 14.4 147,000 1.5 1,657 6.2 
Total 4,936 --- 9,825,600 --- 26,536 100. 
2015* 
CC.OO. 1,601 64.0 5,135,800 97.9 8,591 39.8 
UGT 1,593 63.7 5,129,400 97.8 8,382 38.8 
Others 1,043 41.7 1,647,700 31.4 3,694 17.1 
Non members 306 1.2 57,100 10.9 892 4.1 
Total 2,501 --- 5,247,500 --- 21,559 100. 
  Source: CES and Spanish Ministry of Labour 
   (*) Provisional data 
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4. Conclusions 
The associative resources of the unions (membership and representation) 
have revealed indicators that are particularly sensitive in evaluating both 
changes in the labour market environment (structural resources) as well as 
regarding labour relations (institutional resources). A study of their 
structure, evolution and trajectories is therefore quite relevant, particularly 
during periods of crisis. After reviewing the specialized literature on trade 
union membership in Europe, we have identified distinct variables 
(structural, circumstantial, institutional, sociodemographic) according to 
their impact on the same and recent evolution, finding that although there 
has been some generalized weakening the diversity between the main labour 
relation systems remains. In the specific case of Spain, empirical evidence 
allows us to question the clichés existing regarding the inexorable decline of 
unionism since, as we have verified, a major quantitative increase occurred 
during the upward phase of the economic cycle and it was resistant (yet not 
exempt from limits and even contradictions) during the recession, as well as 
on its capacity for adaptation to changes in occupational structure, given its 
membership patterns that are comparable to those of European unionism. 
  
 
From peak to trough: Swedish strikes and lockouts in the 
first half of the twentieth century 
Jesper Hamark1 
 
he Swedish labour market went through a remarkable transition in the 
first half of the last century: from wide-ranging militancy to quiescence. 
My suggestion is that the relative strengths of the three main ideologies 
within the labour movement—communism, syndicalism and social 
democracy—had an impact on the long-term decline in industrial strife. This 
idea is tested by examining quantitative conflict data in relation to intra-
labour power balance. Whenever suitable, I make a distinction between 
strikes and lockouts.2 
I do not disregard other explanations; the phenomenon of work stoppages is 
too complex to be explained by any one factor. But then again, why favour 
ideology? There are countless international studies both on strikes and on 
the labour movement’s ideological evolution. But they hardly ever meet and 
I believe our understanding would improve if they did. 
True, considerable attention has been given to the impact of left-wing 
governance and welfare distribution on strikes.3 But first, the results of these 
                                                
1 Earlier versions of the article were presented at the 38th Annual Conference of the Social 
Science History Association in Chicago, 2013, and the 3rd International Conference on 
Strikes and Social Change in Barcelona, 2015. I am indebted to the participants for their 
constructive remarks. In addition, I am grateful for valuable, critical comments by Klas 
Rönnbäck, Christer Thörnqvist, Sjaak van der Velden and two anonymous referees. 
2 On the common procedure not to separate strikes and lockouts, see VAN DER VELDEN, 
Sjaak. “Lockouts in the Netherlands: Why Statistics on Labour Disputes Must Discriminate 
Between Strikes and Lockouts, and Why New Statistics Need to Be Compiled”. Historical 
Social Research. n.31, 2006, pp. 341-62. 
3  HIBBS, Douglas A. Jr. “On the Political Economy of Long-Run Trends in Strike 
Activity”. British Journal of Political Science. Vol.8, n.2, 1978, pp. 153-75; KORPI, Walter 
and SHALEV, Michael. “Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist 
Societies”. British Journal of Sociology. Vol. 30, n.2, 1979, pp. 164-87; KORPI, Walter and 
T 
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studies are anything but clear-cut4 and second, their focus on labour’s access 
to parliamentary power tends to obscure the fact that “labour” does not form 
an ideological entity.5 
My hypothesis is that ideology makes a difference whether “labour” reaches 
the political echelons or not. If reformism dominates the labour movement, 
conflicts will be fewer than if ideologies endorsing revolution do so. My 
argument questions the most influential interpretation6 of the transformation 
of the Swedish labour market—a hypothesis derived from the power 
resources theory. 
 [The] hypothesis is that to the extent that the working class […] is able 
to achieve strong and stable control over the executive, the conflicts of 
interest between labor and capital will increasingly be fought out in the 
political arena and industrial conflict will decline.7 
According to power resources theorists Walter Korpi and Michael Shalev 
such a shift occurred in Sweden in the mid-1930s. 
I propose that lockouts lost their sting in the second half of the 1920s, 
because of the shifting power balance between the Swedish Confederation 
of Trade Unions, LO, and the Swedish Employers’ Confederation, SAF. 
That said, ideology was by no means marginal for the development of 
lockouts—which were used to target the left opposition within the labour 
movement. Again my proposal is incompatible with the power resources 
                                                                                                                        
SHALEV, Michael. “Strikes, Power, and Politics in the Western Nations, 1900-1976”. 
Political Power and Social Theory. n.1, 1980, pp. 301-34; ROSS, Arthur. M. and 
HARTMAN, Paul T. Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict. New York: Wiley, 1960. 
4 EDWARDS, P. K. “The Political Economy of Industrial Conflict: Britain and the United 
States”. Economic and Industrial Democracy. n.4, 1983, pp. 464-465. 
5 For an elaboration on the ideological tensions within the Swedish labour movement, see 
OLSEN, Gregg M. The Struggle for Economic Democracy in Sweden. Aldershot: Avebury, 
1992, ch. 4. 
6 SWENSON, Peter A. “Solidaritet mellan klasserna Storlockouten och Saltsjöbadsandan”. 
In LUNDH, Christer, ed. Nya perspektiv på Saltsjöbadsavtalet. Stockholm: SNS förlag, 
2009, p. 42. See also e.g. BERGHOLM, Tapio and JONKER-HOFFRÉN, Paul. “Farewell 
to Communist Strike Hypothesis?: The Diversity of Striking in Finland between 1971-
1990”. In DO PAÇO, António Simões, VARELA, Raquel and VAN DER VELDEN, Sjaak, 
eds. Strikes and Social Conflicts: Towards a Global History. 2nd ed.  Lisbon: International 
Association Strikes and Social Conflict, 2012, p. 403; EDWARDS, P.K. “The Political 
Economy of Industrial Conflict: Britain and the United States”. Op. Cit., p. 463; 
FRANZOSI, Roberto. “One Hundred Years of Strike Statistics: Methodological and 
Theoretical Issues in Quantitative Strike Research”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 
Vol. 42, n.3, 1989,  p. 355; FULCHER, James. Labour Movements, Employers, and the 
State: Conflict and Co-operation in Britain and Sweden. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, 
pp. 144-46; HUMPHRIES, Craig. “Explaining Cross-National Variation in Levels of Strike 
Activity”. Comparative Politics. n.22, 1990, pp. 167-84. 
7 KORPI and SHALEV. “Strikes, Power, and Politics in the Western Nations, 1900-1976”.  
Op. Cit., p. 308. 
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hypothesis, PRH, which claims that lockouts ended in the mid-1930s when 
capital was confronted with a left-wing government. 
 Why Sweden? Korpi and Shalev have given it special attention, offering 
this motivation: 
Since Sweden is sometimes considered to be a “prototype of modern 
society”, [it] should be of wider relevance. Moreover, because the level 
of industrial conflict in Sweden has dramatically changed over the years, 
Sweden can be regarded as something of a strategic research site for the 
study of factors influencing the level of industrial strife.8 
There is another, related reason: the PRH “is largely based upon an 
interpretation of the long-term evolution of industrial conflict in Sweden”.9 
In this respect Sweden constitutes a “strategic research site” not only for 
strikes and lockouts as such, but also for the PRH. 
Since I am interested in the long-run development of conflicts, I start at the 
earliest date possible: 1903. This was the year when the Swedish authorities 
started to collect data—data which earlier studies have found to be, first and 
last, of good quality.10 After 1955 the quality deteriorates,11 but for the 
purpose of the present study there is no need to continue after 1950—by that 
time the Swedish labour market was well into quiescence. 
 
Stoppages of work in Sweden 1903-1950: the empirical facts 
There are several ways of measuring strikes and lockouts, but no universal 
agreement on which is preferable.12 I present the three most common 
measurements: frequency, involvement and volume, all given in relation to 
the number of employees.13 
 
                                                
8 KORPI and SHALEV. “Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist 
Societies”. Op. Cit., p. 166. 
9 Ibid., p. 171. 
10 See e.g. MIKKELSEN, Flemming. Arbejdskonflikter i Skandinavien 1848-1980. Odense: 
Odense Universitetsforlag, 1992, p. 441. 
11 THÖRNQVIST, Christer. Arbetarna lämnar fabriken: Strejkrörelser i Sverige under 
efterkrigstiden, deras bakgrund, förlopp och följder. Göteborg: Historiska inst., 1994, p. 91 
12 See e.g. VAN DER VELDEN. “Lockouts in the Netherlands: Why Statistics on Labour 
Disputes Must Discriminate Between Strikes and Lockouts, and Why New Statistics Need 
to Be Compiled”. Op. Cit.  
13 Often the number of non-agricultural employees is used to standardize conflict activity, 
for a discussion see HAMARK, Jesper. Ports, Dock Workers and Labour Market Conflicts. 
Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 2014, p. 41. 
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FIGURE 1 Relative frequency: stoppages of work per million employees. 
Sweden, 1903-1950 
 
Sources: KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM. Arbetsinställelser…  series E:1-E:4; 
SOCIALSTYRELSEN. Arbetsinställelser… 1911-1938*; STATISTICS 
SWEDEN. Statistical Yearbook of Sweden, 1939-1950*; 
http:/historicalstatistics.org/, edited by Rodney Edvinsson. 
* Refer to year of data, not year of publication. 
 
The frequency of stoppages increases in the beginning of the period, but 
drops after the workers’ crushing defeat in the 1909 General Strike (Figure 
1).14 During WWI, the number of stoppages explodes and reaches an all-
time high in 1918. From that time on the trend falls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 HAMARK, Jesper and THÖRNQVIST, Christer. “Docks and Defeat: The 1909 General 
Strike in Sweden and the Role of Port Labour”. Historical Studies in Industrial Relations. 
n.34, 2013. 
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FIGURE 2 Relative involvement: workers involved in stoppages of work 
per thousand employees. Sweden, 1903-1950 
 
 Sources: see Figure 1. 
 
Involvement (Figure 2) and volume (Figure 3) in 1909 by far surpasses 
every other year. During WWI there are increases with new, post-General 
Strike records in 1920 and 1925. From these years onwards the trends 
demonstrate a decline. (The upsurge in 1945 is due to a single strike in 
engineering, discussed below.) 
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FIGURE 3 Relative volume: days lost in stoppages of work per thousand 
employees. Sweden, 1903-1950 
 
 Sources: see Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 4 Relative involvement: workers involved in strikes and 
lockouts/mixed conflicts per thousand employees. Sweden, 1903-1950 
 
Sources: see Figure 1. 
Note: “Mixed” refer to conflicts involving both a strike and a lockout or to 
situations where the parties perceive the character differently. 
 
0 
2000 
4000 
6000 
19
03
 
19
05
 
19
07
 
19
09
 
19
11
 
19
13
 
19
15
 
19
17
 
19
19
 
19
21
 
19
23
 
19
25
 
19
27
 
19
29
 
19
31
 
19
33
 
19
35
 
19
37
 
19
39
 
19
41
 
19
43
 
19
45
 
19
47
 
19
49
 
0 
40 
80 
120 
19
03
 
19
05
 
19
07
 
19
09
 
19
11
 
19
13
 
19
15
 
19
17
 
19
19
 
19
21
 
19
23
 
19
25
 
19
27
 
19
29
 
19
31
 
19
33
 
19
35
 
19
37
 
19
39
 
19
41
 
19
43
 
19
45
 
19
47
 
19
49
 
strikes lockouts and mixed conflicts 
From peak to trough: Swedish strikes and lockouts in the first half of the twentieth century 
 
143	  
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 9, May 2018, p. 137-166 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that lockouts together with mixed conflicts 
constitute an important share of total stoppages in the 1900s and the 
1920s15—but also that major lockouts vanish by the end of the 1920s. Strike 
volume on the other hand reaches post-General Strike record level in the 
early 1930s. 
The high activity during and immediately after WWI was an international 
phenomenon.16 Sweden was ahead of the cycle, probably because it did not 
take an active part in the war, and hence there was less pressure on Swedish 
labour to act “in the interest of the nation”. 
 
FIGURE 5 Relative volume: days lost in strikes and lockouts/mixed 
conflicts per thousand employees. Sweden, 1903-1950 
 
Sources: see Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 The number of lockouts is but a tiny part of total stoppages, and therefore frequency of 
stoppages is of little use to separate. 
16 HIBBS. “On the Political Economy of Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity”. Op. Cit. 
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TABLE 1 Workers involved per conflict, averages. Sweden, 1903-1950 
Character 
Workers 
involved 
strike 147 
lockout 1 074 
mixed 
conflict 569 
Sources: KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM. Arbetsinställelser…  series E:1-E:4. 
Op. Cit.; SOCIALSTYRELSEN. Arbetsinställelser… 1911-1938. Op. Cit.; 
STATISTICS SWEDEN. Statistical Yearbook of Sweden, 1939-1950. Op. 
Cit. 
 
In accordance with theoretical expectations, Table 1 shows that on average a 
lot more workers were involved in lockouts than in strikes. 
 
Industrial strife and ideology 
A few researchers have studied the influence of ideology on strike activity.17 
Nonetheless, this perspective is somewhat of a Cinderella. Roberto 
Franzosi’s thoughtful The Puzzle of Strikes provides an illustration: Franzosi 
gives credit to the complexity of industrial strife and yet, when he 
summarizes different theories on strikes, there is one aspect missing: 
ideology.18 
What is the rationale for arguing that ideology affects strike records? After 
all, except for times of deep political crisis, workers do not strike with the 
aim of replacing the current socio-economic system. Most of the time 
                                                
17 BERGHOLM and JONKER-HOFFRÉN. “Farewell to Communist Strike Hypothesis?: 
The Diversity of Striking in Finland between 1971-1990”. Op. Cit.; HIBBS, Douglas A. Jr. 
“Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies”. The American Political Science 
Review. Vol. 70, 1976, pp. 1033-58; KNOWLES, K. G. J. C. Strikes: A Study in Industrial 
Conflict with Special Reference to British Experience between 1911 and 1947. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1952, ch. 2, section 1; ROSS and HARTMAN.  Changing Patterns of 
Industrial Conflict. Op. Cit., pp. 66-67. For Swedish studies, see OLSSON, Tom. 
Pappersmassestrejken 1932: En studie av facklig ledning och opposition. Lund: Arkiv, 
1980; STRÅTH, Bo. Varvsarbetare i två varvsstäder: En historisk studie av 
verkstadsklubbarna vid varven i Göteborg och Malmö. Göteborg: Sv. Varv, 1982. 
18 FRANZOSI, Roberto. The Puzzle of Strikes: Class and State Strategies in Postwar Italy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 7-12. 
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striking is a costly last resort to achieve a more decent life here and now. 
The rationale is the following: 
Grievances can be assumed to be present at every workplace, but only rarely 
are they transformed into collective action. In the words of Douglas Hibbs, 
“Communist parties [are] important agencies for the mobilization of latent 
discontent and the crystallization of labour-capital cleavages [and they] will 
have a systematic impact on strike activity.”19 The communists’ goal is to 
bury capitalism. It requires massive mobilization. For communists, battles 
within the system provide opportunities to mobilize and to politicize, with 
the objective to transform them into battles against the system.20 
Strikes and intra-labour movement ideologies: Syndicalism 
The reformist-dominated LO, founded in 1898, was challenged in 1910 by 
the syndicalist confederation SAC. SAC practiced decentralization and 
direct democracy, and it declared itself to be a militant organization of class 
struggle.21 The imperative struggle was about property, not about politics, 
and must therefore be conducted in the industrial sphere—where strikes 
were held to be the main means. And yet the individual strikes in 
themselves had little value. Their raison d'être was to provide training 
before the final showdown: the general strike, which would pave the way 
for a social revolution. 
For each work stoppage in 1917-1927, authorities noted whether workers 
were unionized and, if so, in which union(s). This means that SAC strikes 
can be related to total strikes. I have chosen to compare frequency and 
involvement in the first and the last three-year periods.22 In 1917-1919, the 
number of SAC strikes amounted to one-fourth of all strikes. Strike 
frequency fell throughout the 1920s and Table 2 reveals that SAC strikes 
fell even faster: its share shrank to 17% in 1925-1927. SAC’s portion of 
worker involvement also fell, from one-fifth to one-tenth. 
 
                                                
19 HIBBS. “Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies”. Op. Cit., p. 1053. True, 
Hibbs was taking about European communist parties in the 1950s and 1960s—at that time 
“no longer revolutionary in the traditional Marxist sense”. Hibbs’ reasoning will have no 
less relevance when communists were revolutionaries, as in inter-war Sweden. 
20 The same strategy is used by other revolutionary groups (whether labeled communist or 
not), including Swedish syndicalists up to the early 1920s. 
21 PERSSON, Lennart K. Syndikalismen i Sverige 1903-1922. Stockholm: Federativ, 1975, 
pp. 159-60, 170-71; PERSSON, Lennart K. “Revolutionary Syndicalism in Sweden before 
the Second World War”. In VAN DER LINDEN, Marcel and THORPE, Wayne, eds. 
Revolutionary Syndicalism: An International Perspective. Worchester: Scolar Press, 1990, 
pp. 87-92. 
22 Volume is left out because of deficiencies in the individual stoppages of work reports. 
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TABLE 2 Syndicalist (SAC) strikes. Sweden 1917-1927 
 
Frequency  
of strikes 
Workers 
involved  
in strikes 
SAC’s share of  
total strike 
Period SAC Total SAC Total Frequency Involvement 
1917-1919 373 1,540 31,100 165,400 24% 19% 
1925-1927  96   566  4,900   56,100 17%   9% 
Sources: SOCIALSTYRELSEN. Arbetsinställelser… 1911-1938. Op. Cit. 
1917-1919, 1925-1927. 
Note: Strikes where SAC was involved jointly with other unions are counted 
as SAC strikes. 
 
 
SAC’s contribution to total strike activity can be related to its organizational 
size. 
 
TABLE 3 SAC and LO membership. Sweden 1917-1927 
 Members, yearly averages  
Period SAC LO Relation SAC/LO 
1917-
1919 
19,800 222,300 8.9% 
1925-
1927 
35,100 412,700 8.5% 
Sources: KJELLBERG, Anders. Facklig organisering i tolv länder. Lund: 
Arkiv, 1983, p. 269; PERSSON, Lennart K. “Revolutionary Syndicalism in 
Sweden before the Second World War”. In VAN DER LINDEN, Marcel 
and THORPE, Wayne, eds. Revolutionary Syndicalism: An International 
Perspective. Worchester: Scholar Press, 1990, p.85. 
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The number of SAC members in 1917-1919 was 9% of that of LO. During 
the 1920s, SAC’s membership increased and in relation to LO, SAC only 
marginally lost ground. Thus we cannot attribute the drop in absolute and 
relative syndicalist strike activity to a fall in the organizational strength of 
SAC. 
The decline is better understood as an ideological makeover, which started 
slowly in 1918 and continued until 1922. Based on international experience 
of rebellions against capitalism, SAC leaders now claimed that the social 
revolution, still revolutionary in character, must be evolutionary in form. 
Lennart K. Persson has summarized the new deal: 
Socialism could not be realized with a stroke of the pen. It evolved as the 
result of an organic process from below. […] Workers’ power could only 
grow if geared to gaining an ever-increasing control over (and workers’ 
participation in) industry. Step by step, this struggle would finally lead to 
the complete takeover of production and distribution, thus to the 
elimination of all capitalist elements.23 
With this revised ideology it was logical that conflict strategy changed.24 
Now the disadvantages of strikes were stressed, for instance that most of 
them were lost even in the case of victory, since forgone wages were not 
compensated for by pay increases. Instead syndicalist frontrunners promoted 
another means of struggle: the register.25 It was the syndicalist alternative to 
collective agreements and shorthand for SAC’s aim to gradually take 
control of workplaces, raising wages, distributing work and limiting 
competition among its members. Of especial strategic importance was 
increasing industrial control, which was seen as a partial expropriation of 
capital and the way towards complete expropriation. Evolution replaced 
revolution and the register was preferred to striking. 
The emphasis of the negative aspects of strikes by prominent syndicalists 
went so far that in the early 1920s SAC was criticized by the communists 
for being opponents of strikes.26 Opponents or not, the decline in SAC 
strikes fit well with its new ideological/strategic vision. 
 
 
 
                                                
23 PERSSON. “Revolutionary Syndicalism in Sweden before the Second World War”. Op. 
Cit., p. 89. 
24 PERSSON.  Syndikalismen i Sverige 1903-1922. Op. Cit., pp. 204-6, 254, 258-65. 
25 A related English concept is “encroaching control”. 
26 PERSSON. Syndikalismen i Sverige 1903-1922. Op. Cit., p. 254. 
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Power resources 
Before continuing with the other two branches of labour, it is time for an 
interlude: the dominant explanation for the long-run conflict decline. The 
power resources theory, PRT, holds that in the sphere of production, power 
resources27 are varying yet unequally distributed in favour of capitalists.28 
The control of capital is challenged by the workers’ main resources: 
industrial and political organization. It is presumed that the greater the level 
of unionization and the greater the electoral strength of the left, the greater 
are the power resources of the working class. Also assumed important is the 
connection between the union and the political left wing. The PRT suggests 
that the variance in the balance of strength between labour and capital 
affects a range of social outcomes, such as welfare policy and 
unemployment level. 
When labour is strong enough to win governmental power, it can shift the 
focus of class struggle: industrial exchange between the classes is replaced 
by political exchange. With stable, left wing governments able to dictate 
worker-friendly policies, costly strikes lose in attractiveness. Political power 
could be used to “redistribute the result of production [and] the level of 
employment could be raised, reducing the spectre of unemployment”.29 
Consequently, countries experiencing stable, left-wing governments and 
strong unions have seen a long-term downturn in the level of industrial 
strife, as opposed to countries where these conditions have not prevailed.30 
This is the specific PRH, derived from the theory. 
Note that for political exchange to take place, two prerequisites are 
necessary. First, labour’s power within politics must be secure. Only with 
stable left-wing governments, could unions be expected to deliver peace in 
the labour market. (Temporary left-wing governance is assumed to increase 
the level of conflict, since workers will take the opportunity to put 
maximum pressure on friendly, but short-lived governments.) Second, there 
must be substantial coordination between the political and the union branch 
                                                
27 Defined as “the ability of actors to reward and punish other actors”. KORPI and 
SHALEV. “Strikes, Power, and Politics in the Western Nations, 1900-1976”.  Op. Cit., p. 
305. 
28 Ibid.  
29 KORPI, Walter. The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1983, p. 47. 
30 KORPI and SHALEV. “Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist 
Societies”. Op. Cit., pp. 180-84. For similar arguments, see HIBBS. “On the Political 
Economy of Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity”.  Op. Cit., pp. 154, 165; MIKKELSEN. 
Arbejdskonflikter i Skandinavien 1848-1980. Op. Cit., p. 411; ROSS and HARTMAN. 
Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict. Op. Cit., pp. 68, 112; SHORTER, Edward  and 
TILLY, Charles. Strikes in France, 1830-1968. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, 
p. 328. 
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of the labour movement, and the unions must have authority enough to 
discipline their members.31 
 
The power resources hypothesis and the end of Swedish labour market 
conflicts 
According to Korpi and Shalev a sharp drop in the level of labour market 
conflicts in Sweden occurred in the mid-1930s, a few years after the Social 
Democratic Party, SAP, came into office.32 Over two decades ago their 
empirical claim was briefly questioned by James Fulcher who pointed out 
that “strike frequency had been declining steadily since the early 1920s” and 
that “worker-days-lost had been in decline as well”.33 The critique could be 
made more comprehensive. First, Korpi and Shalev might argue that neither 
of the measurements discussed by Fulcher is the most appropriate, since 
they themselves are mainly interested in workers involved.34 Second, even 
though Fulcher speaks of “strikes”, he is really talking about stoppages. A 
sharper critique distinguishes between strikes and lockouts. Third, there is 
an ambiguity in the writings of Korpi and Shalev that has not yet received 
attention: was the labour movement stable in political power in 1932 or only 
in 1936, when the social democrats won their second-in-a-row election? Let 
us start with the ambiguity: 
Sweden had had social democrats in governance before, but the 
“government which came to power in 1932 enjoyed”, state Korpi and 
Shalev, “much stronger electoral backing”.35 This forms the basis for their 
idea that the 1932 government was a stable one (recall: stability is required 
for the switch from the industrial to the political arena to take place): “It 
appears that in these years, the feeling was growing that this time the Social 
Democrats had come to stay in a governing position.”36 Of course, in 
                                                
31 KORPI and SHALEV. “Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist 
Societies”. Op. Cit., pp. 179-80. 
32 Ibid., pp. 168, 171. See also KORPI, Walter. The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: 
Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, pp. 96, 98, 
393-94n; KORPI and SHALEV. “Strikes, Power, and Politics in the Western Nations, 1900-
1976”. Op. Cit., pp. 320-21. 
33 FULCHER. Labour Movements, Employers, and the State: Conflict and Co-operation in 
Britain and Sweden. Op. Cit., pp. 145-46. 
34 KORPI and SHALEV. “Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist 
Societies”. Op. Cit., pp. 176, 186n. 
35 Ibid., p. 171. 
36 Ibid., p. 172. Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson’s biographer, Anders Isaksson, makes a 
different judgment, that the predominant feeling after the 1932 election was that the new 
government would be rather short-lived. See ISAKSSON, Anders. Per Albin, 4: 
Landsfadern. Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 2000, p. 236. 
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retrospect one might claim that the SAP government of 1932 was stable, 
since today we know for a fact that the social democrats won elections for 
an additional 40 years. It is not very convincing, though. 
It appears as if Korpi and Shalev themselves found their line of reasoning 
disturbing. A year after their 1979 article, they wrote that “prior to 1936 
political exchange was not yet a realistic alternative to strike activity for the 
labour movement”37, and according to Shalev it was “the decisive political 
victory of the Social Democrats in 1936 [that] opened up a new ‘conflict 
strategy’ for the Swedish working class”.38 
It should also be noted that the statement about the “much stronger electoral 
backing” of the 1932 government is debatable in itself. When SAP formed 
the government after the 1924 election, the party had 104 seats out of 230 in 
the Second Chamber—incidentally the same relation prevailed after the 
1932 election. Neither in 1924 nor in 1932 did the combined seats of social 
democrats and communists—who could be expected to at least passively 
support a social democratic government—suffice to reach a majority in the 
Second Chamber.39 Without doubt Korpi and Shalev’s later, “1936 version” 
makes much more theoretical sense and I will brace myself against that 
one.40 
Consider first the lockouts. According to Korpi “the well-organized 
Swedish employers had frequently resorted to lockouts […] up to the middle 
of the 1930s. With a Social Democratic government, lockouts became 
difficult to use successfully, and have tended to disappear”.41 But the last 
lockouts of magnitude launched during our period were in 1928, when 
49,000 workers were locked out (53,000 if we also include workers in 
mixed conflicts).42 Between 1929 and 1936, on average 125 (sic) workers a 
year were locked out. The PRH does not do any better if we instead look at 
                                                
37 KORPI and SHALEV. ”Strikes, Power, and Politics in the Western Nations, 1900-1976”. 
Op. Cit., p. 322. Consequently, in a regression with left-wing cabinet seats on workers 
involvement, the independent variable left-wing cabinet seats is set to zero for all years 
before 1936. See also SHALEV, Michael. “Industrial Relations Theory and the 
Comparative Study of Industrial Relations and Industrial Conflict”. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations. Vol. 18, n.1, 1980, p. 31. 
38 Ibid., p. 31. 
39 STATISTISKA CENTRALBYRÅN. Rikdagsmannavalen åren 1929-1932. Stockholm: P. 
A. Norstedt & Söner, 1933, p. 67. 
40 Empirically their initial, theoretically weaker “1932 version” performs better, though still 
rather poorly. 
41 KORPI. The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden. 
Op. Cit., p. 96. 
42 SOCIALSTYRELSEN. Arbetsinställelser… 1911-1938. Op. Cit., p.17. 
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volume. In 1928 there were 3.6 million lockout-days whereas in the 
following years, 1929-1936, there were 47,000 of them—in total.43 
The strike trend also speaks against Korpi and Shalev. Figure 1 reveals that 
the strike frequency44 trend declines throughout the period, and it is hard to 
detect any trend break in the mid-1930s. If anything, there is a break after 
1923 when the rate of decrease in the number of strikes per million 
employees becomes slower. Focusing instead on decrease calculated as a 
percentage, things at first look better for Korpi and Shalev. From this 
perspective, frequency fell faster in the mid-1930s than in almost any other 
period.45 Yet, it should be of little comfort to the PRH. From its peak in 
1918, frequency fell by nearly nine-tenths until 1935.46  The fact that 
frequency, expressed as a percentage, decreased even more on an annual 
basis after 1935 is not important, since the great share of the total decline is 
timed in a way Korpi and Shalev cannot explain. Also, neither of the other 
activity measurements offers the PRH any relief. By the time SAP won their 
second election in 1936, the relative strike volume was just over a quarter of 
the yearly average for 1920-1935, and relative strike involvement was lower 
than in any previous year.47 
 
Strikes and intra-labour movement ideologies: Communism 
The socialist labour movement split in 1917. The strong oppositional 
minority within SAP had become organizationally cornered, and it formed a 
new party in 1921 relabelled the Communist Party of Sweden, SKP, when it 
also became a section of the Comintern. Unlike the syndicalists, SKP 
worked inside the LO-affiliated unions. The specific union tactics changed a 
few times in response to shifts in the policy of Comintern, but the Swedish 
communists were constantly criticizing the LO leadership for being soft on 
capital; they perpetually argued in favour of a more militant union policy, 
and their strategic goal was always to win hegemony within LO. 
The influence of SKP grew during the 1920s and from 1926 onwards one 
could talk about an organized communist opposition. 48  SKP did not 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Strictly speaking stoppages, but see note 15. 
45 KORPI and SHALEV. “Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist 
Societies”. Op. Cit., p. 167; confirmed by my calculations. 
46 SOCIALSTYRELSEN.  Arbetsinställelser… 1911-1938. Op. Cit. 
47 Ibid. 
48 CASPARSSON, Ragnar. LO under fem årtionden, Andra delen: 1924-1948. Stockholm: 
Tiden, 1951, p. 64; DE GEER, Hans. Arbetsgivarna: SAF i tio decennier. Stockholm: 
Svenska arbetsgivareföreningen, 1992, p. 84. 
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dominate any of the national unions, but it controlled one fifth of the local 
branches in unions affiliated to LO. The leaders of LO were concerned: the 
reformist supremacy over the Swedish trade union movement appeared to 
be threatened.49 
By the end of the 1920s, SAP and LO changed their policy vis-à-vis the 
communists: from one of ambivalence, to one of rejection. Anti-
communism became a “comparative advantage” of the social democrats.50 
Communists were threatened by expulsion from LO and in the 1930s the 
threat was realized, when both individuals and local branches were 
banished. The new reformist policy struck a considerable blow to SKP, 
which was split in 1929.51  Moreover, from 1933 onwards the unions 
affiliated to LO all became more centralized: decision-making was removed 
from the members (through referenda) and the local branches to the national 
boards.52 Still being relatively strong at the branch level, but with little 
power on the national boards, the communists lost further influence.53 
In what way did communism affect strike activity? It might well be that 
local branches dominated by communists struck more often than those 
where reformists had hegemony, but since the official statistics do not 
discriminate between conflicts based on the strikers’ ideology, there is no 
easy way to test the idea. Klas Åmark has suggested that the communists 
played an important role in the majority of the larger conflicts from the 
mid-1920s well into the crisis of the 1930s. 54  “Larger” could imply 
involvement or—my choice—volume.55  
 
 
                                                
49 KENNERSTRÖM, Bernt. Mellan två internationaler: Socialistiska Partiet 1929-37.  
Lund: Arkiv för studier i arbetarrörelsens historia, 1974, pp. 20-21. 
50 SCHÜLLERQVIST Bengt. Från kosackval till kohandel: SAP:s väg till makten 1928-33. 
Stockholm: Tiden, 1992, ch. 6-8, and especially pp. 99 and 236n. 
51 As a result, Sweden had two nominal communist parties for a few years: one belonging to 
the Comintern and one trying to maneuver somewhere between reform and revolution—
later relabeled the Socialist Party. Here, “communists” refer to both. 
52  ANDERSSON, Sten. “Kommunisternas ‘makt’ inom svensk politik och 
fackföreningsrörelse: En problematisering av ett spännande forskningsfält”. In 
BLOMBERG Eva, HORGBY, Björn and KVARNSTRÖM, Lars, eds. Makt och moral: En 
vänbok till och med Klas Åmark. Linköping: Avd. för historia, Univ, 1998, p. 253; 
HADENIUS, Axel. Facklig organisationsutveckling: En studie av Landsorganisationen i 
Sverige. Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren. 1976, pp. 125-126. 
53 ÅMARK, Klas. Facklig makt och fackligt medlemskap: De svenska fackförbundens 
medlemsutveckling 1890-1940. Lund: Arkiv förlag, 1986, p. 141. 
54 Ibid., pp. 138, 141. 
55 Volume is more convenient because it allows me to rely mostly on official statistics. For a 
discussion on the alternative use of involvement, see Hamark. Ports, Dock Workers and 
Labour Market Conflicts. Op. Cit., pp. 164-165.  
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TABLE 4 The largest work stoppages by absolute volume. Sweden 1926-
1950  
Trade Year Character Days lost 
engineering 1945 strike 
c.11,000,000-
13,500,00056 
building 1933-34 strike57   3,130,000 
paper pulp58  1928 lockout   2,700,000 
textile 1931 strike   2,100,000 
mining 1928 
strike  
and lockout 
  1,500,000 
paper pulp 1932 strike   1,400,000 
  
Sources: CASPARSSON. LO under fem årtionden, Andra delen: 1924-
1948. Op. Cit., pp. 97-100; SOCIALSTYRELSEN. 
Arbetsinställelser…1911-1938. Op.Cit.; STATISTICS SWEDEN. 
Statistical Yearbook of Sweden, 1939-1950. Op.Cit. My calculations. 
 
Table 4 shows the largest conflicts from 1926 to 1950, from the first year of 
organized communist opposition well into the era of quiescence, in other 
words the period suggested by Åmark is extended. Arbitrarily I have 
included only conflicts with more than 1,000,000 days lost.59 
                                                
56 According to STATISTICS SWEDEN, p. 247, there were in total 11.3 million days lost 
in 1945, whereas a later public inquiry stated that 13.5 million days were lost in the 
engineering strike alone (SOU 1984:19. Arbetsmarknadsstriden II: en kartläggning av 
arbetsmarknadskonflikter i det moderna samhället. Stockholm. 1984, pp. 35, 175—a 
source quoted by KJELLBERG, Anders. “Storkonflikten 1980 och andra stora 
arbetskonflikter i Sverige”. Arbetarhistoria, 138-139, 2011, p. 34). Note that I have used 
the lower estimation in Figure 3 and 5. 
57 The building conflict contained also a lockout. However, SOCIALSTYRELSEN. 
Arbetsinställelser…1911-1938. Op.Cit. does not mention the lockout in its written report 
(pp. 138-43); probably because the lockout was very small in comparison to the strike (p. 
16). 
58 The conflict started in paper pulp mills, but was spread through sympathy lockouts to 
paper- and sawmills. 
59 Apart from one million being a nice number, conflicts below the threshold are not only 
trickier to quantify with precision, but they are also more difficult to assess in terms of the 
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Before discussing the individual conflicts, it is necessary to explain the 
method for assessing communist strength.60 By the end of the 1920s, the 
communists had, according to a study by Lennart Gärdvall, their largest 
influence within paper pulp, mining, sawmilling, building and 
engineering,61 that is, with the exception of the textile sector, all trades listed 
in the table are covered. Although intuitively not a poor indicator of 
communist influence on conflicts, for my purposes it is not sufficient. 
Rather, it must be made credible that the communists affected decisions to 
strike, decisions to keep on striking, and—more generally—decisions to 
turn down settlements with the employers. 
In 1928, the last major inter-war lockout was imposed, targeting wages in 
paper pulp. The Conciliation Commission proposed two settlements, both of 
which were accepted by the negotiators of the Paper Industry Workers’ 
Union, only to be outvoted twice by the members. A proposal to give the 
union’s negotiators authorization to reach a deal “at the table” was also 
turned down in a referendum. The conflict continued until the union 
negotiators accepted (an improved) deal without asking the members. 
According to social democratic trade union historians Torvald Karlbom and 
Ragnar Casparsson, as well as SAF’s magazine Industria, the referenda 
provides evidence for the decisive influence of the communists, organized 
around SKP’s paper Folkets Dagblad Politiken which contained daily 
propaganda against the settlements. It is notable that the union members 
voted “no” despite the fact that the editor of LO’s magazine 
Fackföreningsrörelsen, Sigfrid Hansson, made the issue of authorization 
into a vote of censure.62 
According to Tom Olsson, the communists “acted as leaders” in 1928 but 
“were of only marginal importance” in the 1932 paper pulp conflict.63 He 
backs the statement with an empirical study on the participation in May Day 
                                                                                                                        
ideological balance of power. Partly because there are no individual strike/lockout reports 
after 1927, partly because these smaller conflicts have attracted fewer researchers. 
60 For a longer elaboration, see Hamark. Ports, Dock Workers and Labour Market Conflicts. 
Op. Cit., pp. 36-39. 
61 GÄRDVALL, Lennart. “Facklig opposition: Om arbetarrörelsens fackliga och politiska 
splittring 1917-29”. In ERIKSSON, Maj-Lis, ed. Med eller mot strömmen?: En antologi om 
svenska folkrörelser. Stockholm: Sober Förlags AB, 1980, p. 43. 
62 CASPARSSON.  LO under fem årtionden, Andra delen: 1924-1948. Op. Cit., pp.  95-
102; KARLBOM, Torvald. Pappersindustriarbetarnas fackliga organisationshistoria. 
Stockholm: Tiden, 1945, pp. 239-47.  On communist influence during the conflict, see also 
SWENSON Peter. A. Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and 
Welfare States in the United States and Sweden. Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 96; 
SÖDERBERG, Tom. “Pappersmasseförbundets första halvsekel”.  In 
Pappersmasseförbundet: 1907-1957. Stockholm: PMF, 1957, pp. 83-86. 
63 OLSSON. Pappersmassestrejken 1932: En studie av facklig ledning och opposition. Op. 
Cit., p. 442. 
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demonstrations by the union local branches: did the branches choose to join 
a communist demonstration or not, and did their choices change over the 
years?64 Olsson works with a non-random sample of twenty-one branches, 
1929-1936. Since we aim to reveal a shift between the two conflicts, it is 
more reasonable to compare 1929 and 1932. Between these years, and 
among the seventeen branches Olsson actually reports, one of the branches 
saw definite diminishing communist influence, and in addition one or two 
(depending on one’s judgment) branches experienced a slight decrease. It 
does not strike me as evidence for any serious communist weakening. 
Moreover, the comparison somewhat overestimates the decrease, since 
Olsson chooses to start in 1929 (rather than in 1928) when the communists’ 
prestige had grown in the preceding conflict (as noted by Olsson himself). 
Communism within paper pulp does not seem to have been in too a bad 
shape in 1932. Out of fifteen members in the union’s General Council, four 
were communists and five of the union’s largest local branches had boards 
with a communist majority.65 Of course this says little about changes over 
the preceding years, but it does not align easily with the thought that the 
communists were “marginalized”. 
History repeated itself. As they had to do four years earlier, in 1932 the 
members had to consider two proposals by the Conciliation Commission 
and one on authorization for the union negotiators. Again all three were 
voted down.66 A union ombudsman complained that “the conflict does not 
follow trade union but political lines”, and another explained that the 
majority of the members listened to “the blandishments of the irresponsible” 
rather than to the board’s advice.67 The board blamed the results of the 
referenda on “the communists’ furious agitation and considerable 
influence”. 68  As in 1928, according to Karlbom and Casparsson, 
communism affected the outcome of the referenda.69 Speaking at the time, 
the chairman of LO, Edvard Johansson, explained that the reports in Folkets 
Dagblad Politiken were the reason that the strike had been so drawn-out and 
                                                
64 Ibid., pp. 115-31. 
65 KENNERSTRÖM. Mellan två internationaler: Socialistiska Partiet 1929-37. Op. Cit., p. 
58. 
66 OLSSON. Pappersmassestrejken 1932: En studie av facklig ledning och opposition. Op. 
Cit., pp. 266, 316, 327. 
67 Ibid., p. 312; CASPARSSON.  LO under fem årtionden, Andra delen: 1924-1948. Op. 
Cit., p. 240. My translations. 
68 CASPARSSON. LO under fem årtionden, Andra delen: 1924-1948. Op. Cit., p. 240. My 
translation. See also KARLBOM. Pappersindustriarbetarnas fackliga 
organisationshistoria. Op. Cit., pp. 278, 282. 
69 Ibid. The same judgment was made by an official inquiry, see SOU 1935: 8. Betänkande 
med förslag angående åtgärder mot statsfientlig verksamhet. Stockholm, 1935, p. 396. 
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difficult to solve, and Johansson’s successor, August Lindberg, claimed in 
retrospect that the communists played “a major role” in the 1932 strike.70 
The board of the Paper Industry Workers’ Union had not been too keen on 
striking “but”, Peter Swenson writes, “buckled under pressure from intense 
Communist agitation among the ranks of [the] members”.71 
According to Eva Blomberg, the Miners’ Union gravitated towards 
communism in 1926/1927.72 At the 1927 congress, the communists won a 
couple of important votes and strengthened their position on the new board. 
Björn Horgby claims that the congress was a battle between social 
democrats and challengers from SKP, and that the communists seized 
power.73 While not flawed, the claim needs qualification. The congress was 
warmly reviewed in Folkets Dagblad Politiken.74 Yet, no communist victory 
was declared and the newspaper did not comment upon the constitution of 
the new board, and neither did the social democratic newspapers.75 It is 
possible that the full consequences of the shifting gravity were not evident 
at the time. But social democrats and communists may also have had their 
reasons not to speak too frankly about the congress. Social democracy was 
generally not inclined to admit any influence of SKP. This is particularly 
apparent in the balancing act of Fackföreningsrörelsen: on the one hand it 
devoted considerable space to criticize communism; on the other, it declared 
communism to be of marginal importance. SKP, in turn, was engaged in the 
United Front policy decreed by Comintern, and in line with this policy, it 
was logical to downplay the role of the party.76 
The new board decided to enter into a “Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation” with the Soviet Miners’ Union—a decision met by a storm of 
protests in bourgeois and social democratic press—and it went for a “battle-
against-capital-agenda”, based on the strike weapon.77 Blomberg, who has 
studied the minutes, states that the board wanted a conflict, preferably in the 
                                                
70 KENNERSTRÖM. Mellan två internationaler: Socialistiska Partiet 1929-37. Op. Cit., p. 
64; SVENSKA METALLINDUSTRIARBETAREFÖRBUNDETS STYRELSE. 
Kommunisternas uppträdande och ansvar belyst med stöd av stenografiska protokoll och 
andra dokument. Stockholm: Tiden. 1945, pp. 77-78. 
71 SWENSON. Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare 
States in the United States and Sweden. Op. Cit., p 97. 
72 BLOMBERG, Eva. Män i mörker: Arbetsgivare, reformister och syndikalister: Politik 
och identitet i svensk gruvindustri 1910-1940. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International, 1995, p. 157. 
73 HORGBY, Björn. Kampen om facket: Den socialdemokratiska hegemonins förändringar.  
Umeå: Boréa, 2012, pp. 48-49. 
74 FDP, 31 March 1927. 
75 FDP; Ny Tid; Social-Demokraten; all 30 March 1927. 
76 GÄRDVALL.  “Facklig opposition: Om arbetarrörelsens fackliga och politiska splittring 
1917-29”. Op. Cit., pp. 33ff. 
77 HORGBY. Kampen om facket: Den socialdemokratiska hegemonins förändringar. Op. 
Cit., p. 49. 
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form of a SAF lockout.78 Such an offensive strategy required resources—
which the Soviet counterpart had. 
In 1927 the collective agreements within mining were terminated by 
workers and employers alike. Faced with irreconcilable demands, SAF 
locked out 4,000 workers, starting in early 1928. The union answered by 
declaring an industry-wide strike. It meant that an additional 8,000 
workers79 became involved in the conflict, which was not settled until late 
summer—basically on pre-existing terms. Financially, at least, the Treaty 
paid off: almost half of the vast strike pay came from the Soviet friend and 
co-op.80 
SAC’s summary of the showdown in Arbetaren was perhaps not too far off 
the mark when it claimed that the “communist board” of the Miners’ Union 
had “wanted to show the Western World that it was conceivable—with 
Russian support—to win labour market battles in Western Europe”. 81 
Arbetaren was also correct when it claimed that the Swedish employers 
were equally inclined to show that the workers could not win with Soviet 
help.  
The influence of Marxism within the unions always provoked SAF. The 
employers were prepared to resort to long and costly battles rather than 
offering concessions to workers inspired by communism—a fact which 
helps to explain why some battles became so voluminous.82 As the leading 
industrialist Christian Storjohann declared at a SAF board meeting in 1928: 
the on-going paper pulp conflict was about “fighting the communists and 
the Soviet Union”.83 
Communism appears to have played a marginal role within the Textile 
Workers’ Union.84 On the other hand, when the union declared an industry-
wide strike in early 1931, it had not been affiliated to LO for two decades. 
This might have given the union a higher degree of independence, and it 
seems plausible that it was less affected by social democratic ideology and 
                                                
78 BLOMBERG. Män i mörker: Arbetsgivare, reformister och syndikalister: Politik och 
identitet i svensk gruvindustri 1910-1940. Op. Cit., p. 157. 
79 SAC organized 2,000 miners, they too followed the declaration. 
80 CASPARSSON, Ragnar. Gruvfolk: Svenska gruvindustriarbetareförbundet under fyra 
årtionden: En kort historik utarbetad på förbundets uppdrag. Stockholm: Tiden, 1935, pp. 
214-15. 
81 Arbetaren, 29 August 1928. My translation. See also CASPARSSON. LO under fem 
årtionden, Andra delen: 1924-1948. Op. Cit., p. 214. 
82 Cf. ÅMARK, Klas. “T. Olsson: Pappersmassestrejken 1932” (review). Arbetarhistoria, 
31-32, 1984, p. 115. 
83 SÖDERBERG.  “Pappersmasseförbundets första halvsekel”. Op. Cit., p. 84. 
84 HORGBY. Kampen om facket: Den socialdemokratiska hegemonins förändringar. Op. 
Cit., pp. 134-35, 146, 207. 
158	   Jesper Hamark 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 9, May 2018, p. 137-166 
 
strategy. Yet, the degree of independence should not be exaggerated. 
Fackföreningsrörelsen directed no criticism at the strike, which suggests 
that there was no serious split between LO and the Textile Workers’ 
Union.85 
Three LO-affiliated unions were involved in the building strike that started 
in April 1933, sparked by employers’ demands for wage reductions. The 
three union boards proposed partial strikes targeting only organized 
builders, whereas the communists called for an industry-wide strike.86 The 
prolonged conflict (it did not end until February 1934 when a displeased 
LO87 more or less forced the unions to quit striking—see The end of 
lockouts below) was extended beyond organized builders and in that respect 
the communist line was victorious. 
In August, a first settlement was presented by the Conciliation Commission, 
but was duly rejected in subsequent referenda. 88  SAF perceived the 
communists (and the syndicalists) as “prime instigators of the building 
conflict, especially in agitating for building craftsmen to vote against 
mediated contract proposals”.89 Another indicator of left-wing sway is that 
in Stockholm, where the communists had their stronghold among 
construction workers, union members voted “no” to a much larger degree 
than in the country as a whole.90 Still, it is hard to find convincing evidence 
suggesting that the communists played a decisive role in the conflict.  Most 
likely their influence made the conflict larger and somewhat more 
prolonged, but the bulk of work days would have been lost even without the 
“prime instigators”. 
In absolute volume, the strike launched by the Metal Workers’ Union in 
1945 is the largest in Swedish history. The communists succeeded in getting 
a majority behind offensive wage demands at Metal’s contract conference in 
1944, despite resistance from the board representatives as well as the LO 
leadership. In a subsequent referendum, more than 70% of the workers 
voted to strike, and the board found it politically impossible not to call it. 
After five months the strike was brought to an end, but only after the board 
had overruled a referendum in which workers had decided to continue 
                                                
85 Fackföreningsrörelsen 1931: 91-92, 329-31. 
86 APITZSCH Hartmut. “Socialdemokrater och kommunister i byggbranschen”. Arkiv för 
studier i arbetarrörelsens historia, 2, 1972, pp. 61-62. 
87 With regards to the building strike, LO showed, “nothing but chilly indifference, if not 
outright hostility”. SWENSON. Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets 
and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden. Op. Cit., p. 100.  
88 KUPFERBERG, Feiwel. “Byggstrejken 1933-34”. Arkiv för studier i arbetarrörelsens 
historia. n.2, 1972, p. 49. 
89 SWENSON.  Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare 
States in the United States and Sweden. Op. Cit., p. 108. 
90 APITZSCH.  “Socialdemokrater och kommunister i byggbranschen”. Op. Cit., p. 62. 
From peak to trough: Swedish strikes and lockouts in the first half of the twentieth century 
 
159	  
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 9, May 2018, p. 137-166 
striking.91 Pär-Erik Back, who has written a comprehensive account of the 
conflict, notes that the metal workers had experienced a dismal growth in 
real wages during the war and that they faced an employers’ association 
endowed with “a minimum of psychological touch and a maximum of 
pertinacity”. But the transformation of discontent into overt conflict became 
‘virtually inevitable’, Back claims, only when the political machinery of the 
communist party was directed at engineering, by the end of the war.92 
Organized, disciplined—but also well represented amongst the rank-and-
file—the communists acted as a catalyst. 
In summary: all the conflicts in Table 4 were in different ways played out 
by the side of, or in opposition to, the reformist trade union movement. 
Communists played an important role in four out of the six largest conflicts 
after 1925 (and a minor role in the building strike). The four conflicts 
amount to 48% of total volume in 1926 to 1950. If we confine ourselves to 
the period 1926 to 1935, the corresponding figure is 29%. 
As a yardstick of communist influence, the figures are biased. Downwards 
because (1) the top conflicts are compared to total conflicts, whereas the 
appropriate comparison would have been to look at all conflicts with 
communist influence in relation to total conflicts; because (2) communists 
should probably be partly credited for the voluminous building strike. 
Upwards because work-days to some extent would have been lost even 
without successful left-wing propaganda (at least in the paper pulp 
conflicts). While the exact level could be debated, there seems indeed to 
have been a strong influence of communism on conflict activity. 
 
Strikes and intra-labour movement ideologies: Social Democracy 
In contrast to Korpi and Shalev, I believe that “labour”, i.e. the social 
democratic branch of labour, became interested in labour market peace long 
before conditions prevailed for political exchange. Social democrats had 
taken on a more positive view of tranquillity long before that. 
 
                                                
91 KJELLBERG.  “Storkonflikten 1980 och andra stora arbetskonflikter i Sverige”. Op. 
Cit., p. 34-35; KORPI. The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions and 
Politics in Sweden. Op. Cit., pp. 246-51. 
92 BACK, Pär-Erik. Svenska Metallindustriarbetareförbundets historia 1940-1956: Band 
IV. Quotations on p. 327. My translation. This work is one of only two major studies of the 
conflict. The deep communist influence is stressed also in the other study, see TRESLOW, 
Kjell. Verkstadsstrejken 1945: En studie av arbetsmarknadens förhandlingssystem vid 
konflikt. Stockholm: Stockholms universitet, 1972, pp. 113-21. 
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FIGURE 6 Relative volume: days lost in stoppages of work per thousand 
employees. Sweden, 1917-1939. Excluding larger, non-LO-approved 
conflicts.93 
 
 Sources: see Figure 1 and Table 4. 
 
Figure 6 is identical to Figure 3 with the difference that a shorter period is 
shown and that the conflicts listed in Table 4 have been subtracted. Thus 
Figure 6 gives a crude illustration of “LO-approved days lost”. Notable is 
the downward shift after 1923 or, at the very latest, after 1925—a full 
decade before Korpi and Shalev’s political exchange. 
In 1928, the Labour Peace Conference was held. The right-wing 
government hosted the event, inviting representatives from both labour and 
capital. Two questions were at the centre of attention: the end of conflicts 
and rationalization within industry. SAF’s summary of the conference was 
generally positive, since most of the speakers from the labour side 
“fearlessly declared their consensus line”.94 But the consensus line of LO 
was not a sudden whim. LO had, according to Anders L. Johansson, 
“already from the early 1920s touched on the idea that government, 
employers and trade union movement would take some form of shared 
responsibility for the rationalization process”.95 In the 1910s, labour was 
                                                
93 The excluded conflicts are the ones listed in Table 4 (with the exception of the 1945 
engineering strike, which falls outside the period shown here). 
94  JOHANSSON, Anders L. Tillväxt och klass-samarbete: En studie av den svenska 
modellens uppkomst. Stockholm: Tiden, 1989, p. 74. See also CASPARSSON. LO under 
fem årtionden, Andra delen: 1924-1948. Op. Cit., pp. 140-52. 
95  JOHANSSON. Tillväxt och klass-samarbete: En studie av den svenska modellens 
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generally hostile to Taylorism, but in the early 1920s this changed within 
the social democratic branch. For instance, in 1922, Fackföreningsrörelsen 
declared that Taylor himself was in fact in favour of workers, although 
Taylorism as actually implemented had had its flaws.96 
Another factor explaining the LO leadership’s increasingly reluctant attitude 
to strikes may be a revised version of the PRH. Between March 1920 and 
June 1926, Sweden had seven governments. Four of them were social 
democratic, possessing governance in 44 out of 75 months. Perhaps, to 
quote Korpi and Shalev’s assessment of the 1930s, “the feeling was growing 
[that] the Social Democrats had come to stay in a governing position”? If so, 
I endorse the logic that reformist union leaders thought about shifting 
battlefields from industry to politics. Of course these governments proved to 
be non-stable. But at that time, who could tell? 
 
The end of lockouts. Managerial strategy and intra-labour movement 
ideologies 
The union movement grew rapidly at the end of the nineteenth century and 
in 1898 several national unions founded LO. Triggered by labour unity, the 
employers also organized. Just a few years after its establishment in 1902, 
SAF became a highly centralized, attacking organization: every lockout 
initiative from the member companies was to be approved by the board of 
directors, and sympathy lockouts were used as offensive weapons in wage 
negotiations. But the effectiveness of secondary action rested on a critical 
precondition.97 Without a centralized union movement, there would be no 
body to punish effectively in the case of subversive behaviour; no one 
whose strike fund SAF could threaten to empty. SAF needed a strong LO, 
yet not too strong. 
Lockouts had occurred already in the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
but with the birth of employers’ associations they became much more 
forceful. The first major clash came in 1905 when a large strike by metal 
workers was answered with an even larger lockout. Even though the final 
                                                                                                                        
uppkomst. Op. Cit., p. 54. My translation. See also OLSSON. Pappersmassestrejken 1932: 
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agreement was a “resounding success for employers”,98 the full potential of 
the lockout was only to be shown the following year. Eight firms were hit 
by strikes, to varying degrees defying managerial prerogatives, and in 
response SAF threatened to shut down just about half of Sweden’s 
manufacturing industry. It had immediate results: LO warded off the lockout 
by accepting the employers’ right to manage, formalized in the December 
Compromise of 1906.99 From that time on, the union tactic of “whipsawing 
employers, picking them off one at a time”100 became dangerous: almost 
any strike could be answered by a full-scale lockout. According to statutes, 
the unions were obliged to pay out support to all members locked out—and 
when a certain share of members in an affiliated union were locked out, LO 
had to pay. The employer strategy threatened to empty the strike funds. 
After the 1909 General Strike, the employers could, according to the SAF 
chairman Hjalmar von Sydow, have used the opportunity to crush LO 
“without difficulty”. 101  Yet they did not. The alternative to LO was 
syndicalist unions—much less sensitive to lockouts, since they neither had a 
centralized fund, nor distributed strike or lockout support. 102  The 
effectiveness of the lockout saved LO. 
Strike activity hit rock bottom in the first half of the 1910s and the 
employers made little use of the lockout: with workers already disciplined, 
there was no need. When strike activity began to climb, wartime pressure 
made it difficult for the employers to respond forcefully. The full-scale 
lockout returned after the war, with massive conflicts in 1920, 1923 and 
1925. The last one was the largest since 1909, involving 100,000 workers. 
But despite the fact that business cycle conditions did not favour the 
workers, the conflict ended quickly and in a draw. 103 Something had 
changed. 
In 1909, the employers’ associations were potentially able to lockout a 
number of workers corresponding to the total union membership. But the 
situation would gradually shift: the employers’ associations continued to 
mainly organize companies within private-owned manufacturing, whereas 
LO increasingly became the representative of the entire working class. In 
1930, SAF could lockout a number of workers matching only half the total 
union membership.104 It meant that large groups of workers could contribute 
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to the strike fund even if SAF blasted off the largest possible lockout. von 
Sydow appreciated the problem in 1928 when he declared that LO had the 
financial resources to withstand much longer lockouts than before. 105 
Hansson made the same analysis in LO’s magazine.106 The lockout had 
become less effective, and with only a few exceptions the use of it ended. 
True, SAF threatened to use the lockout even after 1928, most importantly 
during the 1933-34 building strike. For the newly elected social democrats 
the strike was particularly unfortunate since it threatened the government’s 
programme for economic recovery. LO was as pleased with the strike as the 
government, but had too little authority to put an end to it. In the winter of 
1933-34 SAF decided to threaten LO with the largest lockout ever, 
embracing 200,000 workers. SAF speculated that the government would 
respond to the escalation with compulsory arbitration but if not, LO would 
be stuck paying out money to locked out workers in a conflict it did not 
believe in. SAF further calculated that LO would try to avoid both 
scenarios. In February 1934, LO succeeded in persuading its affiliated 
unions to retreat and to accept employers’ demands for wage reductions.107 
As argued by Swenson, SAF and LO had a common interest in curbing 
workers in the building trades: both organizations were displeased with the 
relatively high wage level and both wanted to knock out syndicalism and 
communism. The SAF leaders calculated correctly: the lockout did not 
materialize; the mere threat gave LO an excuse to intervene. 
Swenson argues that the lockout was as strong as ever in the 1930s.108 But 
there is a world of difference between lockouts targeting LO and (the threat 
of) “friendly”—Swenson’s own label—lockouts hitting the common enemy 
of SAF and LO. 
My interpretation is that the balance of power between SAF and LO had 
shifted in favour of LO in the late 1920s. Therefore lockouts targeting LO 
ceased. Yet SAF continued to make use of, or rather threatened to make use 
of, “LO-friendly” lockouts with the aims of pressing down wages in 
“sheltered” industries such as building, and smashing the left opposition 
within the labour movement. Feiwel Kupferberg has stressed the 
government’s role in forcing peace upon the construction workers, and his 
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conclusion is antithetical to the PRH: the lockout threat was successful 
because of the labour government, not despite of it.109 
 
Conclusion 
The most prevalent narrative on the transformation of Sweden from a high-
conflict country to one of quiescence is associated with the power resources 
hypothesis: the seizure of governmental power by social democracy in the 
1930s gave the working class the opportunity to shift from costly strikes 
within the industrial sphere to less costly redistributive policies within the 
political sphere. But the timing of conflicts does not favour the hypothesis. 
Governmental stability is presumed necessary for the shift to occur, but 
when SAP won their second-in-a-row election in 1936 there is little decline 
left to explain—visibly illustrated by the fact that the number of workers 
involved in strikes and lockouts reached an all-time-low that year. Stable 
reformist possession of parliamentary power may well have contributed to 
keep conflicts low. But we have to look elsewhere to find out why they 
became low in the first place. 
A full account of the decline in Swedish militancy requires in-depth studies 
of a range of topics: development of collective agreements, labour law and 
work processes; gender division of labour; tensions between export and 
home market industries; impact of strike-breaking on workers’ moral; 
structural change in the Swedish economy, etc. I have settled for a less 
ambitious task: to investigate the impact of workers’ ideology and of 
managerial strategy on conflicts. 
The development of lockouts was affected by the balance of power between 
SAF and LO. Major sympathy lockouts ended after 1928, at a time when 
LO had the numerical strength and the financial resources to handle much 
longer conflicts than before. True, SAF continued to make use of the large-
scale lockout as a threat in the 1930s, but by then LO was no longer the real 
target. Instead the target was high wages in “sheltered” industries and the 
left opposition within the labour movement. 
By the end of the 1910s, strikes led by the syndicalist confederation, SAC, 
constituted a large proportion of total strikes, measured both as frequency 
and involvement. In the 1920s, SAC strikes fell sharply in absolute as well 
as in relative terms. The fall can be attributed to a twin change in ideology 
and strategy. In just a few years leading Swedish syndicalists went from 
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advocating strikes to preferring gradual expropriation of the companies, a 
method of struggle that corresponded to the view that socialism could only 
be achieved by an evolutionary path. 
In contrast to the syndicalists, the communists worked inside the reformist-
dominated unions. After 1925, communist influence on conflict volume was 
huge: several times the communists succeeded in getting a majority in 
favour of striking or for continuing striking, in direct confrontation with the 
social democratic union leadership.110 Without communism, Sweden would 
have a lesser reputation as a country of industrial militancy. A couple of 
years into the 1930s, the communists lost ground and major conflicts 
became less frequent. By the end of WWII, the communists gained a very 
temporary initiative within the union movement, an initiative which 
nonetheless resulted in the largest Swedish strike ever, measured by 
absolute volume. In addition, the duration of communist-influenced 
conflicts was partly a function of the employers’, and foremost SAF’s, 
reactions. For pedagogical reasons, workers must never be allowed to win 
such conflicts. 
Most of the time, striking is a costly last resort to achieve a more decent life 
here and now. Why, then, should we expect revolutionaries to affect strike 
rates? Because, to the communists—and to the syndicalists until the early 
1920s—battles within the system provided opportunities to mobilize and to 
politicize, with the objective to transform them into battles against the 
system. But the root causes of the conflicts are not to be found in the 
communists and their machinations, even though this is a pretty standard 
interpretation. 111  Agitators, communist or not, play their part, but as 
Knowles once remarked: “one cannot agitate successfully without 
widespread grievances”.112 
One of the causes of the communist twilight in 1930s was a general trend 
towards centralization within the LO-affiliated unions. Such centralization is 
sometimes described as part of an institutional solution to the strike 
“problem”.113 True, moving influence from the rank-and-file to the union 
leadership reduces strike frequency—given that the leadership has enough 
moral authority. But there is no inherent logic that centralization also 
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reduces involvement or volume. In the Swedish case, where decision-
making was relocated from communist-dominated local branches and union 
referenda (in which the communists won majority in several critical cases) 
to national boards dominated by social democrats, it meant less strike 
activity. The point is that the “institutional fix” cannot be isolated from the 
ideological balance. 
Not only did syndicalism change its attitude towards conflicts, so did social 
democracy. If we subtract non-LO-approved conflicts, there is a manifest 
fall in the level of conflict even after 1923, measured by volume. In 1928 
the Labour Peace Conference was held, at which representatives for SAF, 
LO and the government discussed how to end conflicts and how to 
rationalize industry. But even in the early 1920s, LO had had the idea that 
the three parties should take shared responsibility for the rationalization 
process. Taylorism was reassessed and step by step the leaders of the union 
confederation came to see productivity improvements rather than industrial 
militancy as the way to increase workers’ living standards. Another factor 
explaining the trade union leadership’s increasingly reluctant attitude 
towards strikes might be a revised version of Korpi and Shalev. From 1920 
to 1926, Sweden had several short-lived governments; for most of the 
period these were social democratic. Perhaps even then the feeling was 
growing that the parliamentary future belonged to social democrats. If so, 
there is a definite logic that reformist union leaders thought about changing 
the locus of class conflict: from costly strikes within the industrial sphere to 
less costly redistributive policies within the political sphere. 
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